FACETS OF INDIAN RELIGIO-PHILOSOPHIC IDENTITY

HARSH NARAIN

About The Book

The *Facets of Indian Religio-Philosophic Identity*: is comprised of material, published and unpublished, designed to throw into relief some of the fundamental facets and dimensions of substantive Indian dharmic (religiopilosophic) thought-system. It seeks to analyze the vision of the founding fathers of Indian thought, trace the evolution of the various schools of Indian philosophy, determine the role of reason and what lies beyond, bring out the dialectical character of philosophy called Anvikšiki, probe the meaning and implications of the dharmic mode of existence, propound the microcosmic concept of man, make out a case for the theory of levels of truth, trace the Vedic origins of such traditions of supposedly non-Vedic origin as Sramana and Sankhya, and determine the nature of religious language. The book also examines the contributions of two recent Indian thinkers representative of substantive Indian outlook. It closes with a criticism of contemporary trends in Indian philosophy on the score of its alienation from its moorings.

The book is a significant contribution not only to the history of ideas but also, and rather more so, to the study of certain fundamentals of substantive Indian thought which tend to go by default at our universities.

Rs 100.00

FACETS OF INDIAN RELIGIO-PHILOSOPHIC IDENTITY

Facets of Indian Religio-Philosophic Identity

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To

my son Vivek Vardhan

PROLOGUE

The *Facets of Indian Religio-Philosophic Identity* is comprised of material, published and unpublished, designed to throw into relief some of the fundamental facets and dimensions of Indian dharmic (religio-philosophic) thought-system. It is an attempt, howsoever feeble, to bring into focus the dharmic bedrock of Indian thought.

Part of the material in this work appeared in the form of papers in different journals and other publications and presented at different seminars and conferences, while the rest is being presented for the first time. But all of it was produced with only one end in view, which is, to highlight selected aspects of the groundwork of Indian thought.

In such a work, repetition here and there of points and sometimes even passage is unavoidable. We would, therefore, crave the indulgence of our readers if they feel irked by some such repetition. We will take care of it in the next edition.

For certain reasons, this volume has had to be brought out in a hurry, with the result that it has quite a few errors of proof. The author could not find time to check even its final proofs. There are certain other shortcomings in the work pertaining to make-up etc., of which we are acutely conscious.

The original versions of Chapters IV, V, VII, X, XI, XII, XIV, and XV appeared in *Ānvīkṣikī* (Banaras Hindu University), VI, 3; *Ludwik Sternbach Felicitation Volume* (Akhila Bharatiya Sanskrit Parishad, Lucknow); *Indian Philosophical Annual* (Madras University); *Sambodhi* (L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad); *Religious Language*, N.S.S. Raman & K.N. Mishra, eds. (Banaras Hindu University); *Prajnā*, XVIII, I (Banaras University); *Dr. Bhagawan Das Centenary Volume*, Raja Ram Shastri & N. K. Devaraja, eds. (Kashi Vidyapith, Varanasi); and *Ānvīkṣikī*, VI I;

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It is also gratefully acknowledged that the North-Eastern Hill University, Shillong, was kind enough to sanction partial financial assistance for the publication of this book.

Practically all proof-reading of the entire book was done by my dear son. Vivek Vardhan, amidst his already extremely busy schedule. We had absolutely no time for it, and, had he not come to my succour, the book would not have seen the light of day. We cannot forget to record my deep debt of gratitude to him.

We also feel beholden to Professor N. K. Devaraja for the interest shown by him in the publication of this work.

CHAPTER I

THE MEANING OF 'INDIAN RELIGIO-PHILOSOPHIC IDENTITY'

As its title indicates, this work is devoted to a delineation of some of the fundamental facets of Indian religio-philosophic identity. The expression 'religio-philosophic' is likely to mislead one into believing that the work purports to deal the different religions and philosophies that are flourishing or have flourished on the Indian soil. It is not going to do anything of the sort. Its burden is to analyse some of the radical presuppositions of India's religious and philosophical traditions in general and the structure of her core thought-system. The presuppositions form part of what I call substantive Indian cultural tradition, which is picturesquely summed up in the term 'dharma'. And it is 'dharmic', the adjective of 'dharma' for which the expression 'religio-philosophic' is used here, for want of a better English equivalent.

Our treatment is confined by and large to the mainstream of religio-philosophic thought which has been sweeping over the undivided Indian subcontinent since the inception of the Vedas as its fountainhead. For the same reason, we have not thought it fit to delve into non-Vedic development, which have not much to do with India's core thought-system.

The scope cf this work is too limited to permit inclusion of developments in Semitic thought on the Indian soil A comprehensive account of thought must to be sure, notice of the thought of Indian nationals of all persuations. Not only this : We are prepared to acknowledge that it should take notice also of the thought of a foreign national doing typically non-Indian philosophy here or abroad, of an Indian national doing typically non-Indian—say Western, West Asian, East Asian—philosophy here or abroad, and of an Indian national founding an altogether new philosophical traditions radically different from the known philosophical traditions (if it be possible). But this is only one side of the picture : there is one more side to it, which is more germane to our enquiry.

The foregoing is a quantitative view of Indian thought, based on geo-political, demographical, and national considerations. There can be and is a qualitative or typal view of it as well, which delimits the subject-matter of this work. Philosophy is usually done the context of a culture, as part of a cultural traditon, against the background of a culture, never in vacuo. An authentic philosophy is the quintessence of a culture, the self-consciousness of a culture, and is hence culture-bound, tradition-bound, to a considerable extent. It is not tantamount to denying cross-cultural dimensions to philosophy, however Every cultural tradition has universal side by side with individual elements. What we mean to suggest is that, since philosophy articulates the presupposions of a culture, it must bear the stamp of the culture. And it is this stamp which gives it its qualitative/typal name. A culture or cultural tradition is not necessarily national, not necessarily confined to a geographical unit; it may cut across national and geographical boundaries and become truly international. It is in this sense that Sir Muhammad Iqbal, the great Muslim philosopher of undivided India proclaims that Islam is his country :

Islām terā desa hai, tū muṣtafawī hai

He identified himself with Hedjaz, the cradle of Islam, rather than with India. It is, indeed, his loyalty, to the Islamic tradition that makes him look beyond the Indian horizon. Thus, although he remain an Indian philosopher, or Pakistani philosopher, historiographically speaking, he is essentially, qualitatively, or typally an Islamic philosopher. For the same reason, qualitatively speaking, Indian philosophy is such philosophy as is done in the Indian cultural context, as part of the Indian cultural tradition, against the background of the movement of Indian thought, no matter who does it and where. That is why our account excludes what ever Semitic religio-philosophic thought has grown on the Indian soil.

There are simple cultures as well as advanced culture. Tribal or primitve[1] cultures are simple, monolithic cultures. Advance

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1. '*Primitive, pagan,* and *savage* are, then, three perfectly respectable words...Therefore, I see no reason for abandoning the word, as is periodically suggested...' Stanley Diamond, *In Search of the Primitive* : A Critique of Civilization (New

cultures are complex and pluralistic. Simple cultures are fairly integrated within themselves. Advanced cultures attain integration on a broad scale, often as happens in Europe and America, cross-culturally. They have different levels of integration-subnational, national, and sometimes even international. Religion, an integrating force within a culture, often tends to overflow it. The defining characteristics of a culture are its levels of integration marked by persistent patterns, constants, and emphases. A river is known by its mainstream rather than by its sub-streams fed by its tributaries. A mango-orchard is defined by its mango-trees rather than by its herbage. A forest is usually known by its trees rather than by its undrgrowth. It is true, however, that its undergrowth becomes fairly important, sometimes as important as or even more important than, its trees, in which case the forest may begin to be known by its undergrowth as well.

Following the foregoing considerations, it is fairly easy for one to define and delimit Indian religio-philosophic identity. And this is the rationale of our approach in this work.

Today, cultures have begun to surrender their identities to what is called world-culture, which has begum to grow up fast. In the process, many a cultural identity is doomed to extinction. We have reason to believe, however, that the identity of substantive Indian culture has the potentiality of playing a vital role in shaping the identity of the world-culture. And this work is intended to sample the religio-philosophic dimension of Indian cultural identity.

To this end, the work seeks to analyze the vision of the founding fathers of Indian thought, trace the evolution of the various

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Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1974), pp. 125-126. The literal meaning of 'primitive' is 'ancient' and of 'savage', 'living in the woods' or 'close to nature'. We prefer the meaning of 'primitive' suggested by Paul David Devanadan : 'being nearer the line of demarcation between Man the animal and Man the animal-plus'. See his *The Coneept of Maya* (London : Luttorworth Press, 1950), p. 17.

schools of Indian philosophy, detrmine the role of reason and what lies beyond, bring out the dialectical character of philosophy called Ānvīkṣikī in Indian parlance, probe the meaning and implications of the dharmic mode of existence, profound the microcosmic concept of man, make out a case for the theory of levels of truth, trace of Vedic origins of such traditions of supposedly non-Vedic origin as Śramaṇa and Sāṅkhya and determine the nature of religious language. The work also examines the contributions of two recent Indian philosophers representative of substantive Indian outlook. It closes with a criticism of contemporary trends in Indian philosophy on the score of their alienation from their moorings at the expense of authenticity. The book purports to be a significant contribution not only to the history of ideas but also, and rather more so, to the study of certain fudamentals of substantive Indian thought which tend to go by default in the curricula of our universities.

The topics dealt with in this work by no means exhaust the subject-matter of Indian religio-philosophic identity. They are simply illustrative of the way the subject has to be approached.

The culture of any particular tradition is seen in contrast to cultures of other traditions. This tendency, essentially skin to the Buddhist logicians' theory of apoha (identification, determination of identity, determination of meaning, through negation of negation), appears to be at the root of our sense of identity of a culture. But we can not undertake detailed comparison and contrast among the various cultures in this work. We shall see that Indian culture has been self-identical down the ages in definite fundamental respects in such a conspicuous manner that comparison and contrast will dawn upon the reader's mind even without formal statement thereof.

Sustenance or continutity, continuous cognizability, and/or recognizability can be said to be the descriptive characteristics of identity. This way, too, we are not unjustified in confining our treatment to the mainstream of Indian thought, which alone has the capacity of engendering in us the sense of identity of Indian thought.

Our qualitative notion of identity or self-identity is broadly akin to the *Gītā* concepts of sva-bhāva, sva-dharma, and svakarman,

translating, respectively. as self-being/self-identity, self-nature/self-essence, and self-works-or, to put them otherwise, own-being/own-identity, own-nature/own essence, and own-work.

One of the chief factors determining the identity and individuality of Indian religio-philosophic thought is its systematization and institutionalization of human values, called Puruṣārtha. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, the leading Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher of about 1000 A D., asserts that the seemingly warring religio-philosophic traditions become harmonized in so far as they propound Puruṣārtha (Āgamānāṁ virodho 'pi nātīva Vidyate pramāṇāṁ puruṣārthe sarveṣām a-vivādāt).[1] Let us see in passing what Puruṣārtha mean.

Literally speaking, Puruṣārtha means human value. Values are of two kinds : desiderata and goods. The scheme of Puruṣārtha highlights the latter. Now, goods are of two kinds : some belonging to the utilitarian order and the rest to the trans-utilitarian order. Of these, the former are of two kinds : Art (necessaries) and Kāma (luxuries). The latter, too, are of two kinds : Dharma (Abhyudaya, elevation, transcendence) and Mokṣa (Niśreyas, integration, the summum bonum, or, in the words of Radhakrishna, 'a triumphant passage from the historical to the superhistorical'). Hiriyanna translates them, respectively, as (1) the useful, the economic good. (2) the pleasant, the hedonistic good, (3) the moral, the moral good, and (4) the spiritual, the spiritual good. In sum, the fourfold scheme of the goods (puruṣārtha-catuṣṭaya, catur-verga) can be represented as under :

1. Artha =necessaries, the useful, the economic good (upa-yoga)
2. Kāma =luxuries, the pleasant, the hedonistic good (upa-bhoga)
3. Dharma =Abhyudaya, elevation, transcendence, the moral, the moral good (karma-yoga)

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1. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, *Nyaya-Mañjarī*, Pramāṇa-Prakaraṇa, p. 244.

4. Mokṣa =Niśreyas, integration, the summum bonum, passage from the historical to the superhistorical, the spiritual, the spiritual good (Brahma-yoga)[1]

Manu, followed by certain others, rules that Artha, Kāma, and Dharma have to be purused together,[2] otherwise, let us add, they will turn into animal values (paśvartha).

Without going into further details, we can very well see that this scheme accords full recognition to earthly values side by side with heavenly ones. As a matter of fact. Manu sounds a clear note of warning to those who think of pursuing Mokṣa without first having purused the other three goods. In his parlance, such persons go to hell.[3]

Lastly, Mokṣa is not a variety on object of Kāma. For one thing, they belong to different orders, and, for another, it is maintained that Mokṣa will not dawn till the desire even therefor is given up.[4] Indeed, Yaśodhara, the commentator of the *Kama-Sūtra*, pays obeisance to Artha, Kāma, and Dharma *once*; *repeated* obeisance to those who desire them, especially along with Mokṣa; but *unlimted* obeisance to those who are free from all desire.[5]

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1. *Gīta* 5.21
2. *Manu-Smṛti* 2.224; 2.13; 4.176; *Kāma-Sūtra* 1.2.1; *Artha-Śāstra* 1.7.6,
3. *Manu-Smṛti* 6.25-37
4. *Muktikā-Upaniṣad* 2.68; *Sannyāsa-Upaniṣad* 2.12; *Mahābhārta* śānti-Parvan 331. .4.
5. Yasodhara, *Kānasūtra-Jayamaṅgalā*, the opening verse.

CHAPTER II

THE STRUCTURE OF PRIMITIVE VISION

In order to catch its inner spirit or meaning, struggling, like that of any other religion, to be expressed but never fully expressed at any particular stage of its development, we are required to interpret Hinduism 'according to its meaning and not its lisping expression', as Aristotle has remarked vis-a-vis Empedocles.[1] Of course, Hinduism is neither a treasure-chest nor a treasure-trove, to turn to for ready-made gold ; it is a veritable mine to be dug deep for gold rejecting a lot of rubbish in which it is lost. It was said of Mīr Taqī Mīr, one of the master-builders of Urdu poetry, that what was lofty in him was lofty in the extreme and that what was low in him was low in the extreme (buland-ash ba-ghāyat buland wa past-ash ba-ghāyat past).[2] The remark befits Hinduism eminently. Says Hegel, 'The Hindu mythology takes us abruptly from the Meanest to the Highest, from the most sublime to the most disgusting and trivial'.[3] Here, as Al-Bīrūnī, the greatest Indologist of mediaeval times, was the first to notice, people are prone to intermingle the sublime and the mean even as children tend to intermingle precious pearls and potsherds. 'I can only compare', says he, 'their (the Hindus) mathematical and astronomical literature...to a mixture of pearl

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1. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 985a.
2. Cp. 'Our greatest poets, Isaac Disraeli remarked (in *Curiosities of Literature*), Shakespeare and Drydon, are those who have produced the worst lines'. Cesare Lombroso, *The Man of Genius*, p 24. Of Cowper, Lombroso writes: 'It was singular, he remarked, that his most comic verses were written in his saddest moments, without which he would probably never have written them.' Loc. cit.
3. G.W.F. Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, p. 155. Cp. 'personal inequality, or, according to modern terminology, double, or even contrary, personality, is one of the characters of genius.' Lombroso, p. 24.

shells and sour dates, or of pearls and dung, or of costly crystals and common pebbles.'[1] Here, for example, a Śaṅkara would storm the world with the challenging declaration that all is Brahman but, a moment after, approve the death-sentence, passed on the Śūdra by certain canonical texts,[2] for learning the Vedas.[3] Likewise, one Hindu tradition establishes a relation of companionship, consubstantiality, or complete identity between Viṣṇu and Śiva,[4] while another holds them so inimical to each other that the very sight of Viṣṇu (-image) is tantamount to enmity with Śiva and that, according to the *Sūta-Saṁhitā*—believe it or not—, gleefully butchering the devotees of Viṣṇu constitutes real devotion to Śiva.[5] Such examples can, indeed, be multiplied indefinitely.

It is also significant that some of the finest products of Hinduism owe their existence to relatively mean situations. The great *Gītā* was delivered to the world for no worthier cause than to drive the doubting Arjuna into an internecine war. The entire greatness of Rāma, which unfolded itself in different situations afterwards, hangs on the slender thread of his undiscerning obedience to his hen-pecked father. It is not for nothing that such a lovely flower as lotus, which has such a low origin as mud from which it derives one of its names in Sanskrit, viz. paṅka-ja (literally, born of mud), has all along been such a favourite symbol of Hinduism.

Certainly, Hinduism is a jungle, not a garden ; a phenomenon of nature, not a work of art ; a creation of God, not a creation of man—so to speak. Taking liberties with philoso-

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1. *Albīrūnī's India*, Edward C. Sachau, tr., Vol. 1, p. 25.
2. *Gautama-Dharma-Sūtra* 2.3.4.
3. Śaṅkara, *Śārīraka-Bhāṣya* 1.3.38, p. 280. Significantly enough, Śaṅkara was taken ro task by Śūdra for despising the latter and thereby giving the lie to his professions of non-dualism. See Mādhava, *Śaṅkara-Digvijaya* 6.25.?8.
4. See, for example, *Mahābhārata*, Vana-Parvan 39.76; Śānti-Parvan 341-27; *Padma-Purāṇa*, Sṛṣṭi-Khaṇḍa 23.60; *Skānda-Upaniṣad* 6-10.
5. *Sūta-Saṁhitā* 4.18.48-54; 4.26.26-29.

phical terminology, it is a-pauruṣeya (not ascribable to a person, human or divine), not pauruṣeya (ascribable to a person, human or divine). It is sublime as well as the mean both in the extreme, even as nature is rosy as well as red in tooth and claw, light as well as shade, life as well as death, in the extreme. It is a great matrix, a broad canvas, from which scores of religions (as also irreligions, to be sure) were, are being, and will be carved out. Asghar Gonḍwi, a great modern Urdu poet, has well sung: 'O Shaykh (Preacher)! how vast is the reality that is 'kufr' (paganism), which certain restrictions and rituals made into a faith, a religion!:

> Ay Shaykh! woh basīṭ ḥaqīqat ḥai kufr kī
> Kuchh qayd-o rasm ne jise īmān banā diya

That Hinduism is a phenomenon of nature rather than a creation of man is further demonstrated by the fact that the so-called revelations of the Hindus appear, by all accounts, to be a wild growth. So, according to Manu and the Brāhmaṇa literature, the Vedas were originally extracted, by the Patriarch, (Prajāpati or Brahman the masculine) from the elements—the Ṛg-Veda from fire or the earth, the Yajur-Veda from the air or the firmament, and the Sāma-Veda from the sun.[1] It is only the Atharva-Veda, the last to attain the status of a Veda, which came to be ascribed to a human source, even in the last analysis[2] Sāyaṇa, the greatest commentator of Vedic literature, is inclined to the view that fire, the air, and the sun are living beings (jīva-viśeṣāḥ).[3] Dayānanda, a Vedic commentator of modern times, follows suit. They have no evidence whatever, however, to go upon—at any rate, they have advanced none.

It is, indeed, a patent fact that the Vedas do not display much of the craftsmanship characteristic of later revelations and compositions. Products of nature are generally rough and irregular, which roughness and irregularity are writ large on every page of the Vedas. And yet there is a wealth of unparalleled wisdom in them.

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1. See, for example, *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* 11.4.2.1-3; *Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa* 5.5.7.
2. See *Gopatha-Brāhmaṇa* 1.1.5.
3. Sāyaṇa' *Ṛgveda-Bhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 2.

In fact, the Vedas are not cut and dried compositions planned initially by any human agency ; they have evolved through millennia. Before their compilation in the form of the extant volumes, many time more hymns and verses sprang into existence, as if from nowhere, and floated throughout the length and breadth of the land ages after ages, much of which is irretrievably lost to us. Out of at least 1130 collections of the Vedic hymns, viz. Saṁhitās about a dozen only have come down to us including the four volumes arbitrarily designated as *the* Vedas – the Ṛg-Veda, the Yajur-Veda, the Sāma-Veda, and the Atharva-Veda, respectively. As a matter of fact, they are all Śākhās (branches) of the Vedas, as tradition would have it, rather than *the* Vedas, the term Veda being a generic name for all the collections (Soṁhitā-s) of hymns taken together.

One interesting point which emerges here, which sheds significant light on a special feature of Hinduism, and which has seldom been noticed before, is that, amongst the bewildering variety of the Vedic collections, there was one Ekāyana-Veda which is claimed by the Pāñcarātra tradition to be the original Veda (Mūla-Veda) and compared with which the current Vedas are degenerate Vedas (Vikāra-Veda-s) ;[1] one Nimitta-Śākhā, traditioned to have glorified the Buddha as omniscient ;[2] and one Turuṣka-Śākhā,[3] apparently a collection of or for the Turks.

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1. *Īśvara-Saṁhitā* 1.18, 20, 22-24.

2. See, Śāntarakṣita, *Tattvasaṅgraha* 3511-3516, with Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā* thereon. Cp. Ratnakīrti, *Sarvajña-Siddhi*, in *Ratnakīrti-Nibandhāvali*, p. 25.

3. See *Prapañcahṛdaya*, p. 19. The meaning of 'Turuṣka' in not clear. The term is generally used in Sanskrit of the Muslim invaders and rulers of India. It is also used of the Kuṣāna rulers—Kaniṣka and his descendants—, vide *Ārya-Mañjuśrī-Mūlakalpa* 53, 22, 529. Guṇaratna also refers to 'Turuṣkāḥ' vide his *Tarkarahasyadīpikā*, p. 20. To A.L. Basham, 'Guṇaratna seems to refer to the Christians...and the passage suggests Christ rather than Allāh or Muḥammad.' See his *History and Doctrine of the Ājīvikas*, p. 82, f.n. 1. We are inclined to believe, however, that there is a stronger case for construing

Besides, there appear to have been certain Vedic texts of Sāṅkhya orientation.[1] The *Allā-Upaniṣad*, adoring Allah, Muḥammad, and Akbar the Great is common knowledge. Such ancient texts as the Brahmaṇa-s mention a *Piśāca-Veda*, an *Asura-Veda*, a *Sarpa-Veda*, an *Itihāsa-Veda*, a *Purāṇa-Veda*.[2] The *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* refers to an Upaniṣad of the Asura-s.[3]

The Vedas have no end, says an ancient text [4] According to certain other texts, all sciences and all canonical texts, the texts of the godless not excepted, are comprehended within the compass of the term 'Veda'.[5]

Indeed, the Vedas, too, like Hinduism itself, are a wild growth. It does not mean, however, that the Vedic hymns and their syntactical and verbal structure are also not man-made Far from it. The Vedas themselves acknowledge the human hand behind the individual hymns.[6] This view has the sanction of

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'Turuṣkāḥ' to mean Muslim rather than Christians. Guṇaratna's words are ; अथवा लोकस्वरूपेऽप्यनेके वादिनोऽनेकधा विप्रवदन्ते । तद् यथा — तुरुष्का गोस्वामिनामैकदिव्यपुरुषप्रभवम् That is, Turṣka-s ascribe the source of creation to luminous person, one of the saints. Here the term 'saints' (gosvāminām) apparently refers to the prophets and 'a luminous person' (divyapuruṣa) to Muḥammad, according to the Ṣūfī-s the Light (nūr) whom God created first and for whom the cosmos was created. It is difficult to decide, however, which 'Turuṣkāḥ' are actually meant by Guṇaratna. In this connexion, the Sanskrit-Arabic hybrid entitled *Allā-Upaniṣad* strikes one naturally.

1. See *Yoga-Bhāṣya* 2.23, pp. 229-230: *Mahābhārata*, Śānti-Parvan 301 106; 308.17; 318.71, 81. Certain other inextant 310.25, Śruti texts are also referred to in *Yoga-Bhāṣya* 2.13, pp. 171-172; 4.22, p. 435.
2. *Gopatha-Brāhmaṇa* 1.1.10, for example.
3. *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* 8.8.5.
4. 'Anantā vai Vedāḥ'. *Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa* 3.10.11.3.
5. *Mahābhārata* (Kumbakonam ed.), Śānti-Parvan 122. 25-26, 29.43.
6. See, for example, *Ṛg-Veda* 3.53.12; 5.29.15; 8.19.36; 10.62.4.

the great grammarian Patañjali,[1] though the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school strikes a note of dissent.[2]

But why deify the Vedas exclusively ? Unlike other religions which have only one code each revealed to them, the Hindus have a plethora of such codes. Here, whatever allegiance is commanded by the Vedas, the patent fact is that the Hindus have hundreds of treatises which, though deriving their authority from or idealizing the Vedas, tend to claim to be so autonomous and independent of the Vedas that they are by themselves, to the total exclusion of the Vedas, competent to deliver their readers from the shackles of Māyā. It is said, for example, that it is enough to follow the injunctions of the *Gītā* instead of wasting time over other scriptures.[3] That is to say, whatever the genesis of the scriptural texts other than the Vedas, once the former are there, they tend to assume a status of their own, independent of an equal to the Vedas, in effect.

Another interesting fact about the Hindu conception of revelation is that, according to certain Purāṇa texts, some of our revelations are 'scriptures of delusion' (moha-śāstrāṇi),[4] meant not to guide and save people but to delude and destroy them. So, according to certain Purāṇa-s, Śaṅkara was an incarnation of Śiva or Rudra and proclaimed Māyā-vāda (world-negationism/illusionism/acosmism) as a crypto-Buddhist (pracchanna-Bauddha) simply to delude and destroy the world.[5]

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1. Patañjali, *Mahābhāṣya* 4-3. 101-103.
2. Śabara, *Mīmāṁsā-Bhāṣya* 1.1.5, pp. 178-194.
3. *Mahābhārata*, Bhīṣma-Parvan 43 1.
4. See *Varāha-Purāṇa* 70.35, 36, 38, 40-46. Other religions, too, share this characteristic of Hinduism. See, for example, I. Kings 22.23: Jeremiah 4.10; 20.7: Ezekiel 14.9; 20.25; II Thessalonians 2.11-12;
5. See *Padma-Purāṇa*, Uttara-Khaṇḍa 263.70-75. Also see *Saura Purāṇa* 39.56-66, 71-74. Cp. *Viṣṇu-Purāṇa* 3.17.36-44; 3.18.1-35. The charge, against Śaṅkara, of being a crypto-Buddhist is unfounded, however. See G.V. Budhakar, 'Is the Advaita of Śaṅkara Buddhism in Disguise', pp. 1-18, 160-176, 262-265, 314-326; Gopi Nath Kavirāj, 'Bhūmikā' to *Śārīraka-Bhāṣya*, p. 75.

It is also interesting to note that the Hindu sometimes inclines to grade his scriptures into sāttvika (light-bearing), rājasa (action-inspiring), and tāmasa (delusion-inducing), leading to liberation (mokṣa), heaven (svarga), and hell (naraka), respectively.[1] The fundamentum divisions, according to a certain text, is that the sāttvika scriptures (here sāttvika Purāṇa-s) are marked by superlative importance attached to Viṣṇu ; the rājasa, to Brahman (masculine) ; and the tāmasa, to Śiva. There are besides, certain eclectic scriptures in which priority is given to the goddess Sarasvatī and the Patriarchs/Manes (pitṛ-s).[2] In a similar vein, Vedānta is held to be sāttvika, Mīmāṁsā rājasa and Nyāya tāmasa.[3] The Sāṅkhya scripture is accounted tāmasa.[4]

It is also maintained by the Hindu that certain scriptural texts are primarily meant for the Kṛta-yuga, certain others for the Tretā-yuga, still others for the Dvāpara-yuga, and the rest for the Kali-yuga.[5] Some of the scriptures teach that each Manvantara (aeon, $71\frac{3}{7}$ times the number of the four Yuga-s taken together) has its own revelation (śruti).[6]

Hinduism is by nature a varietist-pluralist religion. The most conspicuous instance of this character of Hinduism is the bewildering variety of its revelations. According to it, not only religious scriptures but secular sciences, too, like grammar, medicine, astronomy, erotics, politics, law, and what-not, have superhuman origins.[7] So, if the Vedas are revelations, the positive sciences are revelations, too

This surprisingly flexible attitude towards revelation on the part of the Hindus is bound to breed in them a spirit of limitless tolerance towards others, uninstantiated elsewhere.

The contents of the Vedas, growing wildly and extracted by the Patriarch out of the elements, are said to have been 'seen'

1. *Padma-Purāṇa*, Uttara-Khaṇḍa 263.81-81-90.
2. *Matsya-Purāṇa* 53.67-68.
3. *Devī-Bhāgavata* 1.1.14.
4. *Padma-Purāṇa*, Uttara-Khaṇḍa 263-68.
5. *Parāśara-Smṛti* 1.25-26.
6. *Vāyu-Purāṇa* 1.59.60.
7. See my 'Tāttvikaṁ Svarūpam Vedasya', pp. 97-140.

(dṛṣṭa) by the Ṛṣi-s, literally seers, and 'manufactured' into the present form by a long line of them.[1] They were, originally not 'conceived' or 'thought' but 'perceived' or 'intuited' by the so-called primitive humanity of intuition.

What is this seeing or intuiting ? The Hindu answer to this question would serve to throw into relief the deep-rooted difference between the Western and Indian philosophical traditions.

The question cannot be answered without an excursion into the Hindu philosophy of history.

It is common knowledge that the Hindus posit a multi-cyclical view of history. It is also generally recognized that, according to this view of history, in each cycle higher ages yield place of lower ones. But what is seldom recognized is that, according to it, the historical process within each cycle is neither regressivistic nor progressivistic in all respects but regressivistic spiritually and progressivistic civilizationally.[2] Civilizationally considered, the initial age of humanity, called Kṛta-yuga, was the most primitive of the four historical ages, viz. Kṛta-yuga, Tretā-yuga, Dvāpara-yuga, and Kali-yuga. It was, by all accounts, almost a fruit-gathering stage. People dwelt in caves and trees.[3] There were neither villages nor towns.[4] A vivid description of this age is found in the epics and the Purāṇa-s. It was much later, traditionally during the regime of Manu or Pṛthu, that civilization developed.[5]

Considered spiritually, however, Kṛta-yuga was the highest stage, according to the whole gamut of Hindu thought. It was an age of the Ṛṣi-s (seers), who, living as they did on roots and fruits, were endowed with the faculty of a kind of non-physical 'seeing', of directly seeing the truth ; they did not have to con-

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1. Loc. cit.
2. According to Nikolai Berdyaev, when civilization progresses, culture declines, and vice versa. See Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis*, pp. 142-143.
3. See, for example, *Vāyu-Purāṇa*, Ch. 8.
4. See, for example. '*Śrīmad-Bhāgavata* 4.18.32.
5. Loc. cit.

ceive or think it out. After Kṛta-yuga, the race of the Ṛṣi-s began gradually to dwindle and came to be totally extinct a few centuries after inception of the Kali-yuga, the last of the four ages constituting the cycle.[1]

Now, in the initial age, the age of Kṛta, there was no philosophy involving thinking; there was only darśana (vision) involving perception/experience. That is why, in our most ancient texts, we find a mine of profound ideas, some of which stand unsurpassed even today, but we do not find the reasoning leading to them. I doubt if it would be possible for the author of, say, the *Īśā-Upaniṣad* to reason out his ideas like a Śaṅkara or an Aurobindo, who vie with each other in considering it their proud privilege to be the faithful followers of the Upaniṣads. In fact, Kṛta-yuga was an age of genius and the Ṛṣi-s were men of genius, rather than of talent. 'Talent knows itself; it knows how and why it has reached a given theory; it is not so with genius, which is ignorant of the how and the why. Nothing is so involuntary as the conception of genius.'[2] Again, 'the man of genius sees the objects which his imagination presents to him. Dickens and Kleist grieved over the fates of their heroes. Schiller was as much moved by the adventures of his personages as by real events. T. Grossi told Verga that in describing the apparition of Prina, he saw the figure come before him, and was obliged to relight his lamp, to make it disappear.'[3]

The significant difference between seeing and thinking is thrown into bolder relief by what Abū Alī Sīnā (distorted as

1. It is difficult to suggest any chronology here. According to the most ancient references to the theory of Yuga-s, the age of Kṛta is 4800 years', of Tretā 3630 years', of Dvāpara 2400 years', and of Kali 1200 years' duration. See *Mahābhārata* Vana-Parvan 188.22-28; Śānti:Parvan 231.20-21; *Manu-Smṛti* 1.69-70. Later, the periods were fantastically prolonged. It is much more difficult to attempt a scientific chronology. The whole edifice of modern Indian chronology hangs on the slender thread of identification, by Sir William Jones, of Megasthenes' 'Sandrocottus' with Candragupta Maurya.
2. Lombroso, p. 10.
3. Ibid., pp. 23-24.

Avicenna) 'one of the greatest Muslim physicians and metaphysicians and one of the most encyclopaedic minds of all time, and Abū Sa'īd Abū Khair, one of the greatest mystics of Islam, said of each other, after they remained closeted together in the latter's monastery for three days and nights : the former said to people waiting outside, 'What I know he sees (harchi man danamū bīnad) ;' the latter, 'What we see he knows (har chi mā bīnīm u dānad)'.[1]

That our seers were really seers and that conceptual thinking in the real sense of the term is a later development is also suggested by an anecdote reported by Yāska, a pre-Pāṇinian Vedic etymologist, that, when the race of the seers was on the verge of extinction, people asked them who would be the seer for them. In reply, the departing seers offered them 'tarka-ṛṣi', viz. reasoning or philosophy, as a substitute.[2]

This anecdote provides a key to the understanding of the entire history of Indian philosophy, which has undergone much distortion at the hands of the moderns.

The age of the Ṛṣi-s was an age of creativity, inventiveness, and exuberance, which lasted, broadly speaking, from time immemorial till the Mahābhārata war. It was followed by an age of constructive philosophers, which lasted, roughly, upto the time of the Buddha. The constructive philosophy characterizing that age soon crystallized into Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Pāñcarātra, Vedic philosophy proper, and Pāśupata,[3] which may be called the five root-systems of Indian philosophy. The darśana or vision of the seers was induced mostly by the phenomena of nature, with the result that it often became indistinguishable from natural phenomena. The vision itself was full of imagery and symbolism. That is why it seems to naturalistically inclined moderns to lend

1. Abū Alī Sīnā, *Kitāb-i Ishārāt*, chapters 'Ṭabī 'iyyāt' (Physics) and 'Ilāhiyyāt' (Metaphysics), tr. into Persian anonymously under the title *Tarjamah-i Kitāb-i Ishārāt*, Hasan Mishkan, ed., 'Muqaddamah' (Editorial Introduction), p. 'Ṭoe',
2. Yāska *Nirukta* 13.12,
3. *Mahābhārata*, Śānti-Parvan 349.64,

itself to naturalistic interpretation. The burden of the root-systems of philosophy was to use the visions as raw materials and construct viable systems out of the chaos.

This was followed by a third phase of creative Indian philosophy, which lasted from the time of the Buddha to the first few centuries of the Christian era and in which vision and construction yielded place to interpretative exegetical philosophy, styled Ānvīkṣikī, and embodied in early Mīmaṁsā (both Pūrva and Uttara), Sāṅkhya, and early Yoga. Aiming that it did at reconstruction and re-systematization of older traditions, it can also be said to be a phase of Indian philosophy creative or re-creative in its own way.

From then on, we find doxographers, paraphrasers, and commentators/glossators/scholiasts but hardly any sizable number of philosophers engaged in thinking out a way for themselves. Technique got the better of experience and loosened the Vedic moorings of these schools. This led to the rise of heterodoxy. Then there was a scuffle between heterodoxy and orthodoxy and inception of logic was the result. By and by logic gained ground, degenerated into dialectic or cristic, and displaced sound logic and philosophy for good.

Rituals are designed to remind one of and epitomize and handle the religious perspective of life and the cosmos as well as the ground and goal of existence. Likewise, technique is developed in philosophy with a view to handling it more efficiently. But, like rituals again, technique develops and multiplies to such an extent and becomes so powerful with the passage of time that it begins not only to dominate philosophy as such but also to choke the very fountain-head of philosophy, viz experience and constructive ideation.

Our dialecticians helped only whittle down the enormous scope of the original idea-patterns, instead of throwing into relief their multi-dimensional character. Compare, for example, the ancient Vedānta of the Upaniṣads and the *Gītā* with the mediaeval Vedānta of Śaṅkara and others, which pales into insignificance before the former in point, inter alia, of range and profundity. The Vedic roots of the Upaniṣadic texts remain almost wholly beyond their ken. It is indeed one reason why they tend to

dismiss Vedic-Upaniṣadic cosmology so lightly.[1] To take a more glaring example : Śaṅkara[2] quotes the (Kṛṣṇa-Yajus) *Taittirīya-Saṁhitā*[3] to say that whatever Manu said was medicine (Yad vai kiñ-ca Manur avadat tad bheṣajam) and identifies the Manu with Svāyambhuva Manu to whom the authorship of the original form of the *Manu-Smṛti* is ascribed. But even a side-glance at the context in which the passage occurs would have revealed to him that it is not Svāyambhuva Manu but Vaivasvata Manu who is meant there. The passage expressly refers to two verses of a Vedic hymn[4] ascribed to the latter Manu. The passage occurs in several other Vedic texts, too, and everywhere means the same Manu. Another instance : Śaṅkara[5] refers to a Vedic passage, 'Tasmāc chūdro yajñe' 'navaklṛptaḥ'[6] Here, all commentators are inclined to interpret 'tasmāt' to mean 'an-agnitvāt', or not being permitted by the Vedas to kindle sacrificial fire. Whereas what the context actually indicates is that the Śūdra is debarred from performing sacrifice because of not having been born after a god. According to the text, the Brāhmaṇa was created after the fire-god (Agni), Kṣatriya after Indra, and Vaiśya ofter All-gods (viśve-devāḥ), but the Śūdra is not associated with any such god.[7] Another instance : Our commentators take it for granted that the Śūdra is debarred from studying the Vedas and performing sacrificial rites by all the scriptures,[8] whereas the position is that many ancient scriptures allow him both.[9] All writers from Śabara downwards refer to

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1. See Śaṅkara, *Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā-Bhāṣya*, Āgama-Prakaraṇa, Kārikā 7, pp. 47-48; K. 15, pp. 146-147. *Aitareya-Upaniṣad-Bhāṣya* 1.2, p. 66; *Śārīraka-Bhāṣya* 1.4.14, pp. 317-3 .0; 2.1.33 p. 406; etc.
2. *Śārīrakā-Bhāṣya* 2.1.1, p. 320.
3. *Taittirīya-Saṁhitā* 2 .2.10.2.
4. *Ṛg-Veda* 8.31.
5. *Śārīraka-Bhāṣya* 1.3.34.
6. *Taittirīya-Saṁhitā* 7.1.1.6.
7. Ibid. 7.1.1.4-5.
8. See, for example, *Śārīraka-Bhāṣya* 1.3.38.
9. *Yajur-Veda* 26.2. For further references, see my 'Sāmājika Samatā ke Sandarbha meṅ Bhāratīya Darśana', pp. 142 ff.

a Vedic text, 'Vācā Virūpa ! nityayā',[1] to show that, according to the Vedas, words are eternal,[2] construing the word 'nitya' to mean 'eternal'. But the word never means 'eternal' in the Vedas, as has been demonstrated by certain recent authors.[3] Likewise, the later philosophers take it for granted tnat the Vedic hymns and the Upaniṣads are either eternal or God-revealed, whereas these texts make it abundantly clear repeatedly that they were authored by man.[4]

In fact, the Vedic texts have a world of profound ideas unexploited by this day, as is evidenced by the work of Madhusūdana Ojhā, for example.

Thus, Indian philosophy has passed through five stages : the three creative phases of creative vision or generative insights (from the earliest times to the Mahābhārata war), constructive philosophy (from the Mahābhārata war to the time of the Buddha), and interpretative exegetical philosophy (from the time of the Buddha to the first few centuries of the Christian era) on the one hand and the two uncreative phases of logic and dialectic/eristic ensuing thereafter on the other. The bulk of the so-called philosophers belonging to the ages of logic and dialectic are not philosophers worth the name, fired with the spirit of quest. They are motivated more, at their best, by technical considerations and, at their worst, by the will to victory in dialectical duels than by the will to truth characteristic of the creative ages. They tended more and more to reduce philosophy from the status of a truth-hunting exercise to that of a match-winning one. More, Śaṅkara and other mediaeval philosophers appear to have done scarcely more than revive ancient thought pioneered by such pre-Buddhaic sages as Kāśakṛtsna and others.[5]

Side by side with spiritual experience, in the age of intuition, there were also what may be called scientific or rather proto-

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1. *Ṛg Veda* 8.75.6.
2. *Mīmāṁsā Bhāṣya* 1.1. 3, p. 347.
3. See my 'Tāttvikam Svarūpam Vedasya' pp. 132 ff,
4. See Ibid , pp. 134 ff. Also see note 20 above.
5. See, for example, *Śārīraka-Bhāṣya* 1.4.22, pp. 332-333. For details, see Gopi Nath Kaviraj, 'Bhūmikā'. passim,

scientific intuitions, which were embodied in the Upa-Vedas, literally sub-Vedas, lost to us. They seem to have given some impetus to positive sciences and arts, and works like the *Yantra-Sūtra,*[1] *Samarāṅgaṇasūtradhāra,*[2] *Yantra Sarvasva,*[3] etc. were the result. But the tradition was lost somehow.

It is not very right to suppose that the age of the Upaniṣads was an age of intellectual discussions and disputations. The so-called discussions appear to have been neither logical nor dialectical but experiential : they involved not logical dialectical reasoning but, as Sri Aurobindo puts it, 'a comparison of intuitions and experiences in which the less luminous gives place to the more luminous, the narrower, faultier or less essential to the more comprehensive, more perfect, more essential. The question asked by one thinker or another is "What does thou know ?", not "What dost thou think ?" nor "To what conclusion has thy reasoning arrived ?" Nowhere in the Upaniṣads do we find any trace of logical reasoning urged in support of the truths of Vedānta. Intuition, the sages seem to have held, must be corrected by a more perfect intuition ; logical reasoning cannot be its judge.'[4]

Whitehead has convincingly argued that thinking is not always, and seldom meticulously and adequately, verbal. 'The position of metaphysics in the development of culture cannot be understood without remembering that no verbal statement is the adequate expression of a proposition......Mankind never quite knows what it is after.[5] That is 'why the logicians' rigid alter-

1. *Mahābhārata*, Sabhā-Parvan 5.122.
2. *Samarāṅgaṇasūtradhāra*, ch 31.
3. *Yantra-Sarvasva*, ascribed to Bharadvāja in its 'Vaimānika-Prakaraṇa' (the Book of Aircraft) edited by Swami Brahmananda Parivrajaka Vidyamartanda and published by the Sarvadeshika Aryapratinidhi Sabha, New Delhi, under the title '*Bṛhad Vimāna-Śāstra*. Its authenticity is in doubt, however. See Swami Satyaprakash, 'Bṛhad-Vimāna-Śāstra', *Gangaprasad Abhinandana Grantha* and *Gangaprasad Upadhyaya Abhinandana Grantha*, pp. 405-414.
4. Sri Aurobindo, *Life Divine*, Vol. I, p. 83.
5. A.N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, pp. 16-17.

native "true or false", is so largely irrelevant for the pursuit of knowledge."[1] Asghar the poet complains :

> Nawā-i rāz kā sīne meṅ khun hotā hai
> Sitam hai lafz-parastoṅ meṅ kho gayā hūṅ maiṅ

('My tragedy is that I am so lost amongst verbolators that the secret in my heart has begun to bleed to death.') Hence, if words are taken too seriously, as, for instance, modern philosophical analysts are prone to, they will land us into sheer abstractions wholly unrelated to reality. Sri Aurobindo also has it that our Sruti-oriented philosophers 'avoided the besetting sin of metaphysics, the tendency to battle in the clouds because it deals with words as if they were imperative facts instead of symbols which have always to be carefully scrutinized and brought back constantly to the sense of that which they represent. Their speculations tended at first to keep near at the centre to the highest and profoundest experience and produced with the united consent of the two great authorities, Reason and Intuition.'[2] Indeed, verbolatory has all along been a recurrent sin of philosophers, rather philosophasters. Even Leibniz complains, 'Metaphysics has ordinarily been treated as a mere doctrine of terms, like a philosophical dictionary, without ever coming to a discussion of things.'[3]

Well, as shown above, the history of Indian philosophy is roughly divisible into the age of experience (ṛṣi-yuga/pratyakṣa-yuga/darśana-yuga), the age of systematics (śruta-ṛṣi-yuga), the age of exegesis (anudarśana-yuga/ānvīkṣikī-yuga/mīmāṁsā-yuga), the age of logic (tarka-yuga), and the age of dialectic/eristic (kathā-yuga). For our present purpose, we may huddle logic and dialectic together and treat them as belonging to a common age. Indeed, they have been concurrent all along, broadly speaking. Now, this composite age of logic-dialectic is divisible into the age of analogy (upamāna-yuga), the age of authority (śabda-yuga), and the age of inference (anumāna-yuga), in a more or less chronological order The age of experience was the age

1. Ibid., p. 15. Cp. 'Language is smaller than mind' (Vāg vai manaso hrasīyasī). *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* 1.4.4.7.
2. Sri Aurobindo, op. cit., pp. 83-84.
3. *Leibniz : Philosophical Writings*, Mary Morris, tr., p. 215.

of seers, of genius In the age of logic, the age of analogy comes first, because it is nearest to the age of experience. Then comes the age of authority, which is at the second remove from the age of experience. Last comes the age of inference, which happens to be at the farthest remove from the age of experience. Analogy purports, more or less, to be showing what one has seen. Authority is, roughly, identifying oneself with one who has seen. As regards inference, it is neither showing the seen nor identifying oneself with the seer, to be able to assert what is what. It is the result of a complicated process : it is knowledge derived from the recollection of invariable concomitance.

Thus, the creative philosophers of India were seers and knowers They saw, and to some extent analogized, too. Around the age of the Buddha and Mahāvīra, it was analogy which prevailed. Then came authority, into the orthodox as well as the heterodox camps. The words of the Buddha and Mahāvīra assumed as self-certifying a character as the Vedas. Inference or logic proper was to develop last.

It is interesting to note that the bulk of the Lokāyata school believed only in perception as a way of knowing. It was quite in continuation of the spirit of the creative age of Indian philosophy, though in a clumsy manner. In Northrop's terms, to be explained in the sequel, the Lokāyata school believed only in the differentiated aesthetic continuum. This was its lopsidedness, from the point of view of the age of experience, which had to do much more with the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum.

We take it that classical European philosophy surpasses later European philosophy in depth, exuberance, and generative insights. Whitehead goes to the length of declaring that 'The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.'[1] This remark seems to hold good here, too Thus, the whole gamut of mediaeval and modern Vedānta has scarcely anything substantial to add to ancient Vedānta, or, on the one hand, the Upaniṣads, the *Gītā*, the epics, the Purāṇa-s, and the medical treatises and, on the other, the long line of pre-Christian and pre-Buddhaic masters like Kāśakṛtsna, Āśmarathya, Bodhāyana,

1. Whitehead, op. cit., p. 53.

and others whose works are wholly lost to us and whom the mediaeval Vedāntin-s like Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and others claim to follow. The later Sāṅkhya-Yoga, too, appears to be but a part of the larger Sāṅkhya-Yoga tradition writ large on the pages of these treatises, as also represented in the works of Kapila, Āsuri, Pañcaśikha, Vārṣagaṇya, and other pre-Buddhaic teachers. Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā and Uttara-Mīmāṁsā (Vedānta) together formed part of a larger tradition. There is a well attested tradition[1] that there was a great Mīmāṁsā work comprising 20 chapters, divided into Karma-Kāṇḍa comprising its first 12 chapters forming the extant *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra* of Jaimini, Devatā-Kāṇḍa comprising its next 4 chapters forming the extant *Saṅkarṣa-Kāṇḍa*, of Jaimini or Saṅkarṣaṇa,[2] and Jñāna-Kāṇḍa comprising its remaining 4 chapters forming the *Brahma-Sūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa in its original redaction. The Nyāya system seems to have begun as an attempt to codify the rules of disputation and the Vaiśeṣika system, as a system of proto-science. Whatever philosophy they came to develop in course of time is much inferior to the afore-mentioned systems of Indian philosophy. Also, their main ideas were formulated in the pre-Christian and possibly in the pre-Buddhaic times. And why only the orthodox system ? Even the ultra-heterodox system of Indian philosophy called Lokāyata struck root as well as fructified in the creative age itself. Similar is the case with Jainism, Buddhism, and the philosophies of the Ājīvika-s and smaller heterodox schools. Jainism could break no new ground after its canonical age. Ājīvika-s, whose existence is attested to even during the regime of Colas and Pallavas in the south and on whom the latter evoled a poll tax called Ācuvi-kācu, failed to register any religio-philosophic growth after the times of Mahāvīra and the Buddha. Similar appears to be the case of the Lokāyata tradition with the solitary exception of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa of the 8th century A.D., who has bequeathed to us a treatise on rejection of epistemology

1. See, for example, *Prapañcahṛdaya*, p. 39; *Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha* 1.17, 20-22.
2. *Saṅkarṣa-Kāṇḍa*, see Bibliography. According to Madhusūdana Sarasvati, its author is Jaimini. See his *Prasthāna-Bheda* (pp. 11-12) ; according to *Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha* (1.21), Saṅkarṣaṇa.

and metaphysics, entitled *Tattvopaplava-siṁha.* Buddhism kept developing till the 4th century A. D. whereafter it was bogged down in logic and dialectic on one hand and Mantra-Tantra on the other. Their logic and dialectic were designed with a view to fulfilling merely technical needs and whetting the dialectical skill of their disputationists rather than in response to any really philosophic quest, as is the case with the mediaeval orthodox systems in general. In pre-Buddhaic times, there appears to have arisen a large mass of literature on philosophy of language to longer extant, and unparalleled today. It is, indeed, authoritatively learnt that Vyāḍi's *Saṅgraha* consisted of as many as a hundred thousand couplets [1]

As a matter of fact, most of the so-called philosophical development in the post-Christian era appear to be in the nature of mere variations on familiar themes, and hence not only significant from the point of view of creative advance in philosophy.

The history of Indian thought traced above goes directly counter to the dogmas of evolution and rectilinear progress. According to Darwin, man was preceded by animals and plants ; according to substantive Indian thought, by gods (deva-s) patriarchs/manes (pitṛ-s), and seers (ṛṣi-s), in the ascending order,[2] animals and plants following mankind.[3] H.P. Blavatsky's thesis is that perfected beings came to our planet as a special spiritual influx, to guide humanity as also to colonize the earth, as is illustrated by the stories of the solar and lunar kings, patriarchs, and the Seven Seers (Sapta-Ṛṣi-s). Sri Aurobindo has it that the Vedic seers were remnants of the preceding, more advanced aeon. This theory is none the less plausible than the theory of rectilinear evolution which unwarrantably rules it out.

Indeed, Indian thought is not evolutionistic but involutionistic-evolutionistic. According to it, the Absolute's way is to lapse from its pristine purity and assume lower and lower order of being. In the process, there is, first, Hiraṇyagarbha/Īśvara or Brahman (masculine) and, then, in the descending order

1. *Mahābhāṣya*, Paśpaśāhnika, Vol. I, pp. 46, 48, for example.
2. *Manu-Smṛti* 3.201,
3. *Śrīmad-Bhāgavata* 6.6.21 ff.

(cosmic) seers, patriarch/manes, gods, and humans.[1] Amongst humans too, there are, first, human seers, then philosophers, and lastly logicians and dialecticians, side by side, of course, with the commonalty. After this involutionary phase has been completed an evolutionary one begins, from below upwards. The involutionary order of the successive ages conceived traditionally is Kṛta-yuga, Tretā-yuga, Dvāpara-yuga, and Kali-yuga. This is followed by an evolutionary order, which is Kali-yuga, Dvāpara yuga, Tretā-yuga, and Kṛta-yuga.

The tradition of following the same involutionary order from Kṛta-yuga downwards in the next cycle of the yuga-s as well and thereby postulating a leap from the lowest stage of humanity to the highest without passing through intermediate stages represented by Dvāpara and Tretā, appears to be not only not sustainable on rational grounds but. as shown by Satyavrata Sāmaśrami,[2] against the spirit of the Vedic tradition, too. Sāmaśrami takes his cue from a statement in the *Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa* followed by Manu, to the effect that Kali is the sleepy, Dvāpara is the wakeful, Tretā is the standing and Kṛta is the moving.[3]

Any way, let us not dogmatize overmuch about prehistory, 'Our discussions will be adequate', says Aristotle, 'if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions, any more than in all products of the crafts.'[4]

Now, the most radical difference between Indian and Western philosophy is said to be that the former is basically a darśana (vision) while the latter is conceptual thinking. This is, as we have seen, true primarily of Indian philosophy in the earlier phases. Later Indian philosophy tended to reduce itself increasingly to the status of dialectical reasoning; it, nevertheless, retains the vision of truth as its ideal, hence it remains, to some extent or other, distinguishable from Western philosophy which aims primarily at intellectual satisfaction. The Hindus still acknowledge the supremacy of our seers over our dialecticians, which

1. *Ṛg-Veda* 10.121.1, read with *Manu-Smṛti* 3.201.
2. Satyavrata Sāmaśrami, *Aitareyālocana*, pp. 105-106.
3. *Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa* 33.3.
4. Aristotle, *Nicomachaean Ethics* 1094b12-15, p. 309.

distinction is foreign to the Western philosophical tradition in general.

It goes to the credit of F.S.C. Northrop to be the foremost in the West to have had an inkling of this dimension of Indian philosophy. According to him, truth as well as reality has two continuums: the aesthetic/intuitional component and the theoretic/conceptual component, the first dominating in the East and the second in the West. The aesthetic component of things refers to objects directly apprehended, without mediation by concepts, whereas the theoretic component refers to objects of conceptual thinking. The aesthetic component is of two kinds; the differentiated and the undifferentiated. The differentiated aesthetic component refers to objects of sensory perception, while the undifferentiated aesthetic component refers to objects of what may be termed transcendental perception, known as Zen in Confucianism, Tao in Taoism, Nirvāṇa in Buddhism, Ātman or Brahman in Hinduism, the Divine Nothing among mystics, and so on. Colour, sound, and other objects constituting the differentiated continuum are at bottom derived by differentiation from the undifferentiated continuum. Northrop's finding is that the East is characterized by too much emphasis on the aesthetic continuum, and that, too, on its undifferentiated side; whereas the West lays too much emphasis on the theoretic continuum 'In the Western sense of the term (i.e. metaphysics), writes Northrop, these Easterners are not metaphysical at all ; instead, they are the most extreme positivists, since they insist that no reality exists except that which is immediately apprehended. The inferred postulated type of knowledge of the West designating unobserved electrons electromagnetic propagations, or the unseen God the Father they tend traditionally to deny.'[1] He continues, 'Thus, they are metaphysical only in the sense they claim to have noted an immediately apprehended factor in experience in addition to the data given through the specific senses.'[2] According to him, only a beautiful blending of the two 'different yet complementary' components can form a firm basis for the emergence of a more perfect world culture.

1. F.S C. Northrop, *The Meeting of East and West*, p. 366.
2. Loc. cit.

C.G. Jung, the great analytic psychologist, has a clear grasp of the fact that 'an Indian does not think, at least not what we call 'think'. *He rather perceives his thought*.'[1] Jung has his own explanation to offer. 'The primitive's reasoning, he avers, 'is mainly an unconscious function, and he perceives its results.'[2] The same characteristic is shared by the Indian, for the simple reason that Indian culture 'has enjoyed almost an unbroken continuity from primitive times,'[3] Jung's contention is not without force. The original Semitic religion yielded-place to new phases by exclusion at every step, whereas Hinduism developed by inclusion of all experience, good, bad, and indifferent. That is why the pristine primitivism—if we are allowed to use the expression—of Semitic culture is lost beyond redemption, and their emphasis is not on experiencing the Truth that is God but on simply obeying Him or His representative. As regards Western culture, Jung's analysis is that its 'evolution from a primitive level was suddenly interrupted by the invasion of a psychology and spirituality belonging to a much higher level of civilization. We were stopped in the midst of a still barbarous polytheism, which was eradicated or suppressed in the course of centuries and not so very long ago'[4] Jung believes that 'this fact has given a peculiar twist to the Western mind Our mental existence was transformed into something which it had not yet reached and which it could not yet truly be. And this could only be brought about by a dissociation between the conscious part of the mind and the unconscious It was a liberation of consciousness from the burden of irrationality and instinctive implusiveness at the expense of the totality of the individual. Man became split into a conscious and an unconscious personality.'[5]

We have already seen that each cycle of ages shows progress in one direction and regress in another, that there is neither all-round progress nor all-round regress. To Jung, the Hindu

1. C. G. Jung, 'What India Can Teach Us', p. 527.
2. Loc. cit.
3. Loc. cit.
4. Loc. cit.
5. Loc cit.

would submit that the primitives of today are not the spiritually advanced primitives of the beginning civilization but (decadent races who have fallen into a state of degradation (vṛṣalatva) thanks to their dissociation from the leaders of spiritual culture, the Brāhmaṇa-s.[1]

Discursive thinking or intellectual knnwledge on one hand and direct vision or intuitive insight on the other form a pair of opposites which is variously expressible, such as the following :

A-parā vidyā (lower science)	**Parā vidyā (higher science)[2]**
A-vidyā (ne-science)	**Vidyā (science)[3]**
A-jñāna (un knowing)	**Jñāna (knowing)[4]**
Vi-jñāna (phenomenal knowledge)	**Jñāna (noumenal knowledged)[5]**
Vi-jñāna (discursive thought)	**Darśana (vision)[6]**
Vidyā (positive/secular science)	**Ātma-vidyā (spiritual science)[7]**
Rājasa and tāmasa jñāna (temporal knowledge)	**Sāttvika jñāna (transcendental knowledge)[8]**
Mantra-vid (knower of the word)	**Ātma-vid (knower of the self)[9]**
Satya (relative truth)	**A-mṛta (eternal verity)[10]**
Satya (relative truth)	**Satyasya satyam (absolute truth)[11]**

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1. *Manu-Smṛti* 10 43-44 ; *Mahābhārata*, Anuśāsana-Parvan 33. 21-23 : 35. 17-8 ; *Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa* 7.4. 18.
2. *Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣad* 1.1.4.
3. *Īśa Upaniṣad* 9-11 ; *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad* 4.4.10 ; *Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad* 5·1 ; *Katha-Upaniṣad* 1.2.4 5; *Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣad* 1.2 8-9 ; *Sūtra-Saṁhitā* 4.22.17 ; Cp. *Mahābhārata*, Śānti-Parvan 301 82-83 ; 306.5 ; 307.2 ff ; *Atharva Veda* 11.8.23.
4. *Gītā* 13.11. CP. *Sūta-Saṁhitā* 4.22.17.
5. *Gitā* 7.2 ; 9-1 ; 13-30 ; 18.20-22 ; *Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣad* 1.1.3 ; *Chandogya-Upaniṣad* 6.1.4 ff.
6. *Sūta Saṁhitā* 4.2.81.
7. Ibid 4.5.189.
8. *Gitā* 18.20-22.
9. *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* 7.1.3.
10. *Bṛhadāranyaka-Upaniṣad* 1.6.3.
11. Ibid. 2.3.6.

Pravṛtti	Nivṛtti[1]

Ontological counterparts of these epistemological pairs of opposits, in general way, are :

Sam-bhūti (becoming)	A-sambhūti (non-becoming/being)[2]
Kṣara (perishable)	AKṣara (imperishable)[3]
A-para-Brahman lower Absolute)	Para-Brahman (higher Absolute)[4]
Śabda-Brahman (the Logos)	Para-Brahman (the Absolute)[5]
Brahman (the Divine)	Para (the Absolute)[6]
A-vara (the lower)	Para (the Supreme)[7]
Mūrta (immanent)	A-mūrta (transcendent)[8]
Adhi-mātra (verbal)	A-mātra (trans-verbal)[9]
Trai-guṇya (tri-dimensional)	Niṣ-traiguṇya (non-tradimensional)[10]
Alpa (conditioned)	Bhūmā (un-conditioned[11]
Pratyakṣa (obvious)	Parokṣa (hidden)[12]
Preyas [(*more*) pleasant]	Śreyas [(*more*) blessed][13]

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1. *Mahābhārata*, Śānti-Parvan 301.82-83.
2. *Īśa-Upaniṣad* 12-14. Cp. *Mahābhārata*, Śānti-Parvan 307.2 ff.
3. *Svetaśvatara-Upaniṣad* 5.1. Cp. *Gitā* 3.15 ; 8.3, 4, 11, 21 ; 11.18, 37 ; 12.1, 3 ; 15.16, 18 ; *Mahabharata*, Śānti-Parvan 306.5 ; 307.10 ff.
4. *Praśna-Upaniṣad* 5.2; *Maitrāyaṇi-Upaniṣad* 6.22 ; *Mahābhārata*, Śānti Parvan 270.1-2.
5. *Maitrāyani-Upaniṣad* 6 22 ; *Mahābhārata*, Śānti-Parvan 270. 1-2 ; *Vakyapadiya* 1.1.
6. *Kaṭha-Upaniṣad* 1.2.16.
7. *Muṇḍaka-Upanisad* 2.2.8.
8. *Bṛhadaranyaka-Upanisad* 2.3.1 ; *Maitrāyani-Upanisad* 6 3.
9. *Māṇḍūkya Upanisad* 8.12.
10. *Gita* 2.45.
11. *Chāndogya-Upanisad* 7.23.1.
12. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upanisad* 4.2.2.
13. *Katha-Upanisad* 1.2.1.

The dichotomy of reality and truth into lower and higher on the part of the Hindu leads him to bifurcate reality and truth into temporal and transcendental, vyavahāra and paramārtha, a tendency shared with him by the bulk of the schools of Indian philosophy. Like Parmenides who bifurcates knowledge into the way of seeming and the way of truth;[1] Plato, into the world of things, of becoming, of opinion/belief on one hand the world of ideas/forms, of being, of knowledge on the other ;[2] Aristotle, into the ancillary science and the superior science;[3] Kant into the phenomenal and the noumenal;[4] Hegel, into the relative and the absolute, though inclusive of the relative;[5] he and Bradley, into appearance and reality, though inclusive of appearance;[6]—the Hindu scriptures postulate two kinds of reality and of truth as listed in the two immediately preceding paragraphs; Pali Buddhism postulates sammuti (loka-sammuti, public opinion[7]) and paramārtha (ultimate) truth on one hand[8] and neyattha-sutta (word of indirect meaning) and nītattha-sutta (word of direct meaning) on the other,[9] the Mādhyamika, on the alleged authority of the Budha postulates two kinds of truth, lokasaṁvṛti-satya/ tathyasamvṛti-

1. Parmenides, *The Way of Truth*, in F.M. Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides*, pp. 30 ff.
2. Plato, *The Republic* 505-518, 533, 585, passim.
3. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 982a.
4. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* A236-A260/B295-B315, pp. 257-275.
5. G.W.F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of mind*, Vol. I, Preface, pp. 77-78, passim. In fact, the dichotomy is writ large in his works almost throughout. According to him, the absolute comprehends the relative and does not exclude it.
6. F.H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, throughout, especially chapter XXIV ; Hegel, *History of Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 95.
7. *Majjhima-Nikaya*, Majjhima-Paṇṇāsaka, Subha-Sutta, p. 474 : *Sutta-Nipāta*, Aṭṭhaka-Vagga 4, Mahāvyūha-Sutta 13, p. 439 ; *Kathāvatthu*, Pañcama-Vagga, Sammuti-Nāṇa-Kathā 49, pp. 277-278.
8. *Kathāvatthu-Atthakakathā*, quoted in *Abhidhammattha-Saṅgaha*, Vol. II, p. 796, n. 1.
9. *Aṅguttara-Nikāya*, Vol. I, p. 57.

satya (empiricial truth) and paramārtha-satya (absolute truth) on one hand[1] and neyārtha (conveyable sense) and nitārtha (conveyed sense) on the other;[2] the Yogācāra school of Buddhism bifurcates truth into para-tantra (other-dependent/relative) and pari-niṣpanna (well-established/absolute)[3]; Vatubandhu the Kāśmīra-Vaibhāṣika Buddhist philosopher,[4] Harivarman the Bahuśrutīya Buddhist author of the *Satyasiddhi-Śāstra* (written by him in 253 A.D.),[5] Śaṅkara the Advaita-Vedāntin,[6] the *Sūta-Saṁhita*[7] which Śaṅkara is reputed to have gone through eighteen times before writing his great commentary on *Brahma-Sūtra*[8] bifurcate truth and reality into vyavahāra (relative empirical) and paramārtha (absolute/ transendental). The only extant treatise of the Lokāyata school, entitled *Tattvopaplavasiṁha*, takes such a bifurcation of truth for granted. Referring to the distinction between empirical/conventional truth (loka-vyavahāṛa, laukika mārga), he remarks that, so far as empirical/conventional truth is concerned, a child and a learned man behave alike.[9] Jainism distinguishes between mediate (parokṣa) and immediate (pratyakṣa) knowledge,[10] between a statement of partial truth (naya) and that of the whole truth (pramāṇa),[11] between relative truth (syādvāda) and absolute truth (kevala-jñāna)[12] between practical standpoint (vyavahāra-naya) and categorical standpoint (niścayanaya),[13] between one-sided statement (vikalādeśa) and full statement (sakalādeśa).[14] Jainism does not regard the two truths as mutually exclusive, however. They

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1. Nāgārjuna, *Madhyamaka-Sastra* 24.8.
2. *Samādhirāja-Sūtra*, 7.5.
3. Vasubandhu, *Trisvabhava-Nirdeśa*, throughout; *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-Triṁśika* 21.
4. Vasubandhu, *Abhidharmakośa* 6.4 94.
5. Harivarman, *Satyasiddhi-Śāstra*, pp. 16, 355.
6. Śaṅkara, *Sarīraka Bhāṣya* 2.1.14
7. *Sūta Saṁhita* 4, Brahma-*Gītā* 2.17, 19-20.
8. See Kaviraj, 'Bhūmika', p. 75; Budhakar, p. 3.
9. Jayarāśi, *Tattvopaplavasiṁha*, opening page.
10. Samantabhadra, *Āpta-Mīmaṁsā* 10.101.
11. Umāsvāti, *Tattvārthādhigama-Sūtra* and *Bhaṣya* 1.9.12,
12. Samantabhadra, *Āpta-Mīmaṁsā* 10.105,
13. *Bhagavatī-Sūtra* 18.6.
14. Akalaṅka, *Laghīyastraya* 62.

are thought to be related to each other as part and whole, respectively.

In Chapter VIII, setting out a much fuller treatment of the issue, we have tried to discover truth-bifurcating tendencies in the remaining Indian traditions as well, such as Sāṅkhya-Yoga, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā.

The Hindu division of truth purports to be not a horizontal but a vertical division. That is to say, the higher truth is higher not quantitatively but qualitatively: It is in the nature of an improvement upon the latter. The scientist of today is better equipped for superior secular knowledge than the seer of the Upanisad. But then there is a knowledge different in kind from and superior to secular knowledge, in respect of which the scientist does lag behind the seer.

The dichotomy in question is pregnant with implications. No philosophy worth the name can afford to dispense with it. The higher order of truth and reality must be regarded as qualitatively different from the lower in a conspicuous way. Indeed, when Hegel claimed all philosophy to be idealistic, he purported to underline exactly the universally acknowledged distinction between appearance and reality, the finite and the infinite.[1] Karl Marx—yes, the 'materialist' Marx – goes a step further and puts forward the thesis that 'all science would be superfluous if the appearance, the form, and the nature of things were wholly identical.'[2] However, the category of the temporal has, down the ages, proved a safe asylum for superstition and other evils in Hinduism. This circumstance constitutes one of the potent factors responsible for engendering in the Hindus an amazing capacity of peacefully putting up with other religions and cultures on the one hand and suffering all sorts of irreligion and barbarism on the other. The latter tendency has of course rendered him weak in principle and practice. When everything—good, bad, and indifferent—has to have a place in the scheme of the thought and action and to be tolerated as a temporal necessity, strong likes and dislikes tend gradually to

1. Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, Vol. I, p. 168.
2. Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, p. 649.

become out of place, with the result that superstition and barbarity come to the fore in the long run, according to Gresham's Law. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad invites pointed attention to this unenviable trait of Hinduism thus: 'Without doubt, we must acknowledge this tolerant approach to thought and action, which has all along been projecting itself in the history of India But the matter does not end just here. ...Some boundary lines have to be drawn somewhere If we do not do so, all canons of knowledge and morals will be shaken. Tolerance is certainly a valuable thing but, at the same time, the value of steadfastness of faith, maturity of opinion, and integrity of thought also cannot be gainsaid. So, there must be a line of demarcation which may keep these values in their proper places.'[1] Azad makes a powerful plea against compromising truth and adds: 'If the boundaries of tolerance are extended to such an extent as to allow it to interfere with your beliefs and mollify your decisions, then it is not tolerance, it is the negation of the stability of thought.'[2] And, Azad concludes, the history of Hinduism is a long tale of compromises between science and superstition.

Well. this ambivalent character of Hinduism is responsible for making the Hindus the most gifted, righteous, and spiritually advanced people down the ages on one hand and the most wretched, self-centred, and self-indulgent worldings on the other. Captain Wilford's bitter experience in this behalf, reported by Hegel, is an instance in point[3]

Northrop tries to explain this ambivalence of the Hindu character by reference to his thesis that the Oriental preoccupies himself with the a-theoretical, a-logical, undifferentiated, aesthetic continuum and that way is a man of principle like any other race,

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1. Abul Kalam Azad, *Tarjumān al-Qur'ān* (Urdu) Vol. I, p. 324.
2. Ibid., p. 324.
3. The Captain collected manuscripts and commissioned some Brāhmaṇas to find out of them facts about Adam and Eve, the Deluge, etc. The latter produced statements as if to order. Wilford wrote many treatises on the subject, till at last he could detect the deception. See Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, p. 164.

or with the fleeting events and is that way an opportunist; whereas the Westerner, being occupied with the abstract, is consistently and constantly a man of principle. According to him, the Eastern soul is divided against itself. It is involved either in the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum or the differentiated aesthetic continuum, hardly, if ever, with the theoretic continuum. He is, therefore, at once an absolutist and a relativist/opportunist. The Westerner's commitment is absolute; the Oriental's, provisional and varying.[1]

Northrop's undifferentiated aesthetic continuum is what the Hindu would like to designate transcendental (paramārtha) and differentiated aesthetic continuum, temporal (vyavahāra). The Hindus, as pointed out above, have all along been inclined to bifurcate truth and reality into temporal and transcendental,[2] a tendency shared by the Buddhists, the Jainas, and the Lokāyatas as well. The category of the temporal has really proved a safe asylum for the baser elements in Hinduism, which, instead of being rejected out of hand, as was done by Socrates and the Semitic prophets, were thoughtlessly and equanimously relegated to the realm of the temporal by Hindu savants and thereby

1. Northrop, pp. 376-377, 380-389.
2. The origins of the bifurcation are traceable to (1) the bifurcation of truth into vidyā and a-vidyā on the one head and parā and a-parā on the other, and the bifurcation of reality into Para-Brahman and Apara-Brahman, as in the *Īśa-*, *Muṇḍaka-*, and *Praśna-Upaniṣads* ; (2) the bifurcation of reality into sambhūti and a-sambhūti (*Īśa-Upaniṣad* 12-14) and (3) into concrete (mūrta) and abstract (a-mūrta), real (sat) and apparent (tyat), as in the *Bṛhadārañyaka-Upaniṣad* 2.3.1, the concrete being false and the abstract true according to *Maitrāyani-Upaniṣad* 6.3 ; (4) into the perceptible (pratyakṣa) and the hidden (parokṣa), as in *Aitareya Upaniṣad* 2.14 and *Bṛhadāranyaka-Upaniṣad* 4.2.2; (5) the concept of 'truth (satyasya satyam) as in *Bṛhadāranyaka-Upaniṣad* 2.3.6; and (6) the statement in *Yajur-Veda* 40.16 that truth's face is covered with the vessel of gold. The bifurcation was systematically worked out, however, in Buddhism first.

allowed to subsist indefinitely. The Hindu felt safe with his paramārtha, unruffled by and indifferent to these developments which all he hastened to consign to the lumber-room of vyavahāra.

That is why, as Jung would have it, 'You see them there side by side, in the same town, in the same street, in the same temple, within the same square mile: the most highly cultured mind and the primitive. In the mental make-up of the most spiritual you discern the traits of the most primitive, and in the melancholy eyes of the illiterate half-naked villager you divine an unconscious knowledge of mysterious truths.'[1]

1. Jung, pp. 528-529.

CHAPTER III

THE SUPERSTRUCTURE OF REASON

Growth of philosophy on the Indian soil has been bewilderingly luxuriant. Roughly speaking, there are three great philosophical traditions discernible in pre-Islamic India :

1. The Vedic tradition, consisting of the schools of Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Bhāgavata/Pāñcarātra, Vedas proper (right from the Saṁhitā-s down to the Upaniṣad-s), and Pāśupata, which forms the substructure on which the superstructure of the other traditions rests.
2. The non-Vedic tradition, as of the Asura-s and Lokāyatas-(hedonists and materialists) on one side; Jaina Tīrthaṁkara-s like Pārśvanātha and Mahāvīra on another; free lance thinkers and cynics like Makkhali Gosāla, Sañjaya Beleṭṭhiputta, Pakudhu Kaccayāna, Puraṇa Kassapa, Ajira Kssakambalin, and certain others, collectively though not precisely termed Ājīvika-s, on a third; and the Buddhists (not the Buddha) on a fourth.
3. The semi-Vedic tradition, as of Ṛṣabhadeva, the Buddha, and the later extreme forms of Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Pāñcarātra, Pāśupata. and Śaiva Schools, including Tantra,—all, however, to a severely limited extent—for the simple reason that almost all of them commend adherence to the Vedic scheme of life, in effect, whenever they felt called upon to suggest a philosophy of social life.

The three traditions are nameable as orthodox, heterodox, and ortho-heterodox respectively:

The common practice today is to classify Indian philosophy into the orthodox schools of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, and Uttara-Mīmāṁsā/Vedānta and the three hetero-

dox schools of Lokāyata/Cārvāka, Jainism, and Buddhism. But this list was unknown before the 12th century. Earlier, the list of schools of Indian philosophy varied from classifier to classifier. Let us notice the variations in passing :

1. Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Pāñcarātra, Vedas proper, and Pāśupata (according to the *Mahābhārata*)[1]
2. Sāṅkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Buddhism, Jainism, and Cārvāka (according to Haribhadra Sūri of the 8th century)[2]
3. Sāṅkya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Buddhism Jainism Cārvāka, Prābhākara Mīmāṁsā, Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsā, Vedānta, and Veda Vyāsa school (according to some Śaṅkara's *Sarvasiddhānta-Saṅgraha*)[3]
4. Sāṅkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Buddhism, Jainism, Cārvāka, and Mīmāṁsā (according to an anonymous unpublished Jaina work entitled *Sarvasiddhānta-Praveśaka*, one of the two manuscripts of which is dated 1201 Vikramī, the other appearing to be older)[4]
5. Sāṅkhya, Nyāya, Buddhism, Jainism, Cārvāka, and Mīmāṁsā (according to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa of 1000 A.D.)[5]
6. Schools of Kapila, Patañjali, Gautama, Kaṇāda, Vyāsa, and Jaimini (according to the *Viśvasāra-Tantra Guru-Gītā* of 1200 A.D.)[6]
7. Sāṅkhya, Śaiva, comprising Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, Buddhism Nāstika (Cārvāka), and Mīmāṁsā (according to Jinadatta Sūri's *Viveka-Vilāsa* of 1300 A.D.)[7]
8. Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Vaiśeṣika, Buddhism, Jainism, and Mīmāṁsā (according to Rājaśekhara Sūri's *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya* of 1348 A.D.)[8]

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1. *Mahābhārata*, Śānti-Parvan 349.64.
2. Haribhadra Sūri *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya* 3.
3. Śaṅkara, *Sarvasiddhānta-Saṅgraha*, throughout.
4. See Muni Śri Jambuvijayaji, Appendix V to *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*, edited by him with Candrānanda's *Vṛtti*, p. 141.
5. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, *Nyāya-Mañjarī*, Pramāṇa-Prakaraṇa, p. 4.
6. *Viśvasāra-Tantra* (Guru-Gītā).
7. Jinadatta Sūri, *Vivekavilāsa* 8.245, 285.
8. Rājaśekhara Sūri, *Ṣaḍ-darsana-samuccaya* 4.

9. Schools of Kapila, Akṣapāda, Kaṇāda, Vyāsa Jaimini, and Pāṇini (according to Mallinātha's son of 14C0 A.D.)
10. Orthodox systems: Sāṅkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Buddhi-m. Lokāyata, and Mīmāṁsā Besides, separate mention is made of Śaiva-vādin, Brahma-vādin, Vaiṣṇava-vādin, Veda-vādin, and Ājīvaka. (This is according to the Tamil *Maṇimekhalai*)[1]
11. Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Buddhism, Jainism Cārvāka Mīmāṁsā, Viśiṣṭādvaita. Dvaita, Advaita, Nakulīśa-Pāśupata Śaivism, Pratyabhijñā (Kāśmīra Śaivism), and the School of l āṇini (according to Mādhava's *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha* of the 15th century).[2]
12. Brāhma, Śaiva, Vaiṣṇava, Saura, Śākta. and Jainism (according to *Purāṇa-Saṁhiiā*),[3]
13. Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Vaiṣṇava, Vedas proper, and Pāśupata (in Puṣpadanta's *Śivamahimna-Stotra*).[4]

The gulf between one school of Indian philosophy and another appears to even careful scholars to be wider than is the case actually. For example : It is held that all heterodox systems are frankly atheistic or non-theistic; that, while some of our philosophical Sūtra-s either definitely refute, or observe reticence about God, there are others which invoke the God-idea without making important use of it; that, while the medieval Sāṅkhya, the Vaiśeṣika, and the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā are frankly atheistic, the Sāṅkhya being even aggressive in its atheism, the Nyāya and the Yoga Sūtra-s posit an uncreative God radically different from the Semitic God; and that the Vedānta is the only school which postulates some kind of God. But, if we go deeper into this question, we would find a different picture altogether. Let us try to do it.

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1. See S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar, *Maṇimekhalai in Its Historical Setting*, pp. 67, 192.
2. Mādhava, *Sarvadarśana-Saṅgraha*.
3. *Purāṇa-Saṁhitā* 1.16-17.
4. Puṣpadanta, *Śivamahimna Stotra* 7.

About the Lokāyata, we do not know much. In several ancient texts of the Brāhmaṇa-s and the Buddhists alike, it is referred to as a respectable science, cultivated by the Brāhmaṇa-s.[1] In course of time, as reported by others, it developed into an extreme form of the atheistic materialism and acquired a second name, Cārvāka. The only extent text of this school, however, entitled *Tattvopaplavasiṁha*, by Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa of the 8th century A.D., advocates an extreme form of scepticism, in the ultimate analysis. If it can also be styled a kind of atheism in any sense of the term, it is tantamount to trans-polytheistic atheism as distinguished from anti-polytheistic atheism, for he refers to Bṛhaspati, the putative founder of the Lokāyata/Cārvāka school, as the preceptor of the gods (sura-guru),[2] implying thereby his belief in the existence of gods, of course on the empirical level. Jainism does not countenance a Creator, for the simple reason that it holds the world to be eternal; it nevertheless postulates the other world and omniscient souls here as well as hereafter. Indeed, it also enjoins worship of its Tīrthaṅkara-s. The Buddha does not seem to be favourably inclined towards the belief in God. In the *Jātaka*, two arguments are adduced against theism: 'If God designs the life of the entire world—the glory and misery, the good and the evil acts—man is but an instrument of his will and God (alone) is responsible'[3] Again, 'If Brahman (masculine) is lord of the whole world and creator of the multitude of beings, then why (i) he ordained misfortune in the world without making the whole world happy, or (ii) for what purpose has he made the world full of injustice, deceit. falsehood, and conceit, or (iii) the lord of beings is evil in that he ordained injustice when there could have been justice.[4] The Buddha also ridicules theists according to whom the world was made by a good God (bhaddakena Issarena nimmito).[5] He also derides

1. *Mahābhārata*, Ādi-Parvan 70.76; *Saṁyutta-Nikāya* 2.77; *Aṅguttara-Nikāya* 4.428.
2. Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa, *Tattvopaplavasiṁha*, p, 125.
3. *Jātaka* 18.528.142.
4. Ibid, 22.543.936-938.
5. *Majjhima-Nikāya*, Upari-Paṇṇāsaka (III), Devadaha-Sutta (I) p. 19,

Brahma (mas),[1] holds God responsible for the faults of mankind,[2] regards prayers to such God as futile.[3] Yet he postulated Nibbāna (Nirvāṇa), which is interpreted by many as his Absolute It appears that he wanted people to transcend their ego and personal God to reach the Absolute.[3] Whatever be the case with the Buddha's attitude to God, he is himself conceived transcendent ally in the very Tripiṭaka-s.[4] In Mahāyna he became a veritable God. Some of the Mahāyāna texts go to the length of describing the Ādi-Buddha as 'Svayam-bhū' (self-born or rather self-existent, an epithet reserved for God, and calling him the Creator of the cosmos.[5] In another text, Avalokiteśvara is said to be the Creator of the cosmos.[6]

As regrads the orthodox systems, the position of the Nyāya is clear. Apart from the fact that it clearly recognizes God as the dispenser of the fruits of human action,[7] Vātsyāyana has implicit faith in the spiritual science (adhyātma-vidyā) of the Upaniṣad-s[8] and seems to consider Nyāya itself as part of the spiritual science.[9] That way, its God is the same as of the Upaniṣad-s. The *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra* ascribed to Kaṇāda is traditioned to be the successor of one ascribed to Śiva.[10] Even the extant *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra* is reported to have been proclaimed by Śiva.[11] It

1. *Dīgha-Nikāya*, Silakkhandha-Vagga, Brahmajāla-Sutta (1), pp. 17-18.
2. *Aṅguttara-Nikāya*, Tika-Nipāta, Mahāvaggal, Tithāyatana-Sutta (1) p. 1.
3. *Dīgha Nikāya*, Silakkhandha-Vagga, (1) Tevijja-Sutta (13), p 206.
4. See G.C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, P. 508 f.n. 281.
5. *Pady ıkāraṇḍavyūha-Sūtra*, quoted in Narendra Deva, *Buddha-Dharma-Darśana*, pp. 149-150.
6. *Guṇakāraṇḍavyūha Sūtra*, in *Mahāyāna-Sūtra-Saṅgraha*, Vol I p. 265.
7. *Nyāya, Sūtra* 4 1.19-21.
8. *Vātsyāyana, Nyāya-Bhāṣya* 1.1.1.
9. Loc cit.
10. Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra, *Kanāda-Sūtra-Nibandha*, cited in Anantalal Thakur, 'Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra—the Vaiśeṣika', *JOI*, X. 1.
11. Thakur, loc cit.

is significant, therefore, that Maheśvara is the supreme deity in the *Padārthadharma-Saṅgraha* of Praśastapāda.[1] Even Haribhadra attests to Śiva being the supreme deity of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school.[2] Besides, according to the reading adopted by Viṭṭhaleśa and Rādhāmohana Gosvāmī Bhaṭṭācārya, the *Nyāya-Sūtra* contains a Sūtra, 'Tattvaṁ tu Bādarāyaṇāt' (For *the* Truth, turn to the Vedānta),[3] which implies that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system is subservient to the Vedānta. As regards the Sāṅkhya, it is now common knowledge that the early, epic Sāṅkhya was far from atheistic, was Absolutistic The Sāṅkhya system is described so even in the Rudra-Saṁhitā of the *Śiva-Purāṇa.* Even the founder of the so-called atheistic Sāṅkhya, Īśvarakṛṣṇa, postulates eight species of gods and demons, called Brāhma, Prājāpatya, Aindra, etc.[4] It appears that the cosmic intellect (mahat) and the cosmic ego (ahaṅkāra), which are, according to him, the first and second evolutes of Prakṛti (Nature), belong to Prajāpati, the Creator, of the cosmos; otherwise, it is difficult to find the locus of the two. Thus, Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṅkhya, too, does not remain atheistic. The *Yoga-Sūtra* does postulate God. Vācaspati makes it clear that God is the efficient cause of creation.[5]

The position of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā needs special treatment. Jaimini, the author of the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra,* is cited by Bādarāyaṇa in his *Brahma-Sūtra* as a Brahma-vādin.[6] In fact, both Bādarāyaṇa and Jaimini refer to each other in their works as if both belonged to one and the same school of philosophy with different shades of opinion on specific topics. Significantly enough, Sureśvara, a direct disciple of the great Śaṅkara, regards Jaimini as the author of both the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra* and the *Brahma-Sūtra*, inasmuch as he says that Jaimini could not have meant that all scripture is action-oriented, as appears to be the

1. Praśastapāda, *Padārthadharma-Saṅgraha,* pp, 20-22.
2. Haribhadra Sūri, *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya* 13.
3. See *Nyāya-Sūtra,* with Rādhāmohana-Gosvāmi-Bhaṭṭācārya's *Vivaraṇa,* 4.2 52; Viṭṭhaleśa, *Advaitasiddhi Gauḍabrahmānandī.*
4. Īśvarakṛṣṇa, *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* 53.
5. Vācaspati, *Tattvavaiśāradī* 4.3. pp. 395-396.
6. *Brahma-Sūtra* 1.2.28, 31; 1.4.18; 4.3;11-14; 4.4.5.

meaning of one of his Sūtra-s belonging to the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra*, otherwise he (Jaimini) could not have composed the *Brahma-Sūtra* dealing with the knowledge of the Brahman.[1] This statement is closely related to a well-attested tradition, which is that both the extant *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra* and *Brahma-Sūtra* belong to a larger treatise including them plus the *Devatā-Kāṇḍa* or *Saṅkarṣa-Kāṇḍa*, all the twelve chapters of the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra* together with the four chapters of the *Devatā-Kāṇḍa* having been composed by Jaimini and the four chapters of the *Brahma-Sūtra* by Bādarāyaṇa.[2] It appears that the full treatise consisting of these three sections represented a larger Mīmāṁsā system devoted to systematization and interpretation of the Brāhmaṇa-s Āraṇyaka-s, and Upaniṣad-s. Traditionally, Bodhāyana wrote a commentary entitled *Kṛtakoṭi* on the whole of the composite treatise.[3] Thereafter, Upavarṣa and others wrote their own commentaries on the full treatise. It appears, therefore, that Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā and Uttara Mīmāṁsā were, in the beginning, thought to be complementary to each other rather than two different schools altogether Even prior to the aforesaid composite treatises, there were certain treatises ascribed to Kāśakṛtsna, Bādari, Āśmarathya, Ātreya, Kārṣṇājini, referred to in the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra* as well as *Brahma-Sūtra*, who appear to have authored Sūtra-s on both Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā and Uttara-Mīmāṁsā. Though Śaṅkara regards inquiry into dharma (dharma-jijñāsā) and inquiry inro Brahman (Brahma jijñāsā), the subject-matters of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā and Uttara-Mīmāṁsā respectively, as belonging to two different schools,[4] Rāmānuja regards both as one at bottom.[5] Kumārila complains of Lokāyatization of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā system by his immediate predecessors,[6] but he

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1. Sureśvara, *Naiṣkarmya-Siddhi* 1.19.
2. *Prapañcahṛdaya*, pp. 38-39; Śaṅkara, *Sarva-Siddhānta-Saṅgraha* 1.16-17, 20-21 ; Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, *Prasthāna-Bheda*. pp. 11-12.
3. *Prapañcahṛdaya*, p. 39.
4. Śaṅkara, *Śārīraka-Bhāṣya* 1.1.1.
5. Rāmānuja, *Śrī-Bhāṣya* 1.1 1.
6. Kumārila, *Mīmāṁsā-Ślokavārtika*, Granthakāra-Pratijñā 10.

does not create it. Dvaita Vedānta follows Sāṅkhya-Yoga in postulating nature as the material cause of the world. The God of the Bhāgavata-s and Śaiva-s, too, is not a creator ex nihilo. The Vedas speak of the world as having been made of prime matter often called 'wood' (wood' (vana),[1] a term exactly synonymous with the Greek 'hyle' Arabic hayūl'/'hayyūlā'). Creation or rather formation of the world is also compared to the building of a mansion.[2] In fact, there is no school of Hindu philosophy which believes matter to have sprung into existence, or been created, out of nothing.

The same is the case with the soul. It is regarded as uncreate, immortal, eternal – either coeval with or part and parcel of God. Śaṅkara complains that, in the Pāñcarātra system, the soul is treated as a created entity.[3] His statement is stoutly opposed by Rāmānuja,[4] though the *Mahābhārata* does appear to bear out Śaṅkar's contention[5]. It is reported that such ancient teachers of Vedānta as Brahmadatta and Āśmarathya believed in the creation of the soul.[6] The *Yogavāsiṣṭha*, a great work of pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta, also appears to contain suggestions of the souls being born of the Brahman.[7] Its author appears to have taken his cue from the Upaniṣadic text according to which the worlds shoot out of the Brahman like sparks out of a well inflamed fire[8]. The *Yājñavalkya-Smṛti* speaks of the birth of the soul like sparks from a red-hot piece of iron.[9] But the birth of the souls spoken of in these texts is something radically different from the creation of

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1. *Ṛg-Veda* 10.31.7; 10.81.4.
2. Ibid. 10.72.2.
3. Śaṅkara, *Śārīraka-Bhāṣya* 2.2.42-45.
4. Rāmānuja-*Śrī-Bhāṣya* 2.2.41-42.
5. *Mahābhārata*, Bhīṣma-Parvan 66.70-71; Śānti-Parvan 339.40-41 72-74.
6. Veṅkaṭanātha, *Tattvamuktākalāpa*, p. 16 (for Brahmadatta's view); Kavirāja, p. 13 (for Āśmarathya's view).
7. *Yogavāsiṣṭha* 1.11; 3.94.1921, 26, 30; 3 67.68-69; 6/1.124.4-5.
8. *Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣad* 1.1.7; 2.1.1. Cp. '...I speak of a centre from which worlds shoot out like rockets in a fire-works display...' Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, p. 262.
9. *Yājñavalkya-Smṛti*, Prāyaścittādhyāya 67.

the soul by God out of nothing, or the birth of the soul from material substances through a chemical process. Besides, such instances are few and far between and at most exceptional.

Subject to certain exceptions where it is considered to be of a limited or atomic size,[1] the soul is held by the Hindu philosophers in general to be as ubiquitous as the space[2]. So, it is immortal, uncreate, eternal, coeval with God, and omnipresent. It is also believed to be potentially omniscient and omnipotent. In short, the Hindu believes that the soul is perfect in all respects, potentially. It is also open to it to realize its innate perfection and become whatever it chooses to become—Indra, Brahman, and what-not.[3] In fact, the quintessence of the Upaniṣads is that the knower of the Brahman becomes the Brahman[4]. This becoming the Brahman, realization here and now of our potential perfection, self-realization, is, broadly speaking, what the Hindu calls Mokṣa, Salvation, Freedom, about which more in the sequel.

The Semitic God is pure will and behaves like an absolute despot. The Hindu knows no such God. The Hindu God, where he seems to enjoy an extracosmic status, has to deal with the souls according to their actions (karman-s). The Hindu holds human actions in such a high esteem that he is sometimes led to dispense with the idea of God. Indeed, Bhartṛhari prefers to pay obeisance to Karma rather than to God, who is powerless to withstand the might of Karma.[5]

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1. See, for example, *Brahma-Sūtra* 2.3.42.
2. See, for example, *Gītā* 2.24; *Vaiśeṣika* 7.1.30.
3. See, for example, *Devī-Bhāgavata* 9.27.18-20.
4. *Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣad* 3.2.9.
5. Bhartṛhari, *Nītī-Śataka* 108.

CHAPTER IV

REASON AND BEYOND REASON

There is discursive reason as well as intuitive reason (Milton) pure reason as well as practical reason (Kant). Then there is rational or intellectual intuition (Fichte and Schelling) or intellect or intelligence. Frithjof Schuon accords to intellect, and Plato to dialectic, a higher status than reason. Finally, some, like Plato and Aristotle on one hand and Sāṅkhya etc. on the other, conceive reason as if it were part of the soul or a veritable substance, whereas certain others like the Naiyāyikas, conceive it as an attribute or function. In view of such a labyrinth of its applications, it is not very easy to determine the nature and function of reason.

Reason as the ultimate source and arbiter of philosophical knowledge is primarily and predominantly a Western concept, as old as of the Greeks. Not that the authority of reason has remained there unchallenged always. Schopenhauer proclaimed that 'philosophy must, like art and poetry, have its source in the intuitive apprehension of the world.[1] In Bergson we find one of the greatest champions of intuition that the world has produced. In fact, even in Plato, reason is powerless to grasp the Form of the Good, with the result that he is led to postulate a superior faculty called intelligence. Even Aristotle had to lean on what he called Intellectual intuition for apprehension and acquisition of the primary premises of all knowledge, thereby according to intuition the status of the originative source of scientific knowledge.'[2] Nietzsche and Spengler were all for the Dionysian spirit to the exclusion of the Apollonian entire. Nevertheless, the dominant note of Western thought remains that of the supremacy of reason.

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1. Arthur Schopenhauer, *Parerga and Paralipomena*, quoted in Arthur O. Lovejoy, *The Reason, the Understanding, and Time* p. 58.
2. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* 100 b.

Contradistinguishingly, seldom did reason get the upper hand so far as Indian thought is concerned. In fact, it occupies such an insignificant or minor position in Indian philosopny that it has seldom emerged there as a cut and dried concept. Its Indian equivalent, without doubt, is 'buddhi.' When Śaṅkara avers that 'it is 'buddhi' which is our authority in determining the true character of being and non-being'[1], he does appear to use 'buddhi' in the sense of 'reason.'

In the present paper, we have set to ourselves a modest task, the task of throwing into relief the nature and function of reason vis-a-vis Indian thought. To this end, we shall have to dive deep into Indian thought and find out its prime movers, against the background of which to consider the function and role of reason.

Upaniṣadically speaking, there are a series of five layers to our being, viz. physical layer (annamaya-koṣa), vital layer (prāṇamaya-koṣa), mental layer (manomaya-koṣa), supramental layer (vijñānamaya-koṣa), and spiritual layer (ānandamaya-koṣa).[2] Details are wanting, but there is every reason to suppose that the mental layer consists of active internal sense-organs, which are: mind (manas), reason (buddhi), egoity (ahaṅkāra), and consciousness in general (citta)[3] The mind acquires knowledge through the external sense-organs and yields perceptions on its own, reason organizes such knowledge (and intuitions) and assigns value to it, the ego assimilates it and consciousness provides the base of all and preserves all these activities. So, yielding new knowledge is the prerogative of the mind, reason holding the office of a judge and architect.

Reason belongs to the mental layer,[4] whereas each of the

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1. 'Buddhir hi naḥ pramāṇaṁ sadasator yāthātmyāvagame.' *Kaṭhopaniṣad-Bhāṣya* 2.3.12.
2. *Taittirīya-Upaniṣad* 3.2-6. Cp. 'Manomayaḥ prāṇa-śarīra-netā'. *Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣad* 2.2.7.
3. *Praśna-Upaniṣad* 4.8.
4. rather than to the supramental layer which is sametimes adjudged identical with the individual soul :
   'Annamayo' sau bhūtātmā so' nnapracurako yataḥ;
   'Prāṇamayaś ca prāṇātmā saṅkalpātmā manomayaḥ;

hearing).[1] These ṛṣi-s and śrutarṣi-s came later to be followed by 'smṛti-kāra s' (traditionists) who were preservers of the tradition founded by the former.

The age of these fathers of Indian thought was an age of genius, by all accounts. And an age of genius is anything but an age of reason, generally speaking. It is talent which reasons, not genius. To quote Jurgen-Meyer, 'Talent knows itself; it knows how and why it has reached a given theory; it is not so with genius, which is ignorant of the how and the why'.[2] According to Lombroso, the man of genius sees the objects which his imagination presents to him. Dickens and Kleist grieved over the fates of their heroes...Schiller was as much moved by the adventures of his personages as by real events.[3]

It is wrong to suppose that the age of the Upaniṣads was an age of reason. The so-called discussions and disputations amongst the Upaniṣadic seers appear to have been neither logical nor reasoning but, as Sri Aurobindo puts it, 'a comparison of intuitions and experiences in which the less luminous gives place to the more luminous'. The question asked by one thinker or another is "What dost thou know?", not "What dost thou think?" nor "To what conclusion has thy reasoning arrived?"... Intuition, the sages seem to have held, must be corrected by a more perfect intuition; logical reasoning cannot be its judge.'[4]

In course of time, the class of seers began gradually to dwindle and became totally extinct long before the advent of the Buddha. Then the question arose who would act the seer for mankind. Yāska reports that upon this question the seers who were about to leave gave us a peculiar seer called tarka (tarkam

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1. *Nirukta*, with *Nirukta-Bhāṣya*, 1.20. Cp.: 'Iti śuśruma dhīrāṇāṁ ye nas tad vicacakṣire.' *Yajur-Veda Saṁhitā* 40.10.

2. Jurgen Meyer, quoted in Cesare Lombroso, *The man of Genius*, p. 19.

3. *Ibid.* pp. 23-24.

4. Sri Aurobindo, *The Life Divine*, Vol. I (2nd ed., Calcutta; Arya Publishing House, 1943). p. 83.

ṛṣiṁ prāyacchan)[1] The moral of this allegorical anecdote is that the age of experience yielded place to an age of reason.

Well, the history of Indian philosophy is roughly divisible into the age of experience and the age of reason, the age of reason being divisible into the age of analogy, the age of authority and the age of inference, in a more or less chronological order. In the age of reason, the age of analogy comes first, because it is nearest to the age of experience. It is indeed significant that sometimes analogy (dṛṣṭānta) is used in ancient literature as a synonym for direct experience (pratyakṣa), as, for example, in the *Mahābhārata* while enumerating the three sources of knowledge : experience, authority, and reasoning (dṛṣṭāntāgamahetubhiḥ).[2] Then comes the age of authority, which is at the second remove from direct experience. Last comes the age of inference, which happens to be at the farthest remove from direct experience. Analogy purports, more or less to be simply showing what one has seen. Authority is, roughly, identifying oneself with one who has seen. As regards inference, it is neither showing the seen nor a case of identification with the seer, to be able to assert what is what; it is a form of knowledge in which seeing something in the past purports to be just an instance of a universal claimed to be instantiated in the new situation about which inference proceeds.

Roughly upto the age of the Buddha, it was analogy which held the field. Then came authority, into the orthodox as well as the heterodox camps. Inference was to develop last.

It is interesting to note that the Lokāyata school in general believed only in perception as a means of valid knowledge to the exclusion of intellectual knowledge entire. It appears that the Diṅnāga school of Buddhism stepped into their shoes to put a premium on direct experience and strip intellectual knowledge of all its glory.

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1. *Nirukta* 13.12. Here we are tempted to hazard the opinion that the 'tarka-ṛṣi-s' are identifiable with the 'oha-brahmāṇaḥ' of *Ṛg-Veda* 10.71 8, construed in *Nirukta* 13.13 as 'ūha-brahmāṇaḥ.
2. *Mahābhārata*, Śānti-Parvan 36.16.

The most radical difference between Western philosophy and Indian philosophy consists in the patent fact that the former is a philosophy of reason whereas the latter, a philosophy of vision (darśana). This is true as we have seen, primarily of Indian philosophy in its earlier phases Later Indian philosophy, too reducing itself as it did to the status mostly of dialectical reasoning in its zeal for tradition, retained the vison of truth as its ideal and duly acknowledged the supremacy of our seers over our dialecticians, which distinction is foreign to western philosophical tradition in general.

It goes to the credit of Northrop to have had as inkling of the true character of Indian thought. According to him, truth as well as reality has two components, two continuums : the aesthetic (intuitional) component and the theoretic (conceptual, intellectual) component, the first dominating in the East and the second in the West. The aesthetic component of things refers to objects directly apprehended, without mediation by concepts, the hallmark of reason, whereas the theoretic component refers to objects of conceptual thinking The aesthetic compnnent is of two kinds : the differentiated and the undifferentiated The differentiated aesthetic component refers to objects of sensory perception, while the undifferentiated aesthetic component refers to objects of what may be termed transcendental perception, known as Jen in Confucianism, Tao in Taoism, Nirvāṇa in Buddhism, Ātman or Brahman in Hinduism, the Divine Nothing among mystics, and so on. Colour, sound, and other objects constituting the differentiated continuum are at bottom derived by differentiation from the undifferentiated continuum, Northrop's finding is that the East is characterized by too much emphasis on the aesthetic continuum and that, too, on its undifferentiated side; whereas the West lays too much emphasis on the theoretic continuum. This amply accounts for the negligible role of reason in Indian thought. Northrop goes to the extent of asserting that in the Western sense of metaphysics Easterners are not metaphysical at all; instead, they are the most extreme positivists, since they posit no reality except that which is immediately apprehended. 'The inferred postulated type of knowledge of the West designating unobserved electrons,

electro—magnetic propagation or the unseen God the Father they tend traditionally to deny.[1]

Jung has a clear grasp of the fact that 'an Indian...does not think, at least not what we call "think". *He rather perceives his thought.*" he has his own explanation to offer : 'The primitive's reasoning is mainly an unconscious function, and he perceives its results.' The same characteristic is shared by the Indian, for the simple reason that Indian culture 'has enjoyed almost an unbroken continuity from primitive times'. Jung's contention is not without force. The original Semitic religion yielded place to new phases by exclusion at about every step, whereas Hinduism developed by inclusion of all experience, good, bad, and indifferent. That is why the pristine primitivism—if we are permitted to use the expression—of Semitic culture is lost beyond redemption, and there emphasis is not on experiencing the Truth that is God but on simply obeying Him or His representative. As regards Western culture, Jung's analysis is that its 'evolution from a primitive level was suddenly interrupted by the invasion of a psychology and spirituality belonging to a much higher level of civilization...We were stopped in the midst of a still barbarous polytheism, which was eradicated or suppressed in the course of centuries and not so very long ago.' Jung believes that 'this fact has given a peculiar twist to the Western mind. Our mental existence was transformed into something which it has not yet reached and which it could not yet truly be. And this could only be brought about by a dissociation between the conscious part of the mind and the unconscious. It was a liberation of consciousness from the burden of irrationality and instinctive impulsiveness at the expense of the totality and individual. Man became split into conscious and an unconscious personality.[2]

The whole movement of Indian thought is beautifully summed up in an ancient Vārtika in the *Nirukta* :[3]

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1. F.S.C. Northrop, *The Meeting of East and Wet*, p. 366.
2. C.G Jung 'What India Can Teach Us,' *Civilization in Transltion*, R. F. C. Hull, tr., Herbert Read, Michael Fordham, and Gerhard Adler, eds , *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, p. 527.
3. See Ramashankara Bhattacharya, *Purāṇagata Veda-viṣayaka Sāmagrī kā Samikṣātmaka Adhyayana*, p. 418.

Prathamāḥ pratibhānena, dvitīyās tūpadeśataḥ,
Abhyāsena tṛtīyās tu Vedārthaṁ pratipedire.

That is to say, we came by knowledge first by direct experience, then by initiation, and lastly by discipline. Later, we had to lean on reason and reasoning almost entirely.

It is common knowledge that Western and Indian philosophical traditions differ widely in the purposes they have set before themselves Western tradition aims at intellectual satisfaction. Plato and Aristotle trace the genesis of philosophy to our sense of wonder, pure and simple. On the contrary, Indian philosophy has all along meant a much more serious involvement on the part of the philosopher. The Indian philosopher worth the name is after self-emancipation through a transforming self-realization. This being the case, the attitudes of the Western and the Indian tradition towards reason and rational knowledge are bound to differ radically The Upaniṣadic injunction is that the self (which is the ultimate reality) should be seen, heard, reasoned about, as well as realized (Ātmā vā are ! draṣṭavyaḥ, śrotavyo, mantavyo, nididhyāsitavyaḥ)[1] : that is, first seen and last realized. As Iqbal would have it, 'the knowledge of God is first sensation, last direct encounter. His last cannot be contained in reason' :

Ilm-i Ḥaqq awwal ḥawās, ākhir ḥuzūr
Ākhir-ī ū mī na gunjad dar shu'ūr

In a later text written in about the same vein, hearing (śravaṇa), reasoning (manana), and contemplation (dhyāna) are described as the three factors responsible for the vision of truth (darśana).[2]

Śrotavyaḥ Śrutivākyebhyo, mantavyaś copapattibhiḥ,
Matvâ ca satataṁ dhyeya – ete darśana-hetavaḥ.

That is, philosophy should take its start from or originate in vision (pratyakṣa) and end or eventuate in self-realization (aparokṣānubhūti). Western philosophy would stop short at the stage of reasoning or reflection, whereas Indian philosophy would proceed further till the attainment of self-realization. Indian philoso-

1. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad* 2.4.5.
2. Quoted in Vidyāraṇya, *Vivaraṇaprameya-Saṅgraha*, 1.1, p. 4.

phy goes beyond reason. Its aim is to attain that stage which is uninfected by the operations of reason [1]

Yadā pañcāvatiṣṭhante jñānāni manasā saha
Buddhiś ca na viceṣṭate, tām āhuḥ paramāṁ gatim.

That is why reason has failed to attain in Indian philosophy the status it enjoys in the West.

The subject-matter of reason, if considered by itself, is the realm of possibilities, generalities, and abstractions. The mind lays before the reason innumerable possibilities, and the reason selects one to the exclusion of all others. Thus, left to itself, reason will deal with possibilities to the exclusion of actualities. It redounds to the credit of the Diṅnāga school to have so clearly and conspicuously brought out the fact that knowledge is only of particulars and that generalities are in the nature of mere logical constructions, not real objects of knowledge. Therefore, reason without some real source of knowledge to feed it with what may be called raw materials of knowledge will land us in a blind alley. That is why Indian sages have all along kept it subservient to generative insights. Manu's famous dictum is .[2]

Ārṣaṁ dharmopadeśaṁ ca Vedaśāstrāvirodhinā
Yas tarkeṇānusandhatte sa dharmaṁ veda, netaraḥ.

That is. it is reasoning compatible with and subservient to the insights of the seers that leads to the true knowledge of dharma. On its own, reason will provide us only with strings of sets of abstractions, which, howsoever multiplied, will never yield a real entity.

The three Prasthāna-s of Vedānta are well known, which are the Śruti-prasthāna, the Smṛti-prasthāna, and the Tarka-prasthāna. Reason employed in the service of interpreting the Śruti and the Smṛti gives us Tarka-prasthāna or philosophy. Without Śruti and Smṛti, reason is contentless. That way, reason is merely formal and critical, not cognitive. It is significant that even such a protagonist of reason as Hegel was led to regard philosophy as the conceptualization of truths the most important of which are anticipated by religion—by Śruti in Indian parlance.

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1. *Kaṭha-Upaniṣad* 2.3.10.
2. *Manu-Smṛti* 12.106.

CHAPTER V

ĀNVĪKṢIKĪ AS DIALECTIC

Much useful information about *Ānvīkṣikī* was collected by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, the first in our day to highlight the concept as a stage in the development of Indian logic. In the present chapter, it is proposed to carry the research a little further and bring out certain other dimensions of the concept and study it in the context of the Western concept of dialectic.

There have been various lines of development of the concept of dialectic among the Greeks. It appears to have had its roots in dialogue and rhetoric and soon emerged as procedure of discussion. Protagoras and Socrates turned it into what is called the Socratic Method, giving it the appearance of the destructive method of elenchus. Zeno, Plato, and Aristotle gave it the form of conversational thinking. In Plato and Aristotle, it appears more or less in three forms : logic, categoriology, and first philosophy. Zeno is also responsible for using it as *reductio ad absurdum* through conflict of thesis and antithesis. In Heraclitus, we find it in two rather well-defined forms : (1) atonceness of emergence and extinction and (2) identity, interpenetration. and strife of opposites. It is interesting to find that a line of development strikingly akin to that in Greek thought of almost an identical concept of dialectic is traceable in Indian philosophy : Indian philosophy has evolved the concept of *Ānvīkṣikī* (literally, the science of enquiry), which admirably answers to the Zenonian-Platonic dialectic in almost all its important aspects.

The philosophical dialogues of the Upaniṣads and the *Mahābhārata* are important, though they may not be as relevant here as the Platonic dialogues. The Indian counterpart of the dialogues of Plato are the dialogues of the Buddha preserved in the Pāli canon. In the age of the Upaniṣads and the Dharma-Sūtras, dialogue, rhetoric, or eristic was a recognized discipline designated as *vākovākya*, one of the several sciences studied by

Nārada,[1] who is said to have been capable of reply and counter-reply (*uttarottara-vaktā*) with even such an orator as Bṛhaspati; the preceptor of the gods.[2] The science of eristic is also designated as *kathā*,[3] *vāda*,[4] and *sambhāṣā*.[5] *Kathā* is of three kinds : *vāda*, *jalpa*, and *vitaṇḍā*.[6] Akṣapāda defines *vāda* as a truth-hunting exercise'[7], in which sense it can be equated with the dialectic of Plato and Aristotle as distinguished from their 'eristic' ; *jalpa* as a match-winning exercise,[8] in which sense it can be equated with the eristic of Plato and Aristotle ; and *vitaṇḍā* as a worse form of eristic, the parties to which try to get the better of each other without commitment to any position whatever,[9] in which sense it can be equated with sophistic or sophism in the Greek tradition. *Jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* are ostensibly prescribed for jealously guarding the truth like the hedge of thorns round sprouting seeds.[10] An early Buddhist logician also subscribes to this view.[11] Dharmakīrti, the leading Buddhist logician, sardonically remarks, however, that, if such a device is allowed, there is no

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1. *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* 7.1.2; वाकोवाक्येतिहासपुराणकुशल: *Gautama-Dharma-Sūtra* 1.8.6.
2. *Mahābhārata*, *Sabhā-Parvan* 5.5.
3. *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* 1.2 1.
4. *Upāyahṛdaya*, Giuseppe Tucci, *Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources*, pp. 3ff.
5. *Caraka-Saṁhitā*, *Vimāna-Sthāna* 8.6.9-20.
6. *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* 1.2.1.
7. *Nyāya-Sūtra* 1.2.1.
8. *Ibid.* 1.2.2.
9. *Ibid.* 1.2.3.
10. *Ibid.* 4.2.50 :
    तत्त्वाध्यवसायसंरक्षणार्थं जल्पवितण्डे, बीजप्ररोहसंरक्षणार्थं कण्टकशाखावरणवत् ।
11. *Upāyahṛdaya*, p. 4 :
    यथाऽऽम्रफलपरिपुष्टिकामेन तत्फलपरिरक्षणार्थं बहिर् बहुतीक्ष्णकण्टकनिकरविन्यास: क्रियते, वादारम्भोऽपि तथैवाधुना सद्धर्मरक्षणेच्छया, न तु ख्यातिलाभाय ।

reason to disallow physical duel and use of sword.[1] Jaina logicians dismiss *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* as pseudo-dialectic (*kathābhāsa*).[2] It appears that sacrificial ceremonies provided a suitable occasion fot eristical feats. In the horse-sacrifice performed by Yudhiṣṭhira eristicians vied with each other in trying to emerge victorious in the eristical matches.[3]

Caraka deals with *vāda, Jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* in a similar vein[4] He uses the terms '*sandhāya-sambhāṣā*' (peaceful discussion) and '*vigṛhya-sambhāṣā*' (hostile discussion) in the sense of dialectic, and eristic, *vāda* and *jalpa-vitaṇḍā*, respectively.[5] 'The physician should enter into disputation with the physician', he enjoins.[6]

The disputation consists of three processes : thesis (*sthāpanā*), antithesis (*ākṣepa* or *prati-sthāpanā*), and synthesis (*siddhānta*).[7]

In several ancient texts, the king is required to master four sciences : *Ānvīkṣikī, Trayī* (Vedic studies), *Vārtā* (political economy), and *Daṇḍa-Nīti* (polity).[8] It is traditioned that these four sciences were duly dealt with in a 1600-chapters long treatise composed by Brahman (masculine) or Prajāpati in order to inaugurate a new age (*yuga*).[9] Any way, *Ānvikṣikī* is often described as *Nyāya-Vidyā, Hetu-Vidyā* or *Tarka-Vidyā* (science of logic, reaso-

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1. तत्त्वसंरक्षणार्थं सद्भिरुपहर्तव्यमेव छलादि विजिगीषुभिरिति चेन्, नख-चपेट-शस्त्रप्रहारादीपनादिभिरपींति वक्तव्यम्। तस्मान् न ज्यायानयं तत्त्व-रक्षणोपायः।

   Dharmakīrti, *Vādanyāya*, p. 71.
2. See for example, Akalaṅka, *Siddhiviniścaya* 5.2.
3. तस्मिन् यज्ञे प्रवृत्ते तु वाग्मिनो हेतुवादिनः।
   हेतुवादान् बहूनाहुः परस्परजिगीषवः॥
   Mahābhārata, Āśvamedhika-Parvan 85.27.
4. *Caraka-Saṁhitā, Vimāna-Sthāna* 8.28.
5. *Ibid*. 8.15 ff.
6. *Ibid* 8.14
7. *Ibid*. 8.31, 32, 37; *Mahābhārata, Ādi-parvan* 70.40.
8. *Manu-Smṛti* 7.43 ; *Artha-Śāstra* 1.2.1. *Mahābhārata, Śānti-Parvan* 59.33; 318.34-35, 47. Cp. *Gautama-Dharma-Sūtra* 2.2 3.
9. *Mahābhārata, Śāntī-Parvan* 59.29,33.

ning, or eristic),[1] in which sense it comes under fire in extralogical literature. In the *Rāmāyaṇa*, Rāma suggests that the secularist-Brāhmaṇas given to *Ānvīkṣikī* are prattlers, who disregard even the chief religious codes.[2] In the *Mahābhārata*, Indra confesses to Kāśyapa that he came to be a jackal by being given up to the useless science of reasoning called *Ānvīkṣikī*, insinuating against the Vedas, and doubting everything.[3] Manu condemns the subjection of religion to insult through the science of reasoning (*hetu śāstra*,.[4] He also rules that eristicians must not be honoured even by lip-service.[5] He will permit only such '*tarka*' (logic) as is in consonance with the Vedas and other scriptures [6] Vyāsa forbids the teaching of Sāṅkhya to those burnt down by the science of logic.[7]

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1. आन्वीक्षिकी न्यायविद्या *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* 1.1.1; आन्वीक्षिकीं तर्क-विद्याम्—। *Mahābhārata, Śānti-Parvan* 180.47; *Anuśāsana-Parvan* 37.12. Cp. न्यायतन्त्राण्यनेकानि तैस् तैरुक्तानि वादिभिः *Śānti-Parvan* 210 22.
2. कच्चिन् न लोकायतिकान् ब्राह्मणांस् तात ! सेवसे ?
   अनर्थकुशला ह्येते बालाः पण्डितमानिनः ॥
   धर्मशास्त्रेषु मुख्येषु विद्यमानेषु दुर्बुधाः
   बुद्धिमान्वीक्षिकीं प्राप्य निरर्थं प्रवदन्ति ते ॥ *Rāmāyaṇa* 2.100.38-39.
3. अहमासं पण्डितको, हैतुको, वेदनिन्दकः,
   आन्वीक्षिकीं तर्कविद्यामनुरक्तो निरर्थिकाम्,
   हेतुवादान् प्रवदिता, वक्ता संसत्सु हेतुमत्,
   आक्रोष्टा, चाभिवक्ता च, ब्रह्मवाक्येषु च द्विजान्,
   नास्तिकः, सर्वशङ्की च, मूर्खः, पण्डितमानिकः ।
   तस्येयं फलनिर्वृत्तिः शृगालत्वं मम द्विज !॥
   Mahābhāraia, Śānti-Parvan 180.47-49
4. योऽवमन्येत ते मूले हेतुशास्त्राश्रयाद् द्विजः
   स साधुभिर् बहिष्कार्यः नास्तिको वेदनिन्दकः ॥
   Manu-Smṛti 2.11.
5. पाषण्डिनो, विकर्मस्थान्, वैडालव्रतिकाञ्, छठान्,
   हैतुकान्, बकवृत्तींश् च वाङ्मात्रेणापि नार्चयेत् ॥
   Ibid 4.30.
6. *Ibid.* 12.106. Cp. *Mahābhārata, Śānti-Parvan* 269.52, condemning '*vāda*'.
7. न तर्कशास्त्रदग्धाय ··। *Mahābhārata, Śānti-Parvan* 248.18.

He reports, however, that Yudhiṣṭhira sated with pleasures even the wretched logicians (*tārkikān api*),[1] the adverb 'even' suggesting that it was an act of grace or condescension on his part to include the logicians among his beneficiaries.

Incidentally, here the tern '*tarka*' does not appear to stand for the special form of reasoning, sometimes translated as dialectical reasoning, such as in the *Nyāya-Sūtra* : '*Tarka* is the reasoning suggestive of proof calculated to yield knowledge of the true character of a thing, when the true character of the thing is not (already) known.'[2] On the contrary, it stands for the whole process of reasoning of which the '*tarka*' of the *Nyāya-Sūtra* is but one variety. It is more or less in this wider sense that the term is used in the *Brahma-Sūtra* : '*Tarka* is unstable'.[3] In demonstration of the instability of *tarka*, Śaṅkara examines the three means of knowledge—perception, inference, and scripture, thereby suggesting that the term '*tarka*' covers the entire range of logic and epistemology[4] It is interesting to note, incidentally, that Veṅkaṭanātha[5] and Jayatīrtha[6] regard '*ta·ka*' or '*yukti*' as a species of inference (*anumāna*) and Caraka[7] and the Jainas[8] accord to it the status of an independent means of knowledge; Yāska narrates an interesting tradition that, when the tribe of the seers was on the verge of extinction, they installed '*tarka*' as their substitute, to guide mankind.[9] Here '*tarka*' acquires its widest sense of philosophy.

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1. Mahābhārata, Sāntiparvan 45.6.
2. *Nyāya-Sūtra* 1.1.40
3. तर्काप्रतिष्ठानात् ··· । *Brahma-Sūtra* 2.1.11.
4. *Śārīraka-Bhāṣya* 2.1.11.
5. See Sitansusekhar Bagchi, *Inductive Reasoning :* A Study of Tarka and Its Role in Indian Logic, p. 106.
6. *Ibid*-p. 79.
7. *Caraka-Saṁhitā, Sūtra-Sthāna 11.7.18.*
8. See, for example, Māṇikyanandin, *Parīkṣāmukha-Sūtra* (with Prabhācandra's *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa*), 2 1-2; 3.1-2.
9. *Nirukta 13.12.*

We have demonstrated elsewhere how Plato's dialectic becomes co-extensive with philosophy. *Ānvīkṣikī*, too, has had a similar history. Manu seems to equate or identify it with '*ātma vidyā*', the science of the self, while enumerating it among the four sciences the king is required to study.[1] Kauṭilya and Kāmandaka report the followers of Manu (*Mānavāḥ*) to hold that *Ānvīkṣikī* is a branch of the Vedic studies.[2] Here '*Ānvīkṣikī*' seems to refer to what is called Vedānta or Upaniṣad, which deals with the science of the self. Kāmandaka does define '*Ānvikṣikī*' as '*Ātma-vijñāna*,[3] The *Śukra-Nīti* follows suit, substituting '*Ātma-vidyā*' for '*Ātma-vijñāna*'[4] Indeed it subsumes the Vedānta, too, under '*Ānvīkṣiki*'.[5]

The signification of the term '*Ānvīkṣikī*' is further widened when it is made coextensive with philosophy (including methodology and metaphysics) almost in so many words. It is in this sense that Kauṭilya appears to use the term when he remarks that

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1. Manu's words are, to give the reading that commends itself to us most, viz. the reading of Uddyotakara in *Nyāya-Vārtika* 1.1.1, p. 12 :

   त्रैविद्येभ्यस् त्रयीं विद्याम्, दण्डनीतिं च तद्विदः,

   आन्वीक्षिकीं चात्मविद्भ्यो, वार्तारम्भाँश् च लोकतः ।।

   Manu-Smṛti 7.43.

2. त्रयी, वार्ता, दण्डनीतिश् चेति मानवाः । त्रयीविशेषो ह्यान्वीक्षिकीति ।

   Artha-Śāstra 1.2.2-3;

   त्रयी, वार्ता, दण्डनीतिरिति विद्या हि मानवाः ।

   त्रय्या एव विभागोऽयं सेयमान्वीक्षिकी मता ।।

   Kāmandakīya-Nītisāra 2.3.

3. आन्वीक्षिक्यात्मविज्ञानं, धर्माधर्मौ त्रयीस्थितौ,

   अर्थानर्थौ तु वार्तायां, दण्डनीतौ नयानयौ ।।

   आन्वीक्षिक्यात्मविद्या स्यादीक्षणात् सुखदुःखयोः ।

   ईक्षमाणस् तया तत्त्वं हर्षशोकौ व्युदस्यति ।

   Kāmandakīya-Nītisāra 2.7, 11.

4. आन्वीक्षिक्यात्मविज्ञानाद्धर्षशोकौ व्युदस्यति ।

   Śukra-Nīti 1.57 It appears to be a modern text, howexer. See Lallanji Gopal, *The Śukranīti : A Ninceteenth Century Text.*

5. आन्वीक्षिक्यां तर्कशास्त्रं वेदान्ताद्यं प्रतिष्ठितम् ।

   Ibid. 1.152.

Ānvīkṣīkī is Sāṅkhya, Yoga, and Lokāyata.[1] But why, if '*Ānvīkṣikī*' means philosophy, does Kauṭilya instead of giving an exhaustive list of the schools of philosophy, mention only three schools, not caring to mention even Vedānta and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools ?

It appears that, till the age of Kauṭilya, Vedānta had not developed as a school independent of Sāṅkhya, of which it formed part originally. Even the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, regarded technically as a source-book of Vedānta, mentions only two supreme paths of salvation, Sāṅkhya and Yoga, omitting Vedānta altogether.[2] Indeed, it itself cites a *Brahma-Sūtra,* apparently different from the *Brahma-Sūtra* ascribed to Bādarāyaṇa, as setting out the theory of the self akin to the Sāṅkhya theory.[3] Yes, the *Gītā's Brahma-Sūtra* cannot be the *Brahma-Śūtra* we have, for the patent reason that the latter does not set out such a theory. Besides, the extant *Brahma-Śūtra* is ascribable to Bādarāyaṇa rather than to Vyāsa, the putative author of the *Mahābhārata* including the *Gītā,* which it refers to as authorities. Two examples should suffice. The Sūtra describing the self as part of the Absolute[4] appears clearly to refer to the *Gītā* text to that effect.[5] Likewise, in the *Śūtra*

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1. साङ्ख्यं, योगो, लोकायतं चेत्यान्वीक्षिकी ।
Artha-Śāstra 1.2.10.

2. लोकेऽस्मिन् द्विविधा निष्ठा पुरा प्रोक्ता मयाऽनघ ।
ज्ञानयोगेन साङ्ख्यानां, कर्मयोगेन योगिनाम् ॥
Bhagavad-Gītā 3.3.

3. तत् क्षेत्रं, यच्च यादृक् च, यद् विकारि, यतश्च यत् ।
स च यो यत्प्रभावश्च तत् समासेन मे शृणु ॥
ऋषिभिर् बहुधा गीतं छन्दोभिर् विविधैः पृथक् ।
ब्रह्मसूत्रपदैश्चैव हेतुमद्भिर् विनिश्चयैः ।
महाभूतान्यहङ्कारो बुद्धिरव्यक्तमेव च ।
इन्द्रियाणि दशैकं च पञ्च चेन्द्रियगोचराः ॥
Ibid. 13.3-5.

4. अंशो नानाव्यपदेशात्··· ।
Brahma-Sūtra 2.3.43.

5. ममैवांशो जीवलोके जीवभूतः सनातनः ।
मनःषष्ठानीन्द्रियाणि प्रकृतिस्थानि कर्षति ॥
Gītā 15.7.

'And they do remember' (*Smaranti ca*),[1] it is authorities like Vyāsa, the author of the *Mahābhārata*, that are referred to, as held by Śaṅkara for example.[2] Indeed, it is the way of Śaṅkara to quote the *Mahābhārata* and the *Gītā* as '*smṛti-s*', in particular, on behalf of the author of the *Sūtra-s*. So Vyāsa is an authority for Bādarāyaṇa and, accordingly, different from him. Naturally, therefore, the *Gītā's Brahma-Sūtra* is different from the extant *Brahma-Sūtra*. Pāṇini refers to a *Bhikṣu-Sūtra* by a Pārāśarya.[3] This Pārāśarya is identifiable with the Pārāśarya Bhikṣu Pañcaśikha referred to as the preceptor of Janaka in the *Mahābhārata*.[4] Maybe, he or someone else was the author of the *Brahma-Sūtra* referred to in the *Gītā*.

Now, the 'Yoga' referred to by Kauṭilya is usually considered the Yoga system allied to the Sāṅkhya and represented by the *Yoga-Sūtra* ascribed to Patañjali. Kuppuswami Sastri maintains that it stands for the Vaiśeṣika logic and that the word 'Lokāyata' used by Kauṭilya stands for the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika logic in its secularized form and as distinguished from its Vedic associations.[5] He does not indicate the basis, however, for such an

see p. 76

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1. स्मरन्ति च । *Brahma-Sūtra* 2.3.47.
2. With the remark, स्मरन्ति च व्यासादयो यथा जैवेन दुःखेन न परमात्मा दुःखायत इति, Śaṅkara quotes the following text from the *Mahābhārata, Śānti-Parvan* 351.14-16 :
   तत्र यः परमात्मा हि स नित्यो निर्गुणः स्मृतः ।
   न लिप्यते फलैश्चापि पद्मपत्रमिवाम्भसा ।
   कर्मात्मा त्वपरो योऽसौ मोक्षबन्धैः स युज्यते ।
   स सप्तदशकेनापि राशिना युज्यते पुनः ।
   Śārīraka-Bhāṣya 2.3.47.
3. पाराशर्यशिलालिभ्यां भिक्षु-नट-सूत्रयोः ।
   Aṣṭādhyāyī, Brahmadatta Jijñāsu, ed., Shri Ramlal Kapur Trust Granthamala, No. 24 (7th ed., Bahalgarh : Ramlal Kapur Trust, 1971), 4.3.110.
4. पराशरसगोत्रस्य वृद्धस्य सुमहात्मनः ।
   भिक्षोः पञ्चशिखस्याहं शिष्यः परमसम्मतः ॥
   Mahābhārata, Śānti Parvan 320.24.
5. Kuppuswami Sastri, *A Primer of Indian Logic According to Annambhaṭṭa's Tarkasaṅgraha*, pp. xviii, xvi.

interpretation of 'Lokāyata'. Distinguishing this 'Lokāyata' from the materialist system of Cārvāka, he contends that 'the view of the Cārvāka materialist is separately mentioned in a previous part of the same chapter and Kauṭilya rejects it and is not prepared to bring the Cārvāka doctrine under any recognized *vidyā* or branch of learning.'[1] This statement does seem to have force. Kauṭilya mentions '*Bārhaspatyāḥ*' (Cārvāka materialists) and their rejection of the Vedas.[2] Their doctrine cannot come under '*Ānvīkṣikī*', for the simple reason that they reject the Vedas, whereas *Ānvīkṣikī* is, according to him, part of the Vedic studies. Rightly, therefore, Kauṭilya nowhere suggests that his 'Lokāyata' refers to the Cārvāka materialists called '*Bārhaspatyāḥ*'.

As a matter of fact, there is reason to believe that there was also a Vedic Lokāyata (ascribed to the same Bṛhaspati, however), as suggested in the *Maṇimekhalai*.[3] It is noteworthy that 'Lokāyata' finds place in the list of the accomplishments of learned Brāhmaṇa-s in the *Mahābhārata*[4] as well as in the Pāli canon.[5] The term as used in the latter literature is interpreted to mean critical reasoning (*vitaṇḍā vāda*-sattham) in the *Aṭṭha-Kathā*, though, as pointed out by Rhys Davids, it is complimentary rather than derogatory. He interprets it to meam 'Nature-lore,

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1. *Ibid*, p. xviii.
2. वार्ता दण्डनीतिश्चेति बार्हस्पत्याः । संवरणमात्रं हि त्रयी लोकयात्राविद इति । *Artha-Sāstra* 1.2,4-5.
3. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar, *Manimekhalai in Its Historical Setting*, pp. 67, 92.
4. *Mahābhārata, Ādi-Parvan* 70.46.
5. *Dīgha-Nikāya*, Bhikkhu J. Kashyap, ed., Nalanda-Devanagari-Pali-Series (Nalanda ; Pali Publication Board, 1958), *Sīlakkhandha-Vagga*, *Brahmajāla-Sutta*, p. 11 ; *Sāmaññaphala Sutta*, p.61 : *Majjhima-Nikāya*, ed. cit., *Brahmajāla-Sutta*, pp 382, *390; Sela-Sutta*, p. 397; *Assalāyatana-Sutta*, p. 403; *Caṅki-Sutta*, pp. 429, 432; *Saṅgārava-Sutta*, p. 483; *Saṁyutta-Nikāya, ed. cit.*, *Nidāna-Vagga*, *Nidāna-Saṁyutta*, *Lokāyatika-Sutta*, pp. 65-66; *Aṅguttara-Nikāya*. ed. cit., *Navaka-Nipāta*, *Mahāvagga*, *Lokāyatika-Sutta*, p. 66; *Sutta-Nipāta*, ed. cit, *Mahāvagga*, *Sela-Sutta*, p. 354.

wise sayings, riddles, rhymes'.[1] According to G. Tucci, however, it is not '*loka* but '*bhājana-loka*' in the Pāli canon which signifies 'nature'.[2] The *Saṁyutta-Nikāya*[3] lists the Lokāyata doctrines as follows : (1) All is (*sabbam atthi ti*) : (2) All is not (*sabbam natthi* ti) : (3) All is one (*sabbam ekattaṁ ti*) ; and (4) All is separate/different (*sabbam puthuttaṁ ti*) [4] According to the *Aṭṭha-Kathā*, the first and third represent eternalism (*sassata-diṭṭhiyo*), while the second and the third nihilationism (*uccheda-diṭṭhiyo*). The second adumbrates Dīghanakha's view,[5] seemingly revived by Jayarāśi.[6] The *Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra* lists thirty-one kinds of Lokāyata doctrines, including the foregoing.[7]

Well, the *Maṇimekhalai* again There is no reason why, as held by others, the teacher of the gods, the putative founder of Lokāyata, should found an anti-Vedic school of philosophy. The same treatise refers to Buddhism, too, as Vedic, which is not wholly unfounded. Aside from the patent fact that the Buddha is accepted by the Hindus as an incarnation of Viṣṇu, there is not a wholly incredible tradition that there was a veritable *Śākhā* of the Vedas, called *Nimitta-Śākhā*, which was once interpreted to refer to the Buddha as omniscient.[8]

There also appears to be some force in Kuppuswami's interpretation of the term 'Yoga' used in Kauṭilya's passags quoted above. It is evident that tie *Gītā's* 'Yoga' cannot be the Yoga system represented by Patañjali, which has nothing to do with the path of action (*karma-yoga*) as opposed to the path of knowledge (*jñāna-yoga*` ascribed to 'Sāṅkhya'. The *Gītā* makes it clear that Sāṅkhya enjoins the path of knowledge and Yoga, the path of

1. K. N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory cf Knowledge* (London : George Allen & Unwin, 1963), p. 49.
2. *Loc. cit.*
3. *Saṁyutta-Nikāya, Nidāna-Vagga,Nidāna-Saṁyutta, Lokāyatika-Sutta,* pp. 65-66.
4. Jayatilleke, *op. cit.*, p. 50.
5. *Majjhima-Nikāya. Majjhima-Paṇṇāsaka, Dighanakha-Sutta* pp. 193-195.
6. Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa, *Tattvopaplavasiṁha.*
7. *Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra*, pp. 71-72.
8. *Tattvasaṅgraha*, with *Pañjikā*, 3510 ff.

action.[1] In the *Ahirbudhnya-Saṁhitā*, the term 'Yoga', as juxtaposed to 'Sāṅkhya', appears to signify *karma-yoga*, broadly speaking.[2] Another source from which light can be had on this issue is the *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana. It says that, according to Sāṅkhya, nothing can come out of nothing, that what exists cannot be reduced to nothingness, that intelligences are unmodifiable, that modification belongs to the objects—the body, the senses, and the monad (*manas*) · as also to their causes. He adds that, according to Yoga, the elemental creation is due to the acts of man etc., that imperfections and conations are the cause of action, that intelligences are endowed with their own respective attributes, that the non-existent comes into existence and that the existent is reduced to non-existence.[3] Here Vātsyāyana unmistakably identifies Yoga with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Indeed, Raghūttama, a modern Naiyāyika, identifies Vātsyāyana's 'Yoga' with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika with the remark, 'Yoga is *yukti* (reasoning), or *tarka* (logic)'.[4] It is also interesting to note that Rājaśekhara uses the term 'Yoga' as a synonym for Śaiva philosophy,[5] which, however, covers the entire Nyāya school excluding the Vaiśeṣika school, which he chooses to call the Pāśupata school and describes as akin to the Yoga school.[6] It appears that the tradition of a *Yoga-Śāstra* having been written by Śiva or[7] Maheśvara is well based and that the treatise set out a

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1. *Gītā* 3 3.
2. निष्कर्मणः स्मृताः साङ्ख्याः प्रसङ्ख्यानैकतत्पराः ।
   नित्यनैमित्तिकैर् युक्तो योगो योगाङ्गवाञ्छया ॥
   कुर्यादलब्धलाभाय लब्धवृद्धाय एव च ।
   ब्रह्मिष्ठो वैदिकं कर्म नित्यं नैमित्तिकं तथा ॥
   Ahirbudhnya-Saṁhitā 15.24-25.
3. *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* 1.1.29.
4. योगो युक्तिस्तर्कः प्रधानतया येषां ते योगाः ।
   Raghūttama, *Bhāṣyacandra* 1.1.29, p. 133.
5. अथ योगमतं ब्रूमः शैवमित्यपराभिधम् ।
   Rājaśekhara, *Ṣaḍdarśana-Samuccaya* 84.
6. अथ वैशेषिकं ब्रूमः शैवमित्यपराभिधम् । *Ibid.* 113.
   अक्षपादेन ऋषिणा रचितत्वात् तु यौगिकम् ॥ *Ibid.* 131.
7. ···माहेश्वरं योगशास्त्रम् ·· ।
   Bhāsa, *Pratimā-Nāṭaka*, Act V, p.51.

philosophy covering Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. This *Yoga Śāstra* might have been different from the *Yoga-Śāstra* produced by Hiraṇyagarbha,[1] the putative prototype of the *Yoga-Sūtra* ascribed to Patañjali. In fact the *Ahirbudhnya-Saṁhitā* speaks of two Yoga-Saṁhitā-s, one dealing with the science of control (of the mind)—*nirodha-yoga*—and the other with the science of works (*karma-yoga*), though it ascribes both to Hiraṇyagarbha.[2] From Haribhadra Sūri and Praśastapāda it is gathered that Śiva is the supreme deity of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School.[3] Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra says that there was an older *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra* written by Śiva. Even the extant *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* is reported to have been proclaimed to Kapila by Śiva[4] in the form of an owl.[5] Indeed in the *Padārthadharma-Saṅgraha* Maheśvara is the supreme deity.[6]

So, in the *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* Yoga appears to stand for Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika or some kindred school of philosophy. The 'Yoga' of the *Gītā*, too, is different from the Yoga system represented by Patañjali. It appears to be one of the two chief dimensions of an identity, of which the other dimension is Sāṅkhya in the *Gītā* sense of the term.

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1. हिरण्यगर्भो योगस्य वक्ता, नान्यः पुरातनः ।
   Mahābhārata, Śānti-Parvan 349.65.
2. आदौ हिरण्यगर्भेण द्वे प्रोक्ते योगसंहिते ।
   एका निरोधयोगाख्या कर्मयोगाह्वयाऽपरा ।
   Ahirbudhnya-Saṁhitā 12.32.33.
3. आक्षपादमते देवः सृष्टिसंहारकृच्छिवः ।
   विभुर् नित्यैकसर्वज्ञो नित्यबुद्धिसमाश्रयः ।।
   Haribhadra Sūri, *Ṣaḍdarśana-Samuccaya* 13 ;
   देवताविषये भेदो नास्ति नैयायिकैः समम् ।
   *Ibid.*59 ;
   सकलभुवनपतेर् महेश्वरस्य ·· ।
   Padārthadharma-Saṅgraha, p. 20.
4. Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra, *Kaṇāda-Sūtra-Nibandha*, cited in Anantalal Thakur 'Bhaṭṭa-Vādīndra—the Vaiśeṣika', *JOI*, Baroda X, No. 1.
5. Thakur, *Loc. cit.*
6. *Padārthadharma-Saṅgraha*, pp 20-22.

Thus, Kauṭilya's statement. that *Ānvīkṣiki* consists of Sāṅkhya, Yoga, and Lokāyata is capable of being construed to cover almost all the chief schools of orthodox Indian philosophy—'Sāṅkhya' standing for Vedānta, later Sāṅkhya, and later Yoga; Yoga for some now undecipherable system of which Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika might be an offshoot; and Lokāyata, for the Vedic prototype of the later Lokāyata schools. The Pāñcarātra and allied schools are covered by the expression 'Sāṅkhya', without which they are unthinkable. The Śaiva and Pāśupata schools appear to have been subsumed under 'Yoga'. Pūrva Mīmāṁsā does not then seem to have developed into an independent system of philosophy which is why it is left out of account. Therefore, the '*Ānvīkṣikī*' of Kauṭilya is philosophy in the usual sense of the term.

It is in this vein, to be sure, that Kauṭilya waxes lyrical about *Ānvīkṣikī* : '*Ānvīkṣikī* is ever the lamp of all the sciences, the clue to all works, the ground of all merit.'[1] This verse is quoted by Vātsyāyana, with a slight variation just to indicate that it is a quotation.[2] It is bound to remind one of Plato's dialectic which he describes as 'the copingstone of the sciences' and as 'set over them'.[3] In the same vein, he asserts that dialectic and 'dialectic alone, goes directly to the first principles and is the only science which does away with hypotheses in order to make her ground secure; the eye of soul, which is really buried in an outlandish slough, is by her gentle aid lifted upwards; and in this work she uses as hand-maids and helpers the sciences which we have been discussing,'[4] Indeed like '*Ānvīkṣikī*', Plato's dialectic is 'the study of all wisdom whatever'.[5]

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1. प्रदीपः सर्वविद्यानामुपायः सर्वकर्मणाम् ।
आश्रयः सर्वधर्माणां शश्वदान्वीक्षिकी मता ॥
Artha-Śāstra 1. 2. 12.
2. प्रदीपः सर्वविद्यानामुपायः सर्वकर्मणाम् ।
आश्रयः सर्वधर्माणां विद्योद्देशे प्रकीर्तिता ॥
Nyāya-Bhāṣya 1. 1. 1.
3. Plato, *Philebus*, *The Dialogues of Plato*, B. Jowett, tr. (4th ed., Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1953), 534e.
4. Plato, *Republic*, ed. cit., 533 c-d.
5. *Ibid.* 475, 486a.

The verse referred to above, incidentally, also serves to throw into relief the practical character of the Indian concept of philosophy. In fact, the Cārvāka materialists and pan-negativists are dubbed mere wranglers just because their schools are far from conducive to higher life.[1]

Rājaśekhara divides *Ānvīkṣikī* into the question-side (*pūrva-pakṣa*) and the answer-side (*uttara-pakṣa* , placing Jainism, Buddhism, and Lokāyata in the first and Sāṅkhya, Nyāya, and Vaiśeṣika in the second category, and giving them all the common name of 'six logics or dialectics (*ṣaṭ-tarkāḥ* '.[2] This description of *Ānvīkṣikī* leaves no doubt whatever that *Ānvīkṣikī* means what dialectic means to Plato and Aristotle—eristic, logic, and philosophy, all together.

The subject-matter of *Ānvīkṣikī* is twofold : *Ātman* (the Self) and *Tarka*(logic and epistemology). Hence it is more than either *ātma-vidyā* or *tarka-śāstra*. As *ātma-vidyā*, it is identifiable with Upaniṣad or the above-noted schools into which the Upaniṣadic thought came to be crystallized ; as *tarka-śāstra*, it is condemned by the scriptures. Vātsyāyana remarks, that without setting out reasoning, dealt with in the *Nyāya-Sūtra* under fourteen heads, in the table of sixteen categories minus the first two, *Ānvīkṣikī* would run the risk of being reduced to the status of the science of the Self like the Upaniṣad.[3] Uddyotakara adds that the science of the Self, like the Upaniṣad, is included in the first science, the Vedas.[4] This, too, serves to confirm our view that *Ānvīkṣikī* is co-extensive with philosophy. In a way, it may also

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1. न हि लोकायते किञ्चित् कर्तव्यमुपदिश्यते ।
   वैतण्डिककथैवासौ न पुनः कश्चिदागमः ।।
   Nyāya-Mañjarī, Pramāṇa-Prakaraṇa, p. 247.

2. द्विधा चान्वीक्षिकी, पूर्वोत्तरपक्षाभ्याम् । अर्हद्-भदन्त-दर्शने लोकायतं च पूर्वपक्षः, साङ्ख्यं न्यायवैशेषिकौ चोत्तरः । त इमे षट् तर्काः ।

   Rājaśekhara, *Kāvya-Mīmāṁsā*, chapter 2, pp. 10-11. The omission of Pūrva- and Uttara-Mimāṁsā (Vedānta) is significant."

3. *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* 1.1.1, p. 3.

4. *Nyāya-Vārtika* 1.1.1, p. 12.

be said to be akin to Hegel's Logic which comprises formal logic as well as ontology.

Thus, like the dialectic of Plato and Aristotle, our dialectic designated as *Ānvīkṣikī* starts its career as eristic and ends as philosophy.

Ānvīkṣikī came later to be styled *'Nyāya'* which, originally, was not a monopoly of the Naiyāyikas but was used by logicians of all the schools of philosophy. Gradually, however, it came to be more and more pinned down to the school of the Naiyāyikas. Indeed, as is evident from its use in the *Āpastamba-Dharma-Sūtra*, it clearly refers to Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā rather than to the system of the Naiyāyikas.[1] Āpastamba, who is almost as old as Plato, appears to be aware of both the Pūrva- and the Uttara-Mīmāṁasā systems.[2]

Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana and Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana talk of the Greek origin of Indian dialectic and logic. But there is no warrant for such an assertion. The term *'Nyāya'* in the sense of logic appears to be known to Pāṇini, who was anterior to Aristotle, the father of Western logic. In one of his *Sūtra-s*, *'nyāya'* means 'propriety ;'[3] in another, it is derived and given the meaning 'propriety' (*abhreṣa*);[4] and, in a third, it is sought to be derived again.[5] In the last *Sūtra* the term must signify something else, as otherwise it would be superfluous, which is unthinkable of the *Sūtra*-thrifty Pāṇini. This circumstance lends support to the view, originally put forward by Theodor Goldstücker,[6] that here *'nyāya'* means 'logic' or 'syllogistic reasoning'.

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1. *Āpastamba-Dharma-Sūtra* 2.4.8.13; 2.6.14.13,
2. See Bühler, *Sacred Laws, SBE. 'Āpastamba'*, Introduction,
3. *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 4.4.92, read *with the Gaṇa to Sūtra* 4.3.54.
4. *Ibid.* 3.3.37.
5. *Ibid.* 3.3.122.
6. Theodor Goldstücker, *Pāṇini*, pp. 166-167.

CHAPTER VI

THE DHARMIC OUTLOOK

The Sanskrit terms 'samaja' and 'samāja' signify, respectively, a herd of animals and society of human beings (originally, a club or convivial assembly). For their subsistence, individuals of a samaja have to fend for themselves, whereas those of a samāja have to be interrelated and interdependent in one respect or another, directly or indirectly.

Primitive society, a society which has little or no history and has known no progress from time immemorial, lives, moves, and has its being in what are called 'artha' and 'kāma', necessaries and luxuries, but only such of these as are vouchsafed to it by the bounties of nature directly, without the productive mediation of the human hand. When, in course of time, the tendeney towards acquisition of artha and kāma assumes high proportions and begins to be cultivated by artificial means, the society becomes a civilization. When a civilization evolves dharma, viz. a system of transcendental values, values transcending the utilitarian order, such as those reflected by art, religion and philosophy, it becomes a culture. Civilization and culture are sometimes succesive and sometimes simultaneous. Sometimes, again, a primitive society comes to evolve dharma straightway, overstepping the stage of civilization, and thereby becomes a culture before becoming a civilization. In ancient India, for instance, culture seems to have preceded civilization by clear margins. Civilization is marked by the development of positive sciences and technology, suited to the stage of societal evolution, whereas culture is characterized by a harvest of religion, philosophy, and art. Culture is essentially self-culture. In the Brāhmaṇas, music and art are styled 'ātma-saṁskriti', self-culture, self-refinement, self-embellishment.[1] Con-

1. *Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa* 6.27 ; *Gopatha-Brāhmaṇa* 2.6.7.

trariwise. civilization is essentially nurture and culture of resources, so to speak. In fine, a well-developed social order may be likened to an organism, having civilization as its body and culture as its soul.

Religion has played its role in the acculturation of man through inculcation of what is called wary living as against wanton living. Disfavouring the derivation of the word 'religion' from 'religare', 'to bind' man to God,[1] Jose Ortega y Gasset writes : 'To live not wantonly but warily—wary of a transcendent reality—is the strict meaning of the Latin word *religiosus* and indeed the essential meaning of all religion...The adjective... has preserved the original meaning of the noun, and *religiosus* stands for scrupulous, not trifling, conscientious. The opposite of religion thus would be negligence, carelessness, indifference, laxity. Over against *religio* we have *neg-lego; religens* (religicus) is contrasted with negligence!'[2] Sri Aurobindo also observes : 'Religion is the first attempt of man to get beyond himself and the obvious and material facts of his existence'.[3]

Science is the quest for cause with a view to controlling and exploiting nature. So, it aims at action. Philosophy is the quest for reason, which implies teleology, value. So, it aims at thought. And religion is the quest for fulfilment. So, it aims at becoming, transformation. Therefore, religion is the chief concern of man. Sri Aurobindo has rightly remarked that man is not what he thinks, nor what he does but what he becomes. From another angle of vision, science can be held to aim at utility through knowledge of truth; philosophy, at the knowledge of truth, goodness, and beauty; and religion, at the *attainment* of truth, goodness and beauty, tentatively taking truth, goodness, and beauty to represent

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1. It is said that the word 'religion' was coined by the Church Father Lactantius (260-300), the author of the *Divine Institutes*, from 're' and 'ligo' (to tie back, to bind, to reunite). Cp. the term 'yoga', literally 'tie' 'yoke', 'union'.
2. Jose Ortega y Gasset, *Concord and Liberty* (1946), quoted in S. Radhikrishnan, *Recovery of faith*, p. 41, f. n. 3.
3. Sri Aurobindo, *The Synthesis of Yoga*, p. 439.

the summum bonum. From a third angle of vision, we may say that science is motivated by utility; philosophy, by curiosity ; and religion, by felicity.

Marx observes that 'every true philosophy is the spiritual quintessence of its time'[1] and credits Feuerbach with a 'great achievement' for the latter's 'proof that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought'.[2] Hegel was the first to note that 'Philosophy thinks and conceives of that which Religion represents as the object of consciousness,'[3] that 'Thought first of all comes forth within Religion',[4] that 'Thus Religion has a content common with Philosophy the forms alone being different',[5] and that, therefore, 'Philosophy stands on the same basis as Religion and has the same object—the universal reason existing in and for itself'.[6]

Religion, as usually conceived in the West, is essentially personal. Whitehead defines it as 'solitariness' or 'what the individual does with his own solitariness'. Spengler has it that 'No religion aims at improving the world of facts······what has the agony of a soul to do with communism ? A religion that has gone as far as taking social problems in hand has ceased to be a religion.'[7] He concludes : 'Religion is, first and last, metaphysics, other-worldliness, awareness in a world of which the evidence of the senses merely lights the foreground. It is life in and with the supersensible.'[8]

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1. Karl Marx, 'The Leading Article of No. 179 of *Kolnische Zeitung*', *On Religion*, p. 31.
2. Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 3 (1843-1844), p. 328.
3. G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 76.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
5. *Ibid* , p. 79.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 63.
7. Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, Vol. II, p. 195.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 217.

Now, in its narrower acceptation, dharma is only one of the four human goods (puruṣārtha-s) : artha, kāma, dharma, and mokṣa. It is in this sense that Jaimini defines dharma as scriptural command (codanā)[1] and that Śaṅkara opposes dharma to Brahman. Here Śaṅkara defines dharma as physical, vocal, and mental action laid down in the scripture (śārīraṁ, vācikaṁ, mānasaṁ ca karma Śruti-Smṛti-siddhaṁ dharmākhyam),[2] which leads to abhyudaya (prosperity, worldly and otherworldly).[3] The knowledge of Brahman, on the other hand, leads to niśreyasa (the summum bonum, mokṣa).[4] In the same vein, he tends to equate dharma and Brahman with a parā vidyā (lower knowledge) and parā vidyā (higher knowledge), karma vidyā (ritualism) and Brahma vidyā (theosophy), respectively, the one leading to prosperity and the other to the summum bonum [5] Thus conceived, roughly speaking, dharma becomes synonymous with popular religion.

Kaṇāda gives a broader definition of dharma : 'Dharma is what is conducive to abhyudaya and niḥṣreyas.[6] Śāntarakṣita observes that this definition is acceptable to all scholars.[7] Here, too, it is religion, in its higher reaches—religion as ultimate concern, to borrow Paul Tillich's expression.

In its narrower sense, again, as we have seen, dharma is a part of culture, but, in one of its broader senses, as we shall, see, culture is a part of dharma. Dharma, in this broader sense, is neither religion, nor philosophy, nor culture, exclusively; it is all the three rolled into one. Hinduism owns all these three dimensions, as dharma. It is thus distinguishable from Taoism, Buddhism, and Jainism, which are only religion and philosophy; from early Zoroastrianism, Judaism, and Islam, which are only religion and culture ; from christianity, which is, at any rate in its pristine purity, only religion; from Marxism, which is only philosophy and culture; from Confucianism, which is only culture: from Hellenism and Cārvāka, which are only philosophy.

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1. *Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra* 1.1.2.
2. *Śārīraka-Bhāṣya* 1.1.4.
3. *Ibid.* 1.1.1, read with 1.1.4.
4. *Ibid.* 1.1.1.
5. *Ibid.* 1.2.21.
6. *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra*, with Candrananda's *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra-Vṛtti*, 1 1.2.
7. *Taṭtvasangraha* 3485.

It is significant that John declares that 'the law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ' and Paul that 'the Jews require a sign, and the Greeks seek after wisdom.'[1]

It needs a little elaboration Thanks to their life-negating attitude, Buddhism and Jainism have no socio-cultural scheme of their own to offer. They have, therefore to lean heavily on the Vedic scheme of social life. The Buddha never rejected Vedic culture, he only suggested certain reforms. He would rather admire the Varṇa system as practised in more ancient times.[2] Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and Vācaspati Miśra have a fling at the Buddhists for having to follow the code of conduct prescribed in the Vedic scriptures, for they had none of their own.[3] Jainism too, did not feel called upon to propose its own social philosophy, it also had to adopt Vedic culture for the laity, mutatis mutandis.[4] It rather authenticated the Vedic Varṇa scheme by tracing its genesis to the first two of its Tīrthaṅkaras [5] Little philosophy could develop in the whole Zoroastrian tradition, with the exception of Manichaeus, better khown as Mani (115-276), and the *Shikand Gumanik Vijar* (Doubt-Dispelling Treatise), the Pahlavi polemical work belonging to the 9th century. Philosophy is conspicuous by its neglect in the old Testament, New Testament, and Qur'an, except for occasional philosophic touches. Marxism's antipathy to religion is well known. Confucianism is out and out a socially oriented secular religion lacking subjectivity and philosophic orientation. And Cārvāka, if Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa is any guide, is rightly dubbed sheer wrangling (vaitaṇḍika-kathā).[6] Taoism is far from interested in society but is rich in religio-philosophic insight.

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1. John 1.17; I Corinthians 1.22.
2. See, for example, *Sutta-Nipāta*, Lord Chalmers, ed., Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. 37 (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1932), 290, 314-315.
3. *Nyāya-Mañjarī*, Pramāṇa-Prakaraṇa, p. 243 ; *Nyāya-Vārtika-Tātparyaṭīkā* 2.1.6.
4. *Ādi-Purāṇa*, 1.185 ff.
5. *Ibid.*, 16. 179-185 ; 40.167.
6. *Nyāya-Mañjarī*, Pramāṇa-Prakaraṇa, p. 247.

Dharma is satya (truth), which has to be envisioned personally; tathya (fact), which has to be manipulated socially; and ṛta (law), which has to be realized cosmically. Indeed, it is these three rolled into one. It is, as it were, 'the way, the truth, and the life', as Jesus announced himself to be.[1]

In fact, dharma has three dimensions : personal, social, and cosmic. In its personal dimension, dharma is the truth, the way and the life leading to adhyudaya and niśreyasa. In this sense, it can be roughly equated with religion, faith suited to one's native temperament (sattvānurūpa śraddhā), universal rules of religious life (sādhāraṇa-dharma) like the five yama-s and five niyama-s, or Āśrama-dharma, viz. division of stages of life.

In its social dimension, dharma is law governing and sustaining the social order.[2] The law is twofold : Varṇa-law and Āśrama-law, the law governing separation of social power or division of labour in society on the one hand and division of stages of life on the other. It is what the *Bhagavad-Gītā* calls sva-dharma (own-dharma),[3] manifesting itself in sva-karman (own-works),[4] svabhāvaniyata-karman (conduct determined by innate temperament),[5] and sahaja-karman (conduct to which one is born)[6] that is to say, conduct dictated by and suited to one's own nature or temperament (svabhāva). It is, roughly, what Plato calls 'justice', which means one man doing one job 'he was naturally most suited for',[7] 'minding your own business and not interfering with other people'.[8] Summing up his conception of justice, Plato writes that, 'when each of our three classes (businessmen, auxiliaries, and guardians) does its own job and minds its own business, that is justice'.[9] It is interesting to note that this concept of dharma or

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1. John 14.5.
2. *Mahābhārata*, Karṇa-Parvan 69.59.
3. *Bhagavad-Gītā* 2.31, 33 ; 3.35 ; 18.47.
4. *Ibid.* 18.45, 46.
5. *Ibid.* 18.48.
6. *Ibid.* 18.47.
7. Plato, *The Republic*, H.D. P. Lee, tr. (London : Penguin Books, 1955), 433.
8. Loc. cit.
9. Loc. cit.

justice seems to have its counterpart in the Pauline concept of a man's 'calling wherein he was called'. The whole passage in which this concept occurs seems to echo and re-echo the *Gītā*: 'Let every maa abide in the same calling wherein he was called. Art thou called being a servant ? care not for it : but if thou mayst be made free, use it rather. For he that is called in the Lord, being a servant, is the Lord's freeman : likewise also he that is called, being free, is Christ's servant. Ye are bought with a price; be not ye the servants of men. Brethren, let every man wherein he is called, therein abide with God.'[1]

In its cosmic dimension, dharma is regarded as the sustainer of the cosmos. So, according to the *Atharva-Veda*, the earth is upheld by dharma.[2] According to the *Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka*, dharma is the support and substratum of the entire cosmos.[3] In the *Atharva-Veda* itself, it is asserted that the world is sustained by ṛta (law), satya (truth), and other values,[4] which suggests that 'dharma' stands for all such values.

It is difficult to translate the mystical Vedic terms 'ṛta' and 'satya', appropriately. The *Ṛg-Veda* says that ṛta and satya arose out of the well inflamed cosmic fire.[5] The *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* relates ṛta and satya sometimes to the fire (agni) and the sun (āditya) respectively[6] and sometimes to light (bhāsa, apparently meaning the sun) and fire respectively;[7] sometimes, again, to the creation (vāk, literally word) and the creator (sraṣṭā) respectively[8] and sometimes to the creator and the material cause(kāraṇa-brahman) respectively [9] Significantly enough, ṛta as word seems to be

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1. I Corinthians 7.20-24.
2. *Atharva-Veda* 12.1.17.
3. *Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka* 10.63.1 ; *Kūrma-Purāṇa* 1.2.61.
4. *Atharva-Veda* 12.1.1. Cp. *Ṛg-Veda* 10.85.1 ; 10.190.1.
5. *Ṛg-Veda* 10.190.1.
6. *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* 6.4.4.
7. Loc. cit.
8. *Ibid.* 14.8.5.1 ; 2.1.4.10.
9. *Ibid.* 4.1.4.10.

akin to the Heraclitian concept of the Logos,[1] borrowed in the Bible,[2] too, meaning, roughly, word plus reason. It seems to be comparable to the 'Tao' of Taoism as well. It went to Iran and became 'aṣam' in the *Gāthā-s*. It travelled further west and became 'eresh' and finally, in Arabic, 'arsh'. According to one interpretation, ṛta and satya refer to being (bhūta, sattva) and becoming (bhavya, bhāva) respectively. In the *Katha-Upaniṣad*,[3] it seems to mean karma or fruit of karma, as interpreted by Śaṅkara, or righteousness, as interpreted by several moderns. Ṛta may be taken to signify, inter alia, what we call natural law as distinguished from human or man-made law trying to copy or reflect it. Satya appears to be the cosmic ideation controlling it or the insight into it. God is sometimes called Ṛtambhara (upholder of ṛta).[4] The *Yoga-Sūtra* speaks of a ṛtam-bharā prajñā, that is, the ṛta-upholding superconsciousness.[5] Later, dharma came to combine both ṛta and satya.

This conception of dharma implies an innate belief in the meaningfulness of existence. That is to say, according to it, the real is rational (satya), not irrational (mithyā/māyā); law-governed (ṛta) not de trop (an-arthaka); a cosmos (saṃ-sāra), not a chaos (a-sāra). It is pertinent to point out that, according to the *Gītā*, one and the same term 'sat' stands for truth, reality, or existence (sad-bhāva) on one hand; beauty (sādhu-bhāva) on another; and goodness (praśasta-karman) on a third.[6] It is, therefore, quite akin to the Vadic ṛta and satya in signification.

R. C. Gandhi has given the result of the research of a team of scholars on the meaning of the term ṛta as follows : Ṛta means : 'Order, justice, harmony, rectitude inherent in the nature of things. Not moral rectitude merely, but a deeper satisfactoriness in actuality. Suggests powerfully a non-value-neutral conception of order, balance, or proportion. Neglect of "ṛta" is

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1. Heraclitus, Fragments 1-2.
2. Psalms 33.6, 9 ; John 1.1-17.
3. *Kaṭha-Upaniṣad* 3.1.
4. *Bhāgavata* 6.13.17.
5. *Yoga-Sūtra* 1.48.
6. *Gītā* 7.26.

probably responsible for neglect of natural science in India, which is founded upon the notion of immanent discoverable order in the phenomenal world. A metaphysical decline from "ṛta" to "dharma", to "karma", i e. from a comprehensive notion of order in the nature of things to the notion of order or pattern in purely individual careers.' And so on.

To state the three dimensions otherwise, all religion deals with the individual who has three dimensions :

1. Individual-in-himself, which is the philosophic dimension
2. Individual-in-society, which is the cultural dimension
3. Individual-in-the-cosmos, which is the religious dimension.

Since dharma covers all the three dimensions, it can be said to have three dimensions.

This tri-dimensionality of dharma is duly reflected in the Vedic doctrine of congenital debts (ṛṇa-s) or obligations on the one hand and the daily round of super-sacrifices (mahā-yajña-s) on the other. Unlike Rousseau who made the historic declaration that 'Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains',[1] Vedic dharma would proclaim that man is born in debt, which he must repay if he wants to be free[2] The debts are three,[3] or four :[4]

1. Ṛṣi-ṛṇa : the debt to the seers, path-finders, mentors.
2. Pitṛ-ṛṇa : the debt to the manes, patriarchs, progenitors.

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1. J.-J. Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, World's Great Thinkers Series (New York : Carlton House, n.d.), Book I, Chapter 1, p. 1.
2. Cp. 'Rousseau said that Man is born free. Rousseau was wrong No government of a civilized state can possibly regard its citizens as born free. On the contrary, it must regard them as born in debt, and as necessarily incurring fresh debt every day they live, and its most pressing duty is to hold them to that debt and see that they pay it.' G.B. Shaw, *Prefaces* (London : Odhams Press, 1938), p. 312.
3. *Yajur-Veda* 6.3.10.5.
4. *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* 1.7.2.1-5; *Mahābhārata*, Ādi-Parvan 119. 17-20.

3. Manuṣya-ṛṇa : the debt to mankind in general.
4. Deva-ṛṇa : the debt to the gods, cosmic order, nature.

These debts have to be discharged, these obligations fulfilled, these accounts settled before donning the garb of the ascetic in token of one's fulfilment here and qualification for a fuller life hereafter. Out of these debts, the first pertains to the personal, the second and third pertain to the social, and the last pertains to the cosmic dimension of dharma. The first debt is discharged by pursuit of knowledge and self-culture ; the second by contributing to the continuity of the race and social system by procreation , the third by feeding people and by other altruistic conduct ; and the fourth by means of sacrifice (yajaña),

The daily round of super-sacrifices (mahā-yajña-s) to be performed by every householder in repayment of the debts, are[1] :

1. Brahma-yajña : meditation upon God, study of the scriptures etc , and self-study (svādhyāya)
2. Manuṣya-yajña : feeding one's guests and the needy.
3. Pitṛ-yajña : offering oblations to manes and procreating children.
4. Bhūta-yajña : feeding animals.
5. Deva-yajña : making sacrificial offerings to gods and replenishing nature.

Out of these, the first pertains to the personal, the second and third to the social, and the rest to the cosmic dimension of dharma.

The individual-in-himself is born with the debt of the seers, pathfinders, mentors, which he is supposed to repay by performing what is called the knowledge-sacrifice, brahma-yajña, by pursuing philosophy, so to speak. The individual-in-society is born with the debt of the manes, patriarchs, progenitors on the one hand and of mankind in general on the other, which he is supposed to repay by performing sacrifices to them, called

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1. *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* 11.5.6. 1-3 ; *Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka* 2.10 ; *Aśvalāyana-Gṛhya-Sūtra* 3.1.1-2 ; *Āpastamba-Dharma-Sūtra* 1.4.12.13 ; 1.4.13, *Baudhāyana-Dharma-Sūtra*, 2.6. 1-8; *Manu-Smṛti* 3.70 ff.

manuṣya-yajña and pitṛ-yajña, in the form of feeding the needy and procreating children. This is his contribution to culture and society. The individual-in-the-cosmos is born with the debt of the gods, of the cosmic order, of nature, which he is supposed to repay by performing sacrifices thereto as well as to the subhuman kingdom. This is his contribution to religion.

In totality, this is the individual's contribution to dharma

The individual-in-himself is marked by sattva and jñāna, the individual-in-society by rajas and karman, and the individual-in-the-cosmos by tamas and bhakti.

The whole scheme may be represented as under :

1. The individual-in-himself
   (1) dharma in its personal dimension.
   (2) philosophy.
   (3) ṛṣi-ṛṇa.
   (4) brahma-yajña.
   (5) sattva.
   (6) jñāna (knowledge).
   (7) brahma-carya (studentship.

2. The individual-in-society
   (1) dharma in its social dimension.
   (2) culture.
   (3) pitṛ-ṛṇa and manuṣya-ṛṇa
   (4) pitṛ-yajña and manuṣya-yajña.
   (5) rajas.
   (6) karman (works)
   (7) gārhasthya (householdership).

3. The individual-in-the-cosmos
   (1) dharma in its cosmic dimension.
   (2) religion.
   (3) deva-ṛṇa.

(4) bhūta-yajña and deva-yajña.
(5) tamas.
(6) bhakti.
(7) vānaprastha (retirement).

The motif of Vedic Hinduism is sacrifice. Whatever was dear to the Vedic people was considered enjoyable only after performing due sacrifice, in a spirit of renunciation and non-attachment. All life was full of sacrifice. It was considered that non-performance of sacrifice binds and that performance liberates (yajñārthāt karmaṇo 'nyatra loko' yam karma-bandhanaḥ).[1] The yajñārtha-karman (sacrifice-oriented action) gets the new name of niṣkāma-karman (egoless action) in the *Gītā*. The art of performing action without attachment to action is already found mooted in the *Yajur-Veda*.[2] The chief message of the Qur'ān and Islam is 'Jāhidū fī sabīl-i 'llāha (exert thyself in the path of God), which appears to be another version of the message of the Vedas and the *Gītā*.

Needless to stress that debt-consciousness and mahāyajña-consciousness, such as outlined above, are a great desideratum for a sane life-order.

Now, it will be seen that Hinduism, or its concept of dharma, is rather diametrically opposed to the narrow concept of religion sponsored by some writers in the West Whitehead defines religion as 'solitariness' or 'what the individual does with his own solitariness'[3] He contends, 'No religion which faces facts can minimize the evil in the world, not merely the moral evil, but the pain and suffering. The book of Job is the revolt against the facile solution, so esteemed by fortunate people, that the sufferer is the evil person'.[4] Spengler has it that 'No religion

1. *Gītā* 3.9.
2. *Yajur-Veda* 40.2.
3. A.N. Whitehead, *Religion in the Making*, *Alfred North Whitehead : An Anthology*, p. 472 ; also p. 483, omitting the word 'own'.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 484.

aims at improving the world of facts...What has the agony of a soul to do with Communism ? A religion that has gone as far as taking social problems in hand has ceased to be a religion'.[1] He concludes, 'Religion is, first and last, metaphysic, otherworldliness, awareness in a world of which the evidence of the senses merely lights the foreground. It is life in and with the supersensible'.[2] Hinduism is all this plus much more. It is dharma in all its three dimensions—personal, social, and cosmic—and thereby comprehends religion within its compass, without being exhausted thereby [3] It is truth (to be experienced personally), fact (to be experienced socially, publicly, objectively), and law (to be experienced cosmically)- satya, tathya, and ṛta—rolled into one It is 'the way, the truth, and the life', as Jesus would have it [4]

As we have seen, according to the mainstream or rather the fountain-head of Hinduism, the world is sustained not by Māyā (the principle of cosmic illusion) nor by an original sin but by value. It has its origin in bliss, it is sustained by bliss, and it returns to bliss, says the *Taittirīya-Upaniṣad.*[5] The Vedas do not tend to bewail suffering. They do not know such a term as 'duḥkha', the watchword of Buddhism, nor even naraka' (hell), a rather sadistic conception of later times, though they do have faint notions of suffering and hell.[6] In any case, they do not

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1. Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, Vol. II, p. 195.
2 *Ibid*, p 217.
3. Despite the remoteness of the association of ideas, the trilogy of satya-jit, sena-jit, and ṛta-jit in *Yajur-Veda* 17.83, and of satyam-bhara, tathyam-bhara, and ṛtam-bhara, the first and the last term adopted from *Bhāgavata* 5.20.4 and 6.13.17, the last also from *Yoga-Sūtra* 1.48, and the second term coined by us after the tradition. Cp. the typology of the man of fact and the man of truth mooted in Spengler, Vol. II, pp. 11-19 (especially p. 16) and 442.
4. John 14.6.
5. *Taittirīya-Upaniṣad* 3.6.
6. *Ṛg-Veda* 2. 29.6 ; *Yajur-Veda* 30.5 , *Atharva-Veda* 2.14.3 ; 5.19.3 ; 5.30.11 ; 8.2.24 ; 12.4.36 ; 18.3.3.

tend to gloat over the sufferings in hell, as is the case with later religions in India and the Semitic world.[1] Even the concept of transmigration of souls is rather inconspicuous in the Vedic hymns. The original optimistic view of life and the cosmos finds its echo in a saying (gāthā), quoted in the *Rāmāyaṇa*[2] and referred to in the *Mahābhāṣya*,[3] that happiness does reach the living person even after a hundred years.

It appears of course that the thought that this world is imperfect (alpa) and lacks real bliss had been underlying the foregoing trend of thought from the first. The *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* has it that bliss lies not in this imperfect world (alpa) but in the perfect (bhūmā).[4] Even the Vedas prescribe the way of crossing death[5] They often pray for deliverance from death (mṛtyor mukṣīya,[6] atitarāṇi mṛtyum;[7] tam eva viditvā ati mṛtyum eti)[8]. Later, a conspicuous streak of pessimism ran through philosophic Hinduism and the idea began to gain ground that

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1. Cp. 'There is one serious defect to my mind in Christ's moral character, and that is that He believed in hell. I do not myself feel that any person who is really profoundly human can believe in everlasting punishment. Christ certainly as depicted in the Gospels did believe in everlasting punishment, and one does find repeatedly a vindictive fury against those people who would not listen to His preaching.' Bertrand Russell, *Why I Am Not a Christian*, p. 12.
2. *Rāmāyaṇa* 34.6.
3. *Mahābhāṣya* 1.3.12 10 ; 3 1.67.8.
4. *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* 7.23. Cp. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad* 2.4.1-3 ; 2.5.1, 4 4.22 ; 4.5.2-4 ; *Kaṭha-Upaniṣad* 1.1.26-28.
5. *Ṛg-Veda* 7.59.12 ; *Yajur-Veda* 31.18 ; 40.14 ; *Atharva-Veda* 11.5.19 ; 4.35.5.
6. *Ṛg-Veda* 7.59.12.
7. *Atharva-Veda* 4 35 (six times).
8. *Yajur-Veda* 31.18.

the world is full of suffering.[1] Acutely conscious of this, seers like Maṅki began to teach renunciation of all craving (tṛṣṇā).[2] This state of affairs found its culmination in Sāṅkhya, Buddhism, and certain Ājīvika-s. It marked a turning point in the history of Indian philosophy, which, thenceforth, came to be obsessed with the idea, that the world was all suffering and that, therefore, the business of philosophy was to prescribe ways and means to get rid of it. Since, however, Hinduism continued to be optimistic in its heart of hearts, it obviated the possibility of the development of a philosophy of life akin to the atheistic existentialism of the West. Death does appear to be a horror to a Hindu. But, while acknowledging that whoever is born must die, he would assert that whoever dies must be reborn.[3] With the existentialist haunted by the fear of death, the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* would contend, 'Thou exclaimest, "I shall die ; I shall die ! Why dost thou not affirm, "I shall be ! I shall be ! "?'[4] Indeed, the Upaniṣadic declaration,[5] stemming from a Vedic verse,[6] to the effect that 'That [the ground and goal of existence] is perfect, this [the world] is perfect ; because from perfect comes out perfect', has never been called in question openly even by the so-called crypto-Buddhists.

In its Vedic phase, Hinduism was essentially a this-worldly, rather life-and-world-affirming religion. Nevertheless, it extended recognition to ascetics and hermits, whom it does appear to have had within its fold in a considerable number. The *Ṛg-Veda* calls Indra the friend of the muni-s[7] and the *Atharva-Veda*

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1. *Gītā* 8.15; 9.33; 13.8; *Maitrāyaṇī-Upaniṣad* 1 1-7; *Mahābhārata*, Strī-Parvan 2-7 ; *Ṣaṣṭi-Tantra*, quoted in *Vyāsa-Bhāṣya* 4.13, read with Vācaspati's *Tattvavaiṣāradī* thereon, p. 415, and *Bhāmatī* 2.1.3, p. 352.
2. *Mahābhārata*, Śānti-Parvan 177. This Maṅki is usually mistaken for the Makkhali Gosāla of the Buddhist and Jaina canonical texts.
3. *Gītā* 2.27-28.
4. *Yogavāsiṣṭha* 6/2. 101.28.
5. *Muktikā-Upaniṣad*, ch. 1, prescribes this verse as a valedictory verse for 19 Upaniṣads.
6. *Atharva-Veda* 10.8.29.
7. *Ṛg-Veda* 8.17.4.

mentions a god's muni (muner devasya).[1] Besides, copious references to muni-s, yati-s, and tāpasa-s occur in the epics and the Purāna-s, which are so closely interwoven with the narrative that they cannot be lightly dismissed as mere superadditions or interpolations of post-Buddhaic times. Still, there are certain other verses in the Vedas which speak of Indra's enmity with the yati-s. So, in a certain passage, Indra is said to have thrown the yati-s to hyenas,[2] and, in another, to have dispossessed yati-s of their wealth and given it over to Bhṛgu.[3] Sāyana's interpretation of yati in the last passage to mean a non-performer of sacrifice (a-yaṣṭr) merits close and critical consideration.[4] These yati-s, being wealthy, appear to be different from recluses and renouncers of the world. In fact, in the Vedas, the word 'yati' means different things in different contexts. For example, in the last book of the *Ṛg-Veda* it translates as 'Demiurge'.[5] The Vedas contain many a reference to muni without a note of disapproval.[6] The 'vision' of a whole hymn of the *Ṛg-Veda* is ascribed to one hundred ascetics (śataṁ vaikhānasāḥ).[7] 'Śramaṇa', wrongly pinned down to the Jaina and Buddhist monks, is a Vedic term, and not of reproach.[8] Pāṇini refers to a *Bhikṣu-Sūtra* authored by a pārāśarya, a pre-Buddhistic sage who had nothing to do

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1. *Atharva-Veda* 7.74.1.
2. *Taittrīya-Saṁhitā* 6.2.7.5 ; *Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa* 7.28.1; *Tāṇḍya-Mahābrāhmaṇa* 8.1.4 ; 13.4.17 ; *Kauṣītakibrāhmaṇa-Upaniṣad* 3.1.
3. *Ṛg-Veda* 8.3.9.
4. Elesewhere he interprets 'yati' to mean one following an anti-Vedic code of conduct (Vedaviruddhaniyamopetān), vide *Tāṇḍya-Mahābrāhmaṇa* 8.1.4, Part II, p. 268, and an opponent of sacrifice (yajña-virodhinaḥ), vide *ibid*. 13.4.17, Part II, p. 24.
5. *Ṛg-Veda* 10.72.7.
6. *Ibid*. 10.136.
7. *Ibid*. 9.66.
8. *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* 14.7.1.22; *Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka* 2.7.1 ; *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 2.1.70 ; *Baudhāyana-Śrauta-Sūtra* 16.30 ; *Bhāgavata* 11.2.20-22.

with the Buddhist monks.[1] In fact, the Āraṇyaka texts were designed primarily to be studied in the forest and the *Mahābhārata* contains a number of references to the study of the texts by the forest-dwelling Vedic medicants called Vānaprastha-s.[2]

As a matter of fact, the Vedas speak very high of austerity and penance (tapas). According to the *Atharva-Veda*, the gods conquered death by dint of brahmacarya (devotion to knowledge as a celebate) and tapas (penance).[3] Vedic literature contains quite a number of explicit and unequivoval references to the fact that the ancient seers had the Vedas revealed to them through tapas [4] The *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* interprets the term 'ṛṣi' (literally, seer) itself to signify one who got the revelation through tapas and pains (śrama).[5] The *Atharva Veda* uses three terms together—'brahmaṇā, tapasā, śrameṇa' (through knowledge, penance, and pains)—in connexion with a ritual.[6] The term 'muni' is also found used of one who practises tapas.[7] The *Ṛg-Veda* contains a whole hymn devoted to tapas.[8] Manu also praises tapas at length.[9] Patañjali, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya*, considers tapas as one of the distinguishing characteristics of a Brāhmaṇa.[10] Even

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1. *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 4.3.11.
2. Sāyaṇa, *Aitareya-Āraṇyaka-Bhāṣya*, p. 2 ; *Mahābhārata*, Śānti-Parvan 61.5 ; *Harivaṁśa* 3.73.14.
3. *Atharva-Veda* 11.5.19. Also see 4.35.2 ; 11.5.4 ; 11.7.17.
4. *Ṛg-Veda* 4.50.1 ; *Taittrīya-Brāhmana* 2 8.8.5 ; *Gopatha-Brāhmaṇa* 1.1 9 ; a Brāhmaṅa text (śrameṇa tapasā ṛṣan) quoted in *Nirukta* 2.3.2 and, with a slightly different reading, in *Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka* 2.29 ; *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* 6.1.1 1.
5. *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* 6.1.1 1.
6. *Atharva-Veda* 6.133.3.
7. *Mahābhārata*, Vana-Parvan 12. 11-16 ; *Āpastamba-Dharma-Sūtra* 2.9.21.10 ; *Śārīraka-Bhāṣya* 3.4.47-49.
8. *Ṛg-Veda* 10. 154.
9. *Manu-Smṛti* 11.234-244.
10. *Mahābhāṣya* 2.2.6.

the treatise of Manu is said to have been produced by tapas [1]

Besides, certain decidedly pre-Buddhaic Upaniṣadic texts tend to rate renunciation higher than householdership or activism so far as attainment of the summum bonum is concerned. So, it has been said that immortality has been attained by many through renunciation alone.[2] In fact the *Kaṭha-Upaniṣad* and the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad* are full of exhortations for renunciation.[3]

In fine, without assigning an important place to the ascetics, Hinduism will be unintelligible and incomplete. Our epics are simply inconceivable without considering the ascetic an integral part of the culture they so vividly portray.[4]

Yet, for the people at large, the Vedic texts prescribe procreation (prajanana) as the supreme duty (parama).[5] For them procreation is a must : the thread of progeny must not be broken.[6] They call the seers 'desirous of progeny' (prajā-kāmāḥ)[7] and having mansions (mahā-śāla).[8] The *Mahābhārata* maintains that tapas is supreme but that the life of the householder is the greatest tapas.[9] The Vedic texts prescribe and enjoin performance of sacrifice the whole of one's life,[10] performace of action all the

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1. *Manu-Smṛti* 11.243. Cp. *Mahābhārata*, Śanti-Parvan 231.24.
2. *Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka* 10.12, p. 454 ; *Mahānārayaṇa-Upaniṣad* 10.5; *Kaivalya-Upaniṣad* 3 ; *Avadhūta-Upaniṣad* 5.
3. *Kaṭha-Upaniṣad* 1.1.26 ff.; *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad* 4.5.
4. See, for example, *Rāmāyaṇa* 1 42.13-14; 1.51.26-27; 1.63; 1.65; 2.20.29 ; 2.95.7 ; 2.1.1 ; 3.6 ; 3.11.12 ; 5.4.15 ; 5.13.40, 45 ; *Mahābhārata*, Vana-Parvan 64.61-64 ; Śānti-Parvan 17.11 ; 167.16-17 ; 244.12-13 ; *Harivaṁśa*, Harivaṁśa-Parvan 45.35 ; Bhaviṣya-Parvan 73.15.
5. *Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka* 10.63.1, p. 889 ; 10.79, p. 896.
6. *Taittirīya-Upaniṣad* 1.11.1.
7. *Praśna-Upaniṣad* 1.9.
8. *Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣad* 1.1.3 ; *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* 5.11.1.
9. *Mahābhārata*, Śānti-Parvan 11.21.
10. *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* 12.4.1.1.

hundred years of one's life,[1] and playing with sons and grandsons throughout one's entire life.[2] From such texts it transpires that the Vedic tradition is not for complete renunciation of the world. In fact, the word 'sannyāsa' occurs for the first time in the *Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣad*, which, as its very name signifies, is an Upaniṣad of or for the shaven-headed.[3] Yet as a concept it was very much there and even hailed lustily, sometimes [4]

Again, the *Gautama-Dharma-Sūtra* declares the stage (āśrama) of the householder (gārhasthya) to be the source (yoni) of the other stages of life,[5] and, on the authority of the Vedic texts, rules that there is only one stage, that of the householder.[6] The same position is taken by the *Āpastamba-Dharma-Sūtra* with greater emphasis, declaring the other stages as anti-Vedic.[7] The *Baudhāyana-Dharma-Sūtra* follows suit,[8] adding into the bargain that the fourfold scheme of life was introduced by one Kapila, son of Prahrāda, an Asura, in rivalry with the gods. The passage ends with the injunction that this scheme should not be respected by the wise.[9] Even Bhīma condemns Sannyāsa as useless, on the ground that, if it be conducive to the summum bonum, the trees and the hills, too, being eternal Sannyāsin-s (inactive and indifferent to the world like sannyāsin-s), would attain the summum bonum.[10] Kumārila, the great Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā philosopher, would allow prolongation of the stage of celebacy (Brahmacarya) beyond the normal term of twentyfive years or taking to Sannyāsa straightway bypassing the stage of house-

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1. *Yajur-Veda* 40.2.
2. *Ṛg-Veda* 10.85.42.
3. *Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣad* 3.16.7.
4. Ibid , 1.2.11 ; 3.2.6 ; *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad* 2.4.1-3 ; 3.5.1 ; 4.4.22 ; 4.5.2-4 ; *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* 2.3.1.
5. *Gautama-Dharma-Sūtra* 1.3.3.
6. Ibid., 1.3.35.
7. *Āpastamba-Dharma-Sūtra* 2.23.3-9.
8. *Baudhāyana-Dharma-Sūtra* 2.11.29.
9. Ibid. 2.11.30.
10. *Mahābhārata*, Śānti-Parvan 10.24-25.

holdership altogether, only in the event of the individuals concerned being invalids, incapable of keeping house.[1]

This appears to be a partial view of the situation. We have noticed the importance attached to asceticism and tapas in the most ancient Vedic texts. There is, therefore, reason to believe that there is provision for both energism/ activism (pra-vṛtti) and quietism (ni-vṛtti) in the Vedic scheme of things, true to its flexible, comprehensive, and heterogeneous character. The *Mahābhārata* has it that energism and quietism both are inculcated by the Vedas[2] and that energism was preached by Nārāyaṇa[3] and Prajāpati,[4] viz. apparently the seers of the hymns of Man (Puruṣa)[5] and Creation (Nāsadīya)[6] respectively, of the *Ṛg-Veda*. When the religion was codified, it developed a graduated scheme of four life-stages, which, however, did not go unopposed. The opposition must have been put up by an insignificant minority, otherwise much more ancient texts like the Vedic Upaniṣads would not have hailed the innovation and it would not have been so widely accepted and even practised.

Indeed, if one ponders over the diversity of the facets of Hinduism, one is bound to exclaim in Shakespearean parlance : Diversity ! thy name is Hinduism, and with Ahmad Nadīm Qasimi :

Jab bhī dekhā hai tujhe ṣūrat-ī naw dekhā hai

Marḥalah ṭay na huā teɪī shināsā'ī kā

(Whenever I saw thee I saw thee in a new form. The problem of thy identity remains unsolved.)

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1. Kumārila, *Tantra-Vārtika* 1.2.4, p. 192.
2. *Mahābhārata*, Śānti-Parvan 19.1 ; 241.1,6 ; 242.3. Cp. Ibid. 199.40 ; *Manu-Smṛti* 12.88-91. Pravṛtti and Nivṛtti may be taken to correspond, even if remotely, to a-vidyā and vidyā on the one hand and a-sambhūti and sambhūti on the other, of *Īśa-Upaniṣad* 9-14.
3. *Mahābhārata*, Śānti-Parvan 217.2.
4. Ibid. 217.4.
5. *Ṛg-Veda* 10.90.
6. Ibid. 10.129.

Now, this scheme of life purports to strike a balance between energism and quietism, offsetting the excesses of both. It is a compromise between life-affirmation and life-negation, egoism and altruism, the world and the beyond. Originally, all the four stages were not binding on all ; it was the Brāhmaṇa who was supposed to pass through the four.[1] Later, it came to be popular with the royalty as well. Originally, the sannyāsin was the Brāhmaṇa in a different garb. Like dharma which is both energistic and quietistic, the Brāhmaṇas were also divisible into the Brāhmaṇa proper and the Sannyāsin.[2]

Thus, Hinduism came to develop a fourfold scheme of life-stages, styled Brahmacarya (studentship), Gārhasthya (householdership), Vānaprastha (retirement), and Sannyāsa (renunciation).

Earlier, Hinduism had evolved a threefold socio-cultural typology, a three-estate society, constituted of the Brāhmaṇa, the Kṣatriya, and the Vaiṣya, representing the three charismas (tri-guṇa) : Brahman (spirituality), Kṣatra (royalty/imperium/power), and Viś (appetite characterizing the commonalty), corresponding broadly to the three parts of the soul postulated by Plato. A hybrid fourth class of uneducables, slaves, and serfs also emerged and got enrolled in the fellowship under the title Śūdra (literally, runner), thereby having a niche in society. Besides, there have all along been an effective fifth class on the fringes of this quadritype scheme, who enjoyed due recognition and even greater respect than the Brāhmaṇa, so much so that they were kept not out of but above the four-estate society. Let this division of society into these five classes answer to the Vedic 'pañca-janāḥ' (the five peoples, the five classes, or the five estates).[3] Well, in Hindu parlance :

1. the Brāhmaṇa is predominantly sāttvika (knowledge-oriented) ;

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1. *Mahābhārata*, Śānti-Parvan 62.2.
2. Ibid. 199.40.
3. *Ṛg-Veda* 3.37.9 ; 3.59.8 ; 6.14.4 ; 8.32.22 ; 9.65.23 ; 9.92.3 ; 10.54.6.

2. the Kṣatriya is predominantly rājasa (action-oriented) ;
3. the Vaiśya is predominantly tāmasa (appetite-oriented) ;
4. the Śūdra is simply of an indeterminate, undifferentiated, and unoriented temperament[1] and lacks initiative, hence he has to be ordered about ; and
5. the Muni, the Yati, the Tāpasa, the Bhikṣu, the Śramaṇa, later styled 'Sannyāsin', beyond the pale of the three charismas[2] and the four estates.

The fundamentum division is of the four socio-cultural personality types was, originally, character-conduct-temperament (guṇa-karma-svabhāva).[3] In the imagery of the *Ṛg-Veda,* the Brāhmaṇa is the mouth (or head), the Ksatriya the arms, the Vaiśya the thighs, and the Śūdra the feet of the Godhead.[4] Later, the source of Brāhmaṇa-hood was determined to be threefold : penance/austerity (tapas), learning (śruta), and birth (jāti).[5] Sometimes, emphasis was laid on character, vocation, and complexion as determinants of the different Varṇa-s.[6]

The Brāhmaṇa's life is a life of willed austerity. The best Brāhmaṇa is he who has provision for food only for a day, and the worst, who hoards it for three years or more.[7] The Kṣatriya is the reservoir of power and energy, the dynamo, of society controlling it from within and resisting all inroads upon it from without, but tended by the Brāhmaṇa. Accordingly, his distingui-

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1. *Bhaviṣya-Purāṇa* 4.23 97-98; *Mahābharata,* Āśvamedhika-Parvan 39.11.
2. *Nirvāṇa-Upaniṣad,* passim. Cp. *Gītā* 2.45 ; 14.25.
3. See, for example, *Gītā* 4.13.
4. *Ṛg-Veda* 10.90.11-12.
5. *Mahābhārata,* Anuśāsana-Parvana 121.7 ; *Mahābhāṣya* 2.2.6.
6. *Mahābhārata,* Vana-Parvan 143.50; 180.25-26 ff.; Śānti-Parvan 188.10-13.
7. *Manu-Smṛti* 4 2-8 ; 11.7 ; *Yājñavalkya-Smṛti* 1.124 ; *Mahābhārata,* Śānti-Parvan 243.2-3.

shing character is the sense of overlordship (īśvara-bhāva)[1] tempered with spirituality (brahman).[2]

These are the two classes, non-hedonistic and altruistic, in contradistinction to the masses, hedonistic and egoistic. So long as there is provision in society for a regular supply of persons belonging to the two classes, culture retains its vitality, creativity, and exuberance. The Indian sages had the wisdom and prevision to make a permanent arrangement for a regular and systematic supply of such persons by rendering Varṇa flexibly hereditary not long after its inception. Thanks to their foresight, Hinduism was able to hold its own during the millennium-old foreign rule in mediaeval times frankly hostile to it, even though it then remained groping for a saviour all along without success.

The Varṇa-scheme is a multi-dimensional, omnibus scheme of social organization. According to Sri Aurobindo, it is 'an at once spiritual, psychic, ethical and economie order....'[3] For details, the reader is advised to refer to Chapter XIII entitled 'The Structure of Sri Aurobindo's Social Philosophy'.

Paradoxically enough, Hinduism is an a-historical as well as an ultra-historical religion. Its a-historical character is due to its ultimate concern for eternity, for the changeless, for the absolute, whereas its historical character is due to its not-so-well recognized tendency of accommodating therein time, the changing, the relative. This is true only of substantive Hinduism in its pristine exuberance, however, which teaches devotion to both eternity and history, a-sambhūti and sambhūti.[4] It seeks to conquer time and history, apparently so incompatible with eternity, through its theories of eternal recurrence of life and the cosmos, of saṁsāra.[5] Here time loses all its poignancy and

1. *Gītā* 18.43.
2. *Manu-Smṛti* 9.320-321.
3. Sri Aurobindo, *The Human Cycle*, p. 166.
4. *Yajur-Veda* 40.9-11, or *Īśa-Upaniṣad* 12-14.
5. Cp. Plato, *Timaeus* 37d-38b ; Aristotle, *De Generatione et Corruptione* 336b.

dread and becomes just an expression of eternity. To the Hindu, everything is essentially eternal, whose apparently passing phases do not matter much. That is why he soon came to lose interest in history as such. Cosmic history and mythology, which latter has a direct bearing on the former, are enough for him. And, in mediaeval times, even cosmic history was sought to be given a decent burial by lightly dismissing it as mere myth or fiction calculated to conduce to renunciation or self-realization.[1]

Hinduism is a historical religion in one more sense of the term, in which no other religion can lay claim to being such. Almost all other religions get tied down to a well-defined body of literature, wherefore they have to be a fixed deposit of doctrines all through. In their case, change is often dreaded as suicide. The change they do have to undergo with the change of times despite themselves serves only to subject them to self-alienation. But Hinduism is far from tied down to any such literature, its literature being in a state of flux It is the only religion which provides for history. According to it, religion must change with the change of time-place-circumstance (deśa-kāla-nimitta). It is bold enough to proclaim that what is religion in one age may become irreligion in another.[2]

To substantive Hinduism, life and the cosmos are a process, a movement, duly recognized in its theories of life-cycles (saṁsāra) and world-cycles (yuga-cakra/brahma-cakra). It surpasses all other religions in its cosmic vision. It plans the life of the individual as well as society on the cosmic pattern. Yajña-s purport to re-enact the cosmic drama, the cosmic dance of Śiva-Naṭarāja. The Varṇa-scheme represents the image of the organism that is God. Likewise, in the Hindu individual and his conduct, the entire cosmos is involved, and it is to the entire cosmos that he owes his debts.

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1. Kumārila, *Tantra-Vārtika* 1.3.2 ; Maṇḍana, *Brahma-Siddhi*, pp. 124-128 ; Śaṅkara, commentaries on Gauḍapāda's *Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā* 1.7 ; 3.15 ; on *Aitareya-Upaniṣad* 2.1 ; on *Taittirīya-Upaniṣad* 2.6 ; on *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* 6.2.3 : Gauḍapāda, *Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā* 3.15.
2. *Mahābhāreta*, Śānti-Parvan 260.8, 17-19 ; 78.32.

Chapter VII

THE MICROCOSMIC CONCEPT OF MAN

Indian tradition is pluralistic in many respects, but behind, beneath, and underlying this pluralism, there is a strong crust of monism describable as substantive Hinduism. We may take it, therefore, that the Indian traditional concept of man is the concept of man crystallized in substantive Hinduism. And the concept so crystallized is the microcosmic concept of man.

The test of a culture is its concept of man. Culture is a man-making process, Saṁskāra, individual as well as social. It is culture of human nature, is self-culture (ātma-saṁskṛti).[1] A sane concept of man is the criterian of the sanity of the social order. The common fault of all modern social philosophies is that they seldom feel concerned to build up their theses on the firm foundation of a sound concept of man. The result is that they tend to become one-dimensional and fail to hit the mark. Marx did assert that the proper study for mankind is man, that man is the supreme being for mankind, But he, too, failed to make his mark when it came to formulating the concept.

The substantive Indian tradition presents to us the panorama of a profound, multi-dimensional concept of man. According to it, man is a self-transcending being. Evolution of man from the stage of mere society to that of culture throws the matter into bold relief. But it will not be possible for us to trace the course of the evolution here. Suffice it to refer on this occasion to the opening pages of Chapter VI, entitled 'The Dharmic Outlook', in this behalf.

Formerly, the universe gravitated towards and revolved round God and rotated on the axis called man. Without, God, and, within, man was the supreme being for the universe. Man was

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1. *Aitaveya-Brāhmaṇa* 6.27 ; *Gopatha-Brāhmana* 2.6.7.

the very centre of the universe, even as the earth was of the cosmos. Man was a unique, privileged superaddition to the cosmos. Everything was subservient to him, was created for him. Even the gods pined for manhood, the immediate stepping-stone to Godhood. With the advancement of science, there occurred what may be called a Copernican revolution and man ceased to be the unique, privileged being he was. He became a mere by-product of nature. The scientific formula for production of a human individual, as suggested by Howard, is :

> Enough water to fill a ten-gallon barrel;
> enough fat for seven bars of soap;
> carbon for 9,000 lead pencils;
> phosphorus for 2,200 match-heads;
> iron for one medium-sized nail;
> lime enough to whitewash a chicken coop; and
> Small quantities of magnesium and sulphur.

Thus, man became matter, pure and simple. Biology traced the ancestry of man to the ape. Psycho-analysis reduced the human to the instinctual, to the animal with the honourable exception of Jung, however, who strikes a note of dissent in repudiating the thesis that the spiritual life is merely a superstructure upon the instinctual. Biblically, the first human person upon this earth had a fall from paradise after tasting the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge. Today, man has had a second fall, so to speak, a fall from his pristine spirituality to base animality, after tasting the fruit of science.

On the scientific view of person, this life, this precarious existence upon this planet, is all. Man's fate is nothing better than that of an infinitesimal drop in the fathomless ocean of time. But if this life is all, then this vast cosmos is, as Joad would have it, 'a bad joke beyond our understanding, a vulgar laugh braying across the mysteries'.

With the advancement of man's insight into his own being, it is getting clearer and clearer that he is a beast in disguise and that his seeming rationality and spirituality are mere bubbles in the ocean of irrationality and bestiality, mere eddies in the inconscient slime.

But those who go by this verdict of man upon himself and get away with the impression that man is nothing but a beast, fail to realize that no beast is conscious of its being such and that it makes a lot of difference with the being of man. The deeper is our insight into the layers of our being, the more bestial as well as rooted in the dust do we appear to ourselves. But it should not escape notice of the discerning eye that the process is more and more revelatory of our transcendental character. It is, after all, the person himself who succeeds in revealing to himself the deeper and deeper layers of his being. That dimension of our being is something unshared by the subhuman kingdom and may be, has been, called the witness-self. The witness-self has held its own throughout the process of introspection eluding our grasp and transcending all objects and objectifications.[1] Starting as he does as one who regards man as an irrational animal, so to speak, even Freud seems to acknowledge this transcendental character of the human person tacitly by way of his constant emphasis on the need for controlling the irrational in man by laying it bare. Man, that is to say, is essentially a self-transcending being, 'a being concerned with more than itself'. Man is not matter but spirit, endowed with the faculty of transcending or overstepping the bounds of his own being. 'A person leads a spiritual life in so far as he rises above his personal, "practical" interests, as he is able to detach himself from his own and conceived self'.

Hume's oft-repeated analysis of the self misses this most significant point. 'For my part,' he writes, 'when I enter most into what I call *myself,* I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.'[2] Hume concludes that a person is nothing but a bundle of different perceptions. But what, after all, about the witness of the perceptions ? Does it not transcend everything and is it not an identity ? This question does not appear to have bothered Hume. It is,

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1. *Devī-Bhāgavata* 7.32.15-16.
2. David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, p. 252. Cp. *Saṁyutta-Nikāya* 3.46.

indeed, the person within which is the witness of all the items inventoried by Hume. Sureśvara says that where there is doubt there is no self.[1] The self is certitude itself. The person is all the inventory plus much more. He is a system comprising the perennial subject and fleeting objects. The seer of the *Taittirīya-Upaniṣad* seems to be deeper-seeing. He dives deeper and deeper into the interior of personal being and finds a series of sheaths or outer selves in which the witness-self is lost.[2] The objects he finds within do not constitute the self itself but are mere coverings under which the self lies hidden. Of course, by Hume's procedure, one can scarcely do better than stumble at some such sheaths. For realization of the self proper, there are other procedures which we may look to.

It is wrong to suppose, however, that substantive Hinduism values only the witness-self and not the full person. According to it, both the cover and the covered, the object and the subject, the empirical self and the witness-self make up a complete whole. That is the person. If we dissect the person into the self and the not-self *as* real and unreal respectively, we murder the reality that is the person. 'We murder to dissect,' says Wordsworth. There may be little or no difficulty in committing the murder, but the difficulty lies in disposing of the traces, and all known attempts to do it—Māyā-vāda, Śūnya-vāda, and the like—are rendered futile by the detectives that are the critics.

Far from denying or underrating the grosser side of the person, the body, the compounded (sambhūti), and attaching exclusive importance to the uncompounded (a-sambhūti), the self, the Vedas inculcate a synthetic approach, a harmonious blending of the compounded and uncompounded, the immanent and the transcendent.[3]

According to the Atharva-Veda, the human body is a city of the gods, a city of God.[4] In the human body, says the same Veda,

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1. *Naiṣkarmya-Siddhi* 3.37.
2. *Taittirīya-Upaniṣad* 3.2-6.
3. *Yajur-Veda* (henceforth referred to as *YV*) 40.9-11.
4. *Atharva-Veda* (henceforth referred to as *AV*) 10.2.8, 30-31.

all the gods come to dwell like cows in the cowpen—the sun becoming the eyes, the air the breath, etc.[1] The theme is further developed in the *Aitareya-Upaniṣad,* according to which different gods entered the human body in the form of different sense-organs.[2]

Such themes pertain no less to the microcosm than to the macrocosm. In fact on the Vedic world-view, there is a very close correspondence between the macrocosm and the microcosm.[3] The Atharva-Veda is categorical in the statement that 'person' is 'this very Brahman!'[4] The Vedic Absolute itself is called Person (puruṣa) and is cast into the form of a person. The Absolute that is the person is also conceived by the Vedic texts as incarnated into the form of the gods on the superpbysical plane and of the human person on the earth.

The human person is, according to the Vedic texts, rooted in the divine and created literally in God's own image, after God's own likeness. He is also conceived as a spark of the divine.[5]

Substantive Hinduism is without a parallel in viewing the Absolute as a person, as an organism, at such a great length. Each human person is a microcosm representative of the divine Person, the macrocosm. This microcosmic view of the human person is a great distinguishing feature, a great speciality, of Vedic philosophy.

Phenomenologically, what makes a person person is not existence, which belongs even to inanimate objects; not even existence and consciousness; which are characteristic of even animals ; but existence, consciousness, as well as conscience.

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1. *Ibid,* 11.8.13, 30-32 ; 5.9.7 ; 5.10.8.
2. *Aitareya-Upaniṣd* 2.4. Cp. *Mahābhārata* 12.262.40.
3. See, for example, *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* 8.1.3. Caraka deals with the correspondence between the macrocosm and the microcosm at a great length, vide *Caraka-Saṁhitā*, ch 5. Also see *Aitareya-Āraṇyaka* 2.3.4 ; 3.1.2.
4. *AV* 11.8.32.
5. *Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣad* 1.1.7 ; 2.1.1.

Conscience is not entirely a highly developed and enormously complicated tissue of tastes and distates cultivated for generations and generations together. It is woven round a nucleus of a transcendental nature endued with the power of deconditioning us from and raising us above such habit-formations and enabling us to have intimations, clear or vague depending upon what we have made of ourselves, from the macrocosmic Person, so to speak. Thanks to this nucleus, our conscience is basically not a handmaid of instinct or desire : it sometimes goes the length of thwarting our instincts, our desires. It presupposes a vision of the Good, which, though desirable, is not always desired. It has the potentiality, to borrow Jung's expression, of shifting 'the centre of gravity from the ego to the self, from man to God.'[1]

But all this will not be possible if man is regarded as matter, as a state of matter, pure and simple. Even the staunchest of the matterists/materialists cannot be proud of their material ancestry. Man is out to transcend matter even where he appears to be after matter. Farhād was mad after Shīriṅ, for whom he tried to dig a canal in the mountain. Was he mad after her body ? An Urdu poet wonders who there was in the person of Shīriṅ, for one cannot become a mountain-cutter hankering after a handful of dust that was her body :

> Tumhīṅ sach sach batāo kaun thā Shīrīṅ ke paikar meṅ
> Ki musht-ī khāk kī ḥasrat meṅ koī koh-kan kyoṅ ho ?

In a Persian couplet, a lover taunts his sweetheart saying : 'If the heart is just a piece of flesh, then (O Beloved !) the butcher in the town knows the value of my heart better than thee !' :

> Gar dil ba-mazhab-ī tū hamīṅ gosht-pārah īst
> Qaṣṣāb-i shahr bih' zi tū dānad bahā-i dil

Indeed, the human essence refuses to be exhausted by physical, psychological, and even social definitions and seems to transcend his physical, psychological, and social self.

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1. C.G. Jung, 'The Holy Men of India', *C.G. Jung : The Collected Works*, Vol. IX entitled *Psychology and Religion*, p. 581.

On the dharmic view of life, man is essentially a self-transcending being. Reduction of a person to a bundle of impressions after Hume will not do, for it persupposes a witness of the impressions, a witness-self, which is all certitude, which brooks no doubt.[1] Man's capacity to go beyond himself, to overstep the bounds of his apparent being, is attested to by his capacity of reasoning regardless of desire, objectivity regardless of subjectivity, love regardless of recompense, sacrifice regardless of reward. Man is spirit, whose very essence is self-transcendence.

Conscience is our sixth sense, so to speak, the sense of the Good. We will not say the sense of value, which may, in some sense, be said to characterize even animalkind—feeding, sleeping, mating, love of security, care for the young ones, and suchlike. Values are of two kinds, desiderata and goods. Desiderata can be equated with the desired or even the desirable, pure and and simple. When they acquire the dimension of the holy, they become goods.

It is difficult to define the dimension of the holy. The immediate root of the word 'holy' is 'hailo', meaning 'inviolate, inviolable, that must be preserved whole or intact, that cannot be injured with impunity'. The ultimate root of the word is 'hāl', from which 'whole' and 'health' derive. So, holiness would mean wholeness/health. We can find certain indications towards such an explanation of the concept of the holy in the Vedic tradition. The Ṛg-Veda says that the world-process forms but a quarter of the Godhead, the rest, the lion's share, remaining transcendent.[2] The immanent and the transcendent parts of the Godhead are as if violently held apart and consequently striving to unite again. This seems to be the rationale of the evolution of the lower categories trying to ascend to higher and higher planes. The finites forming part of the whole cannot bear the pangs of separation therefrom for long and must strive to reunite. The ancients claimed to have discovered a law of nature according to which everything tends to revert to its source. Aristotle believed that objects tend to fall to the ground because that is where they

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1. See note 1 on p.109, supra.
2. *Ṛg-Veda* (henceforth referred to as *RV*) 10.90.3.

belong ; smoke tends to go up because that is where it belongs.[1] Patañjali the grammarian postulates a similar law, the law of what he calls 'āntarya' (proximity, kinship) and gives similar illustrations, e.g. things made of earth tending to fall to the earth, and fire tending towards its source, the sun.[2] The idea is found mooted in the Vedas and Purāna-s as well.[3] The Qur'ān asserts time and again that we are from God to whom we are destined to return.[4] The Manichaeans have it that the souls are particles of eternal divine light, imprisoned in the body, and that they will reunite with their origin by a magnetic attraction from the latter. So, the holy can be described, very roughly though, as the gravitation of the part towards the whole, of the finite towards the infinite. It transcends the utilitarian order. When love acquires the dimension of the holy, it becomes Bhakti. Rudolf Otto seems to be right in equating the religious with the holy, and the holy with the numinous, the awe of existence. The holy is the gracious, but, if transgressed, becomes the terrible and the dreadful. According to the Psalms, God's name is 'holy and terrible'[5] (111.9), is 'great and terrible', for it is holy' (99.3).[6] Muslim Sūfī-s like Zu 'n-Nūn the Egyptian see in God's perfection (kamāl), Otto's Numen, not only eternal beauty (jamāl), Otto's mysterium fascinans, but also eternal majesty (jalāl), Otto's mysterium tremendum...To Bāyazīd Bisṭāmī, God is so overwhelming that man becomes nothing even at His thought. Indeed, 'Bāyazīd once uttered the call to prayer and fainted. When he came to his senses he said ; 'it is amazing that a man does not die when uttering the call to prayer."[7] In the Vedic tradition, the supreme deity is both the auspicious/holy (Śiva/Śaṅkara) and the terrible (Rudra).[8]

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1. See Lincoln Barnett, *The Universe and Dr. Einstein* p. 7.
2. *Mahābhāṣya* 1.1.50, p. 272.
3. *YV* 10.5.32 ; *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* 7.5.2.8 ; *Vāyu-purāṇa* 1.27 26-27.
4. Al-Baqarah 46, 156 ; Al-Anbiā 53 : Al-Mominūn 60.
5. Psalms 111.9.
6. *Ibid.*, 99.3.
7. Annemarie Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions of Islam* p. 48.
8. See for example, *Bhagavad-Gītā* 10.23 ; *Yajur-Veda* 16.2-3.

One's adherence to the Good against all odds would be possible, even logical, only if one is fired with the sense of the holy, that is, one has a firm faith in the fact that the habitat of one's self is not merely the tiny region of space—time occupied by our body but humanity or rather or rather life entire and of all times.

Here we must address ourself to a difficulty arisng in our view of conscience out of a certain thesis developed in mediaeval Hindu philosophy. According to the Nyāya, the prime movers or motivators (doṣāḥ) of human action (pravṛtti) are attachment (rāga), aversion (dveṣa), and delusion (moha).[1] Thus, in the last analysis, all action is essentially evil. Śaṅkara quotes the relevant Nyāya formula (Pravartanā-lakṣaṇā-lakṣāḥ) and concludes that even compassionate activity is essentially evil, egoistic.[2] Reinforcing his position, Vācaspati and Ānandagiri contend that compassion causes pain, in alleviation of which one indulges in what are called other regarding activities.[3] This means that conscience, while inspiring us to action, activates the ego, instead of shifting the centre of gravity from the ego to the self. Hobbes also favours a similar egoistical analysis of pity and is very ably criticized by Butler. Butler seems to succeed in establishing that the sentiment of pity aroused in our conscience is a unique aspect of our experience, be it ever so much involved in the maze of a subtle satisfaction at our own freedom from the misfortune visiting the case before us and anxiety about our liableness to similar misfortune. Indeed, in its pristine purity, conscience is the bridge between person and the Person.

So, man is existence, consciousness, and conscience, a triplicity which corresponds respectively to the divine triplicity of existence (sat), consciousness (cit), and bliss (ānanda) or freedom,[4] alternatively expressed as isness (asti), illumination (bhāti), and agreeableness (priya).[5] Here, too, person and the Person stand related by way of microcosm and macrocosm respectively.

1. *Nyāya-Sūtra* 1.1.18.
2. *Śārīraka-Bhāṣya* 2.2.37.
3. *Loc. cit.*
4. *Maitreyi-Upaniṣad* 3.12.
5. *Sarasvatīrahasya-Upaniṣad* 23-24.

Indeed, a person is not only what he *happens* to be (on a particular occasion and in a particular context). His surface self is not his real self, much less his only self. He is, in the first instance, a unity manifesting himself on a whole series of occasions and in a whole series of contexts, without exhausting the possibility of his manifestation on further occasions and in further contexts ; in the second instance, behind his surface self, phenomenal self, or physical self, which Patañjali terms śarīrātman, there is a deeper self, a noumenal self, an inner self, which he terms antarātman ;[1] and in the third instance, he is the root-self, the self, the Godhead (paramātman).[2] To follow, alternatively, the procedure adopted by the *Taittirīya-Upaniṣad*, there is the outer physical self (annamaya-koṣa) ; deeper than that, a vital self (prāṇamaya-koṣa) ; deeper than that, a mental self (manomaya-koṣa) ; deeper than that, a supramental, gnostic self (vijñānamaya koṣa) ; and, the deepest of all these, the blissful or free witness-self (ānandamaya-koṣa).[3] An alternative terminology for the five-fold division is : bhūtātman prāṇātman, saṅkalpātman, vijñānātman, and ānandātman.[4] In fact, as suggested above, only part of the person is visible, according to the Vedas.[5]

The entire burden of the *Gītā* is to exhort the human person to anchor his self in the Self, in the divine person, to shift the centre of gravity from the person to the Person, so as to transmute the personal into the Personal. In fact, like the Vedic Person (Puruṣa), the *Gītā* absolute, too, is a Person, designated as the Superperson (Puruṣottama).[6] The human person partakes of the perfection of the Superperson, potentially. Thus, the Superperson is perfect actually and the human person, potentially.[7] 'Man is

1. *Mahābhāṣya* 1 3.67.9 ; 3.1.87.10.
2. Cp. *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* 6.3.2.
3. Taittiriya-Upaniṣad with 119 other Upaniṣads (5th ed.)
4. *Liṅga-Purāṇa*, quoted in *Brahmasūtra-Vijñānāmṛta-Bhāṣya*, Cp. *Liṅga-Purāṇa*, Pūrva-Bhāga 86.93-94.
5. Cp. (Śākala-Śaiśirīya) Ṛg-Veda Saṁhita.
6. *Gītā* 15.16-18.
7. Cp. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad*, valedictory verse.

a "fragmentary totality", says Schuon.[1] Karma (works), tempered with jñāna (knowledge) and śraddhā (the Vedic counterpart of what came to be characterized as Bhakti),[2] is the process by which the potential perfection is actualized.[3]

According to this way of thought, the nucleus of the human person called soul or self is nothing but the divine involved. In other words, it is potentially perfect and all that is wanted of it is to realize the native perfection, to become God. This God-realization does not lead to total cessation of human action or the world-proccss. What actually happens is the dawn of a new perspective, a new interpretation of human action and the world-process, a transvaluation of values, so to speak. The world of plurality does not disappear, but is lit up by another light.[4] Everything remains as it is, only it begins to be regarded in a new light. What was man's becomes God's The difference between the divine and the undivine disappears altogether. Even reincarnation does not cease altogether.[5] Of course it loses its binding character. If this epistemic. transvaluationist soteriology is rejected in favour of an ontic, transformistic one, as in Sri Aurobindo, for example, the question will at once arise how something which has never come to pass in the beginningless past can come to pass at a particular point of time and what has never ceased in the beginningless past can cease for good at a particular point of time. The most conspicuous and concrete example of an epistemic, transvaluationist soteriology is that of Mahāyāna Buddhism, according to which there is absolutely no difference between Samsāra and Nirvāṇa, the empirical and the transcendental, appearance and reality, save between the perspectives in

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1. Frithjof Schuon, *Dimensions of Islam*, p. 26.
2. *RV* 10.151 ; *YS* 19.30, 77.
3. *Devī-Bhāgavata* 9.27.18, 20 ; *Gītā* 3.20 ; 18.45, 46 ; 8.3.
4. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Phylosophy*, Vol. II p. 584.
5. Cp. *RV* 4.26.1 ; 4.27.1 ; *AV* 11.3.32 ff. ; *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* 4.6.1.11 ; 11.1.8.6 ; 12.8.3.31 ; 10.1.5.4 ; *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad* 1.4.10 ; 2.5.18 ; *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* 3.15-16, 25 ; 8.3.2.

which they come to be regarded.[1] Important Advaitins Īśvarakṛṣṇa, *Śrimad Bhāgwata*, and Vallabha follow suit in their own respective ways.[2] The world-process is not a process of decay or degeneration of the divine : it is an essential mode of being of the divine. It is constantly replenished by the sparks from the fire that is the Eternal Godhead.[3]

The substantive Hindu tradition grants the utmost autonomy to the human person. The person is said to be the nearest to God,[4] to be capable of becoming God,[5] to be God.[6] There is nothing higher than man.[7] The human person is often depicted as invincible by gods and demons. A common theme of the epics and the purāṇas is that man can do what the gods and demons are incapable of.[8] Here seers and heroes challenge gods openly and successfully. Arjuna and others defeated even Indra, the king of the gods. A certain seer, Cyavana by name, is said to have produced Kṛtyā, a supernatural magical force, to burn Indra to death, and Indra had to yield.[9] Iqbal, the great Urdu-Persian philosopher-poet of undivided India, would sing :

Khudi ko kar buland itnā ki her taqdīr se pahle
Khudā bande se khud pūche batā teri raza kyā hai

(Hold thy ego so aloft that, before passing each decree, God

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1. See *Madhyamaka-Śāstra* 25.9, 19-20 ; *Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra* 2.131-132, p. 29 ; *Madhyāntavibhāga-Bhāṣya* 3.7, p. 89 ; *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa*, 2-5.
2. *Maṇḍūkya-Kārikā* 2.32 ; *Brahmabindū-Upaniṣad* 10 ; *pañcadaśī* 4.1 ff. ; *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* 62 ; *Prameyaratnārṇava*, p. 25. Cp. *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* 6.2 ; *Śrimad-Bhāgavata* 11.11.1.
3. Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣad 1.1.7; 2.1,1.
4. *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* 2.5.1.1.
5. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad* 4.4.6 ; *Taittirīya-Upaniṣad* 2.1 ; *Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣad* 3.2.9.
6. *AV* 11.8.32 ; *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad* 2.5.19.
7. *Mahābhārata* 12.299.20.
8. See, for example, *Mārkaṇdeya* Purāṇa 57.62-63.
9. *Mahābhārata* 3.124.17-18 ; 13.156.24 ff.

should himself have to ask the creature, 'What is thy will ?') Such an ambition on the part of the human person fits Hinduism better. Here, the human person of cognate with God. If the Semitic tradition is taken at its face value, a whimsical God formed man of the dust of the ground by an arbitrary fiat, breathed into his nostrils the breath of life,[1] and set him 'under impossible conditions to get salvation, but far more likely to be thrown away into the burning refuse-heap of Hell as a hopeless failure.'[2] There is no consubstantiality between man and God, as in Hinduism. In Buddhism, the person's fate is worse. To the Buddhist, personality is a resultant, a joint product, of the five psychophysical aggregates called skandha-s. A Buddhist poet sings :

Nartakībhrūlatābhaṅgo naivaikaḥ paramārthataḥ
Anekāṇusamūhatvād ekatvaṁ tasya kalpitam[3]

(The curve of the creeper-like eyebrow of the dancing damsel is not a unity. Its unity is a mental construction out of the conglomeration of a plurality of atom) Here the person becomes as ephemeral and insignificant a creature of nature in effect as on the afore-mentioned scientific view. Man's fate is worse. To it, personality is a resultant, a joint product, of the five aggregates called Skandha-s doomed to be sublated. Here man becomes altogether ephemeral and insignificant. Its later concept of Buddha-gotra, potentiality of Buddhahood in human beings in general, does serve to mitigate the situation, but here Buddnism is nothing but Hinduism in disguise. And its theory of Nirvāṇa is too elusive to be of practical significance.

The scientific or rather materialistic view of man fare the worst of all. Buddhism postulates at least a psychic first principle over and above the physical, constitutive of man ; but materialism knows only the physical, treating the psychical as nothing better than an episode in the biography of the physical. Thereby, materialism reduces all that is significant for man, all that makes his life worth living, to the status of the subjective or the emotive,

1. Genesis 2.7 ; Al-Ḥajar 29.
2. Sri Aurobindo, *The Foundations of Indian Culture* p. 112.
3. *Tattva-Saṅgraha*, 200.

the pragmatical or the expedient. To illustrate the point, as Joad would have it, on this view of things, 'the face of a loved person consists merely of electrical charges which the *lover* has endowed with its warmth, its contours, its colours and its softness.' And Whitehead : 'The nature gets credit which should in truth be reserved for ourselves : the rose for its scent : nightingale for his song : and the sun for his radiance.' An Urdu poet, Yagana Chingezi, has well sung :

> Har raṅg ko kahtā hai fareb-ī nazarī
> Har bū ko hawā-i manzil-i be-khabarī
> Har ḥusn ko Falsafī kī āṅkhoṇ se na dekh
> Dushman ko mubārak ho yeh bāligh-nazarī

On this view, all moral statements turn out to be in the nature of refined emotive ejaculations or prudent prescriptions. The martyr for a so-called noble cause risks his life in vain. It is a risk without a gain, so far as he is concerned. If society benefits by his martyrdom, he has acted as a tool in the hands of others, rather than as an end in himself. His is a case of exploitation by society.

Materialism views man as a by-product of nature. Biology traces his ancestry to the ape. Psycho-analysis reduces the human to the instinctual, to the libidinal, and shows him up as a veritable beast in disguise. On all these views, man's birth is not by design, not due to an inherent purpose, but by accident.

Such a fortuitous being as man has no rhyme or reason to be fired with the overmastering sense of duty that he is supposed to have.

The case is radically different with the traditional Indian view of man.

The essence of man is not matter but what the Upaniṣads call the Ātman. The concept of the Ātman is the most significant contribution of Indian culture to the study of man and his destiny. Man appears to be a tiny being, a handful of dust, but at bottom he is bigger than the universe. An Urdu poet has well sung : When man wanes, he is just a handful of dust ; but, when he waxes, he cannot be contained in the entire universe :

Ghaṭe agar to bas ik musht-i khak hai insāṅ
barhe to was' at-i kawnayn meṅ sama na sake

Jesus said, Love thy neighbour as thy self. Why ? According to Paul Deussen, Christianity has no answer. But, he asserts, the Indian can easily reply. Love the neighbour as thy self, because he is thy self.

Thanks to its bias for a wholesome concept of man, Indian tradition gives priority to man-making education over matter-manipulating education, character building education over intellect sharpening education, education for regeneration over education for manipulation. It speaks of two and sometimes three births of man in one and the same life-time, viz. birth from mother, birth from initiation (upanayana), and birth from education (dīkṣā).[1] Man has his first birth in nature, the realm of fact, and his second birth in culture, the realm of value. And it is his second birth which differentiates him from animalkind. It is ruled that the birth brought about by the preceptor through education and spiritual discipline is true, undecaying, undying.[2] And initiation marks the will[3] to passage from falsehood to truth, from evil to the good, from darkness to light, from the mortal to the immortal.[4] This is what Rūmī would call education of the soul, as distinguished from education of the body. The initiated youngster is a Vrata-cārin (a man of vow, a committed man) or Brahma cārin (a man on the way to knowledge).

Like Plato who divides the soul into reason (logistikon), spirit/mattle (thumos), and appetite (epithumia), Hindu thought speaks of the tri-dimensionality of personal being, the three dimensions being sattva (the light-bearing dimensions), rajas (the action-inspiring dimension), and tamas (the appetite-inducing dimension), corresponding to the Platonic trilogy respectively. In society, three dimensions manifest themselves as brahman (spirituality), kṣatra (imperium), and viś (commonalty, metapho-

1. *Bṛhan-Nāradīya-Upapurāṇa* 22.8.
2. *Manu-Smṛti* 2.148.
3. *Yajur-Veda* 1.5. Cp. 2.28.
4. *Bṛhadāraṇayaka-Upaniṣad* 1.3.28.

rically wealth or appetite) respectively. The person characterized predominantly by the first charisma is called Brāhmaṇa : that by the second, Kṣatriya ; and that by the third, Vaiśya. Besides, there was a hybrid fourth class of uneducables called Śūdras, no longer necessary.

Unlike Rousseau who made the historic declaration that 'Man is born free ; and everywhere he is in chains,[1] Vedic Hinduism would proclaim, with G.B. Shaw[2] that man is born in debt, which he must repay if he wants to be free. His debts, or demands on him, are three,[3] or four :[4]

1. Deva-ṛṇa : the debt or demand of the gods, of the cosmic order, of nature.
2. Pitṛ-ṛṇa the debt or demand of the manes, of the patriarchs, of the progenitors.
3. Ṛṣi-ṛṇa : the debt or demand of the seers, of the path finders, of the mentors.
4. Manuṣya-ṛṇa : the debt or demand of mankind in general.

These debts have to be discharged, demands met, these these accounts settled before donning the garb of an ascetic in token of one's fulfilment here and one's qualification for a more perfect life hereafter. Exceptions apart,[5] it has been clearly laid down that switching over to asceticism without discharging the debts would spell disaster, here as well as hereafter.[6] The Indian's sens of

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1. J. J. Rousseau, *The Social Contract* Bk 1, Ch. 1, p. 1.
2. Cp. 'Rousseau said that Man is born free. Rousseau was wrong. No Government of a civilized State can possibly regard its citizens as born free. On the contrary, it must regard them as born in debt, and as necessarily incurring fresh debt every day they live ; and its most pressing duty is to hold them to that debt and see that they pay it.' G. B. Shaw, *Prefaces* p. 312.
3. *Taittirīya-Kṛṣṇa-) Yajur-Veda Saṁhitā* 6.3.10.5.
4. *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* 1.7.2.1-5 ; *Mahābhārata* 1.119.17-20.
5. *Jābāla-Upaniṣad* 4 ; *Baudhāyana-Dharmasūtra* 2.10.17.3-4.
6. *Manu-Smṛti* 6.35, 37 ; *Mahābhārata* 1.13.11 ff. ; 1.228.5-13 ; 12.167.40.

indebtedness has been so strong all along that even Emperor Aśoka says in Rock Edict VI (Girnar text) : 'Work I most for the welfare of all the folk ; and of that, again, the root is energy and the dispatch of business ; for nothing is more essential than the welfare of all the folk. And what so ever effort I make they are made that I may attain release from my debt [an-aṁṇa] to animate beings....'[1]

Without a universal faith in the sanctity of person, without conceding an element of the holy in person as such, socio-cultural life would run the risk of coming to a standstill. Democracy treats persons as ends in themselves, as wholes,[2] as absolutes. Only faith in the divine origin of the human person can vouch for such a view. A Philosophy which reduces his status to that of a beast or dust serves to cut the ground from under the feet of democracy, for the simple reason that he loses all significance per se.

Poet says : Man has become different in my eyes ever since I heard it was the Beloved (the Divine) who is in the guise of man :

> Jab se sunā hai yār libās-ī bashar meṅ hai
> Ab ādami kuchh aur hamārī nazar meṅ hai

1. See J.G. Jennings, *The Vedāntic Buddhism of the Buddha* pp. 568-5-69.
2. Cp. Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad.

Chapter VIII

THE LOGIC OF LEVELS OF TRUTH

We have a diversity of truths. Some of them are coordinate, subordinate, or superordinate to some others. Some differ in degree, some in kind, and some in value and significance, from each other. Some alternate with others. This is all common knowledge, common sense, rather commonplace. Philosophy or metaphysics, too, has a distinction between truths, which is more complicated.

All philosophy—absolutistic and non-absolutistic, idealistic and realistic, spiritualistic and materialistic, rationalistic and empiricistic, dogmatistic and scepticistic, positivistic and negativistic, essentialistic and existentialistic, transcendentalistic and phenomenologistic, alike—appears from the first to be committed to a distinction, howsoever vague and inarticulate, between appearance and reality, datum and quaesitum, the immediate and the ultimate, and hence to a doctrine of two kind of truth. Indeed, such bifurcation of truth is regarded as a necessity of philosophic thought. Hegel declares all philosophy to be idealistic in essence, on the ground that, howsoever commonsense and matter-of-fact it be, it is far from satisfied with bare appearance, the immediate given, the crude fact, and must penetrate beyond the crust of appearance to the crumb of reality.[1] Thus, there is a truth of

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1. 'The proposition that the finite is of ideal nature constitutes Idealism. In philosophy idealism consists of nothing else than the recognition that the finite has no veritable being. Essentially every philosophy is an idealism, or at least has idealism for its principle. Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, Vol. I, p. 168. Cp. 'But all science would be superfluous, if the appearance, if the form, and the nature of things were wholly identical. 'Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, p. 649; Ludwing Feuerbach 'hailed the Copernican system as "the most glorious victory

appearance, the immediate, the given as well as a truth of reality, the ultimate, the tranacendent. Religion, too, purports, by the same token, to lay bare before us the panorama of a transcendent order. The Brāhmaṇa-s and Upaniṣad-s have it that the gods love the transcendent (parokṣa) and hate the given (pratyakṣa)[1] Nāgārjuna remarks that, if the given is the real, even children deserve to be treated as philosophers (tattva-vidaḥ). What is the point in philosophizing, then ?[2] Indeed, even matter, indestructible or destructible atoms, and the like are not given to us like tables and chairs, they transcend these. Even to such a thoroughgoing realist as Meinong, the truth of science would be not only different from but even higher than the truth of common sense, of the immediate given.

Again, reality can easily be said to have a without and a within, corresponding to which truth has to be twofold: the superficial, peripheral, immediate truth and the deep, central, ultimate truth. Candrakīti says that everything has two forms, one the result of right view and the other the result of wrong view. And the object of right view is called the truth (tattva) and that of wrong view, conventional truth or truth by courtesy (saṁvṛti-satya).[3]

The doctrine of truths is also related to the doctrine of two

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which idealism has won over empiricism, reason over the senses'', since it is only thought and not the senses that can tell us that we move around the sun and not *vice vice versa*. 'Eugen Kamenke, *The Philosophy of Ludwing Feuerbach* p. 104. 6.1.1.2

1. 'Parokṣa-priyā iva hi devāḥ, pratyakṣa-dviṣaḥ. 'Śatapatha-Brāhmana; *Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa* 3.3.9; *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad* 4.2.2. Cp. *Tāḍya-Mohābrāhmaṇa* 22.10.3.
2. 'Indriyair upalabdhaṁ yat tat tattvena bhaved yadi, 'Jātās tattva-vido bālās; tattva-jñānena kiṁ tadā ?' *Catuḥ-Stava* 3.18.
3. Samyan-mṛṣā darśana-labdhabhāvaṁ rūpa-dvayaṁ vibhrati sarva-bhāvaḥ. 'Samyag-dṛsāṁ yo viṣayas sa tattvaṁ, mṛṣā-dṛśāṁ saṁvrti-satyam uktam.' *Madhyamakāvatāra* 6.23.

worlds. By all accounts, the other world is rated more real and true than this world. This being the case, the truth of the other world is higher and that of this world is lower. That is why those do not beliewe in the other world are dubbed misbelievers (nāstika-s).[1]

The view can also be hazarded that the two truths have their own logics, so to speak, the logic of the definite and the logic of the indefinite, the one pertainining to the lower truth and the other, to the higher truth.

The Vedas tend to bifurcate reality into 'sat' and 'a-sat', which translate as existent and non-existent on the one hand and manifest and unmanifest on the other.[2] In the latter sense, the bifurcation is akin to the bifurcation of reality into 'sambhūti' and 'a-sambhūti' made in the Vedas themselves[3] and appears to correspond to the afore-cited Brāhmaṇa-division of reality into the given (pratyakṣa) and the transcendent/hidden (parokṣa). Another division found in the Brāhmaṇa-s and Upaniṣad-s corresponding to it is one of concrete (mūrta) and non-concrete/abstract/elusive (a-murta).[4] Corresponding to it there are two kinds of knowledge in Vedas, knowledge of the given (a-vidyā) and knowledge of the hidden (vidyā).[5] The Upaniṣadic counterparts, with a shift of emphasis, of these kinds of knowledge are lower knowledge (a-parā vidyā) and higher knowledge (Parā vidyā).[6] In the Upaniṣad, one more distinction is found mooted, which is attracted here, the distinction between truth (satya) and truth of truth (satasya satyam).[7] Such Vedic-Brāhmaṇic-Upaniṣadic distinctions seem to be at the root of the later clear divisions of truth.

Ājīvika-s developed a theory of standpoints (naya), three in number : the substantial standpoint (dravyārthika-naya), the

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1. *Aṣṭādhyāri* 4.4.60.
2. *RV* 10.129.1 and Sāyaṇa's commentary thereon.
3. *YV* 40.9 ff.
4. *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* 14.5.1 ; *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad* 2.3.1.
5. *YV* 40.12. ff.
6. *Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣad* 1.1.4-5.
7. *Bṛhadāraṇyka-Upaniṣad* 2.3.6.

modal standpoint (paryāyārthika-naya), and the dual standpoint (ubhayārthikanaya).[1] On this ground, they are called Trairāśika Ājīvika-s. Jainism developed a more elaborate list of standpoints seven in number. The Buddhist Pali canon mentions two truths, conventional truth (sammuti-sacca) and absolute truth (paramattha-sacca), without, however, distinguishing them in a clear-cut manner.[2]

It was left to the commentators to so define them. In the Pali canon, the first truth is used in the sense of public usage' (loka-sammuti).[3] A more significant distinction adumbrated therein is the one between two kinds of discourses (Sutta s), those of direct meaning (nītattha) and those of indirect meaning (neyyattha).[4] Sometimes, the two kinds of discourses are identified with 'Paramattha' and 'sammuti', in the sense of absolute and conventional truths.[5] The commentaries make it clear, however, that there is no relation of higher and lower between these truths, which are both equally true, though designed to cater to the needs of people of different capacities.[6]

Besides, the Budda's teaching of four Noble Truths (ariyasaccāni) presupposes non-Noble Truths. If 'all is suffering' (sabbaṁ dukkhaṁ) is a Noble Truth, 'all is happiness' is surely a non-Noble Truth. There is no such indication in the Pali canon however. According to Prajñākaramati, the fourth Noble truth is the absolute truth (paramārtha-satya), while the other three are in the nature of conventional truth (saṁvṛti-satya).[7]

The Buddha also mentions the distinction between 'mosā dhamma', viz. evanescent things of the world, and 'a-mosa-

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1. See K.N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 155 f.
2. See *ibid.*, pp. 361 ff.
3. Loc. cit.
4. *Aṅguttara-Nikāya*, Vol. I, p. 57.
5. Jayatilleke, p. 363.
6. Ibid., pp. 364-365.
7. *Bodhicaryātāra-Pañjikā* 9.2, p. 175

dhamma', which is Nirvāṇa.[1] The idea benind this distinction seems to be that, compared with Nirvāṇa, everything else is a mere nothing. This, too, suggests a distinction of truths.

The Buddhist bifurcation of truth was complete in the Mādhyamika school. The doctrine of two kinds of discourse was adopted by the Mādhyamika-s under the old nomenclature (of course in the Sanskritized form).[2] They also called the Neyārtha-Sūtra and Nitārtha Sūtra otherwise as ābhiprāyiki deśanā and tattvārthā desanā.[3] The distinction of 'moṣa-dharma' and a 'mosadharma' was duly adopted by them.[4] Nāgārjnna expressly observes that without keeping in view the distinction between the conventional truth and the absolute truth, it is impossible to understand the Buddha's teachings.[5] So, his two truths are : paramārtha-satya and saṁvṛti satya. He and other Mādhyamikas subdivide saṁvṛti into loka-saṁvṛti and a.loka-saṁvṛti,[6] tathya saṁvṛti and mithyā-saṁvṛti.[7] The first kind of samvrti is conventional/ empirical truth, while the second kind of saṁvṛti stands for erroneous perception, known in the Advaitic tradition as prātibhāsika satya (apparent truth). Sāntarakṣita defines saṁvṛti as buddhi (intellect),[8] which can easily be equated with 'dṛṣti' (view) so strongly condemend in Buddhist literature, from the Pali canon down to the fragmentation of Buddhism into the schools. Candrakīrti identifies it with delusion (moha), which hides the true essence.[9] He elsewhere gives three meanings of saṁvṛti : (1) ignorance (ajñāna), which hides the nature of things, (2) inter-

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1. *Majhima-Nikāya*, III, Sutta 40, p. 330. see also p. 261 ; *Saṁyutta-Nikāya*, III, 14?, etc.
2. *Madhyamaka-Sāstra-Prasannapadā* 1.3, p. 13.
3. Loc. cit.
4. *Madhyamaka-Sāstra* 13-1-2.
5. Ibid. 24-8-9.
6. *Madyamaka-Sāstra-Prasannapadā* 24-8, p. 215.
7. *Madyamārtha-Saṅgraha* of Ehavaviveka, *Journal of Oriental Research* (Madras), Vol. V. stanzas 7-8.
8. *Bodhicaryāvatāra* 9.2.
9. *Madhyamakāvatāra* 6.28, quoted in *BCAP* 9.2, p. 171.

dependent causation, relative being (Paraspara-sambhavanaṁ vā saṁvṛtir anyonyāśrayeṇa), and (3) way of the world (loka-vyavahāra).[1] Maitreyanātha speaks of three kinds of saṁvṛti : (1) prajñapti-saṁvṛti, where we use names in the absence of the named, (2) prattipatti-saṁvṛti, where we fancy things which are non-existent and(3)udbhavana-saṁvṛti, where we name things, such as dharma dhātu, which are far from namable.[2] He also speaks of three kinds of paramārtha : (1) artha-paramārtha, which means the object of supreme knowledge (paramasya jñanasyārtha iti kṛtvā) (2) prāpti-paramārtha, which means the supreme good, the summum bonum (paramo' rtha iti kṛtvā), which is Nirvāna, and (3) pratipatti paramārtha which means that of which the object/ goal is supreme (paramo 'syarthaiti kṛtvā), which is the way (mārga).[3] Bhāvaviveka divides paramārtha into paryāya-paramārtha and-a paryāya paramārtha, viz. expressible and inexpressible. According to him paryāya-paramārtha is also of two kinds : jātiparyāyavastu-paramārtha (universal) and janmarodha paramārtha (extinction).[4] prajñākaramati defines paramārtha as something supreme, the inartificial (un-superimposed) form of things, which is the essencelessness of everything (paramam uttamo 'rthaḥ paramārthaḥ, akṛtrimaṁ vastu-rupaṁ, sarvadharmānām niḥ·svabhavata).[5]

In the Yogācāra Vijñānavāda school of Buddhism, nature/ essence (svabhāva), reality (sat), or truth (satya) is said to be of three kinds : (1) pariniṣpanna (paramārtha, absolute), (2) paratantra (empirical loka-saṁvṛti, tathya-saṁvṛti), and (3) parikalpati (illusory a loka saṁvṛti mithya saṁvṛti).[6] Yaśomitra observes that the Yogācāra-s speak of three kinds of reality (sat) : (1) paramārtha-sat. (2) saṁvṛti-sat, and (3) dravya-sat.[7] They appear

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1. *Madhyamaka-Sāstra-Prasannapadā* 24.8, p. 215
2. *Madhyāntavibhāga-Kārikā* 1.10 and *Bhāṣya* and *Tikā* thereon, pp. 94-95.
3. Ibid. 1.11 and *Bhāṣya* and *Tikā* thereon, pp. 95-97.
4. *Madhyamārtha-Saṅgraha* 2-6.
5. *BCAP* 9.2, p. 171.
6. *Trisavabhavanirdeśa* 1 ff., for example.
7. *Abhidharmakośa-Sphutārthā* 6.4, p. 891.

to correspond to their parinișpanna, parikalpita, and paratantra respectively. We find these three truths described in detail already in the *Śatasehastika Prajñaparamitā*.[1]

Dharmakirti also speak of two kinds of truth : paramārtha and saṁvṛti. The mark of the one is efficiency (arthakriyā) ; the other is devoid of efficiency.[2] Diṅnāga equates saṁvṛti with illusion (bhrānti).[3] Dharmakīrti, too, seems to subscribe to this view in the last analysis, indirectly.[4]

The kinds of truth do not find mention in the *Abhidharma Piṭaka*. In the *Abhidharma Samuccaya* however, Asaṅga says that, when suffering (duḥkha) is described as birth, old age, death, etc., it is according to saṁvṛti-satya ; whereas, when it is described as the five upādāna-skandhas, it is according to paramārtha-satya.[5] Vasubandhu, the Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣika, also recognizes saṁvṛti satsatya and paramartha-sat-satya, but he defines them in his own peculiar way. He says that what ceases to be known as such after its destructoin is saṁvṛti sat. Take the case of a pot. It no longer deserves to be called so after destruction. Contrariwise, what retains its name even after destruction is called paramārtha sat. Matter (rūpa), for example. In the same way, that, too, is saṁvṛti sat which loses its identity on abstraction of certain properties from it. Take the case of water. When its form etc. are abstracted from it mentally, it ceases to be water. Contrariwise, what retains its identity even after such abstraction of its properties, is paramārtha sat Matter, for example, again. Abstract the properties of flavour etc., and you will find that it remains matter.[6] Yaśomitra suggests a slightly varying definition. According to him, saṁvṛti is of two kinds : one dependent upon another saṁvṛti and the other dependent upon another (empirical) reality (atha vā dvividhā saṁvṛtih saṁvṛ-

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1. *Satasāhasrikā-Prajñāramitā*, Ārya-Maitreyanātha-Pariprcchā.
2. *Pramāna-Vārtika* 2.3.
3. *Pramāṇa-Samuccaya*, Pratyakṣa-Pariccheda 8.
4. *Pramāṇa-Vārtika* 2.55-56 ; *Nyāyabindu-Ṭīkā* 1.5, 47.
5. *Abhidharama-Samuccaya*, p. 38.
6. *Abhidharmakośa* (with *Bhāsya*) 6.4, pp. 889-890.

tyantara vyapāsrayā dravyāntara vyapāśrayā ca). The first admits of both division and mental abstraction, whereas the second only of mental abstraction.[1] The *Abhidarma Dīpa* speaks of reality being of four kinds : paramārtha, saṁvṛti, both, and relative (paramārthena, saṃvṛtyā, dvayenāpekṣayā pi ca).[2] The *Vibhāṣāprabhā Vṛti* thereon explains the four kinds thus : What possesses eternal essence (yan nityaṁ svabhāvena sangṛhītaṁ na kadācit svam ātmānaṁ jahāti) is paramārtha; what can be put to empirical use is saṃvṛti, such as pot, cloth, forest, individual, etc. ; the earth etc; belong to the third kind and what acquires its name in relation to something else, such as father, son, teacher, student etc. is relative.[3] Harivarman's *Satyasiddhi Śāstra* is one of the earliest to highlight the two truths called paramārtha and saṁvṛti [4]

According to the substantive Buddhism tradition, the things of popular belief are in the nature of conceptual constructions from primitive sense-data. The so-called individual persons are also conceptual constructions from the five aggregates (skandha-s). Therefore, according to it, only the constituents of things and individuals are true the individuals and things constituted are false, and can be said to be true only by courtesy. This position is graphically stated in the following couplet.

> Nartakī bhrūlatā kṣepo na hy ekaḥ paramārthataḥ
> Paramāṇu samūhatvād ekatvaṁ tasya kalpitam[5]

That is, the creeper like eyebrow of the dancing damsel is far from one. It is (falsely) imagined to be one, because it is an aggregate of atoms. Buddhagoṣa observes that, asked whether a woman passed his way, the Bhikkhu would reply :

> Nābhijānāmi itthī vā puriss vā ito gato
> Api ca atthi saṁghāto gacchate sa mahāpathe [6]

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1. *Abhidharmakośa-Sphutārthā* 6.4, p. 890.
2. *Abhidharma-Dīpa* 5. 304.
3. *Adhidharmadīpa-Vibhāṣāprabhā-Vṛtti* 5.304, p. 263.
4. *Satyasiddhi-Sāstra*, pp. 354-355.
5. *Nyāyavārtikatātparya-Ṭikā* 1.1.10, p. 217.Cp. *Tattva-Saṅgraha* 200.
6. *Visuddhimagga* (Varanasi), Vol. I, p. 67.

That is, I do not know whether a woman or a man passed this way. (I can only say that) an aggregates of bones passed on the highway.

Indeed, it is said that, just as oil is brought out of linseed paramārtha can be brought out of prajñapti (appearance). The individual person is an appearance. When analyzed, he/she is found to consist of skin, bones, flesh, etc. (in all 32 parts), which are, therefore, paramārtha as compared with the individual. But they, too, are analyzable into smaller parts (kalapa s, eight in number) and are, therefore, in the nature of appearance as compared with these. Thus, only the irreducible, further unanalyzable parts are real paramārthasat, all else is prajñaptīsat.

According to Śāntideva, saṁvṛti satya admits of degrees. So, a yogin possesses a higher truth than a commoner. But yogins, too, differ in their intellects. And there are a number of gradations in their capacities.[1]

Candrakīrti has it that, of the two truths, empirical truth is in the nature of means (upāya-bhūta) and absolute truth in the nature of the end (upeya-bhūta).[2] It is also true that, without the staircase of empirical truth (tathya-saṁvṛti), it is difficult to reach the top of the mansion of the ultimate truth (tattva-prāsāda-Śikhara).[3] Muḥammad is traditional to have made a similar remark which is, 'Almajāzu qantaratu' l-ḥaqīqata (vyavhāra) is the staircase to paramārtha). Bhartṛhari says that truth is attained through untruth.[4] Nāgārjuna contends that, without the support of vyavahāra, paramārtha cannot be preached.[5]

Criticizing the Budhist bifurcation of truth into paramārtha and saṁvṛti, Kumārila contends that there can be only one truth. So, saṁvṛti is either true or false, it cannot be anything else. If, therefore, it is true, what is saṁvṛti ? And, if false how saṁvṛti-satya ? Just as treeness is not the universal of such contrary enti-

1. *BCA* 9.3-4.
2. *Madhyamakāvatāra* 6.80, quoted in *BCAP* 9.4, p. 179.
3. Quoted in *Abhisamayālṅkāraloka*, p. 346.
4. *Vākyapadiya* 2.240/238 51, *Madhyamaka-Sāstra* 24.10
5. *Madhyamaka-Sāstra* 24.10.

ties as tree and lion, truth cannot be the universal of the false and the true. And, if the false and the saṁvṛti are synonymous, like 'lālā (saliva) and 'vaktrāsava' (mouth-juice). then the distinction of saṁvṛti and paramārtha is a fraud.[1] But the Buddhist does not leave room for such an animadversion. Prajñākaramati has made it clear that, as a matter of fact, there is only one truth, paramārtha-satya. It is people in general who regard something other than paramārtha as a truth, and that is called empirical truth, saṁvṛti-satya. It is simply in deference to the way of the world that the Buddhist speaks of popular truth as 'truth'. So, the distinction between paramārtha and saṁvṛti is itself saṁvṛti. Otherwise, the fact of the matter is that only paramārtha-satya is truth, there is no other truth[2] Prajñākaramati quotes the Buddha also as saying, 'There is only one truth, Monks ! and it is Nirvāṇa'.[3] Even in the Pali canon, there are indications that truth is only one, neither two nor more.[4] So, in fact, the Buddhists are quite clear in their minds that ultimateiy there is only one truth and that it is to distinguish that truth, the philosophical truth, from popular truth that they speak of two truths. Prajñākaramati is categorical in the statement that only paramārtha-satya is satya and that in the state of enlightenment (Paramārtha-daśāyām) saṁvṛti-satya is simply nonexistent.[5]

Advaita Vedānta recognizes, loosely speaking, as many as four kinds of truth: paramārtha, vyavhāra, pratibhāsa, and tucch/alīka/nityabādhita. Paramārtha is the absolute truth; vyavahāra is empirical or conventional truth; and pratibhāsa is erroneous perception of, say, a snake in a piece of rope. Vyavahāra and

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1. *Mimṁsa-Śloka-Vārtika* 1.3, Nirālambanavāda 6-10.
2. *BCAP* 9.2, p. 175.
3. *Loc, cit.*
4. 'Ekaṁ hi saccaṁ, na dutiyam atthi.' *Suttanipata*, 184, or Aṭṭhaka Vagga, Cūla-Viyūha-Sutta, 7, p. 234 ; 'Na heva' saccāṇi bahūni nānā. '*Ibid.* 18k. Cp. 'Avitaȟārthena tāvad ekam eva satyaṁ, na dvitīyam.' *Bodhisriitvabhūmi*, p. 292, quoted in Jayatilleoe, p. 3k4.
5. *BCAP* 9.2, p. 171.

pratibhāsa differ only in duration. Vyavahāra lasts for many lives, and is sublated at the dawn of paramārthasatya : whereas pratibhāsa lasts for a moment, an hour, and so on. These three correspond to the truths recognized in the various schools of Buddhism, as under :

Paramārtha	Vyavahāra	Pratibhāsa
Paramārtha	Loka/Tathya-Saṁvṛti	A-loka-/Mithyā-Saṁvṛti
Pariniṣpanna	Paratantra	Parikalpita
Paramārtha sat	Dravya-sat	Saṁvṛti-sat

The Advaitin's tuccha means absolutely non-existent, so non-existent that, though it is given words, it is never experienced veridically or illusorily, such as hare's horn, a round square, etc. The Buddhists do not categorize it separately, they tend to subsume it under the third category, or, if they recognize only two truths, then under the second one.

The *Śūta-Saṁhitā*, belonging to the *Skanda-Purāna*, describes two kinds of paramārtha: the essential (Svabhāvataḥ) and the superimposed or mentally constructed (kalpitaḥ Brahmaṇy adhyastamāyayā).[1] In explanation of this distinction, Mādhava-Vidyāraṇya observes that the first paramārtha pertains to the Jñāna-Kāṇḍa (Knowledge section) and the second, to the Karma-Kāṇḍa (Action-section) of the Vedas.[2]

As a matter of fact, the distinction of paramartha and vyavahāra is articulated by almost all Indian schools of philosophy in some form or other, indeed even by those schools which are vocal in repudiation of the distinction. Kumārila's criticism has been noted above. Yet the same Kumārila countenances a space-bodied (vyoma śarīra) God (Paramātman) as the referent of the Vedic expression 'God is (like) space' (khaṁ Brahma) and as the presiding deity of the Vedas.[3] Besides, he categorically

1. *Sūra-Saṁhitā*, with Madbava's *Tātparyadīpikā*, Yyjñavaibhava-Khaṇḍa, *Brahma-Gītā* 2.17-18.
2. *Sūtasaṁhitā-Tātparyadīpikā*, ad ibip., p. 777.
3. *Tantra-Vārtika*, 3.1.13, p. 70.

lays it down that the aspirant after, liberation should turn to the Vedānta for proper knowledge of the self, without which libera tion is not possible.[1] According to him, Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā simply counters the arguments of the disbeliever in the self, it seldom tries to set out a positive theory of the self.[2] Prabhākara also rules that 'I' and 'mine' are the result of identification of the not-self with the self, but that this truth should be taught to those who have renounced the world and not to those attached to action and its fruit.[3] Here, it is evident, both Kumārila and Prabhākara seem to accord tacit approval to the distinction of paramārtha and vyavahāra. Likewise, according to the reading accepted by Viṭṭhaleśa and Rādhāmohana Gosvāmī Bhaṭṭācārya, the concluding, 52nd Sutra of the *Nyāya Sūtra* reads thus : 'Tat-tvaṁ tu Vādaryāṇāt', that is, we should turn to the *Brahma Sūtra* for the ultimate truth.[4] What is this if not a tacit recognition of the distinction of paramārtha and vyavahāra ? The Sāṅkhya system has it that, as a matter of fact, the self is neither bound nor attains liberation, what is bound and liberated is Prakṛti.[5] But the same system prescribes ways and means for attaining liberation. It may well be taken, therefore, that it deals with two orders of truth, and that the paramārtha is revealed by it only towards the end, saying that the self is eternally free The Yoga system also distinguishes true knowledge from knowledge born of conceptual construction (vakalpa-buddha).[6] In Jainism, the dichotmy of paramārtha and vyavahāra takes the form of 'kevala jñāna' (absolute/complete knowledge) and 'syād-vāda' (relative/-

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1. *Mīmāṁsā-Ṣloka-Vāriika* 1.1.5, Ātmavāda, concluding couplet. Cp. *Tantra-Vārtika* 3.1.8.27 (2nd ed.), p. 227.
2. *Tantaa-Vārtika* 1.3.27 (2nd ed.), p. 227.
3. *Mīmāṁsā-Sioka-Vārtika* 1.1.5, Ātmavāda, coucluding couplet.
4. *Bṛhatī* 1.1.5, p. 356.
5. *Nyāya-Sūtra-Vivaraṇa* 4.2.52; *Advaito-Siddhi-Gauḍabrahmānandī.*
5. *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* 62.
6. *Yoga-Bhāṣya* 1.9, etc.

partial) knowledge,[1] niścaya-naya and (vyavahāra-naya,[2] sakalādeśa and vikalādeśa.[3] Vallabha's distinction of 'prapñca' (the world as expression of the Divine essence) and 'saṁsāra' (the world as misconstrued by us into something different from Brahman)[4] ——to put it otherwise, in the Kantian vein, saṁsāra-in-itself and saṁsāra——, seems to correspond in effect to the distinction of paramārtha and vyavahāra. Vidyāraṇya, a great Advaitin and predecessor of Vallabha has mooted a similar distinction between God's creation (Īśa-sṛṣṭi) and soul's creation (jīva-sṛṣṭi),[5] which seems to correspond to Vallabha's distinction between Prapañca and Saṁsāra. The Quran, too, adumbrates a kindred distiniction. It says on the one hand that the world is not false/meaningless (bāṭil)[6] that God has created it out of truth (ḥaqq),[7] that he has not created heaven and earth for His sport (lahwo laīb),[8] and that His creation is faultless[9] but it also declares, on the other hand, that worldly life is nothing better than sport (lahw wo laīb)[10] and that real life is other worldly life.[11] It appears that the contradiction can be resolved by assuming that the former class of statements refere to Prapañca and the latter to Saṁsāra. In fact, even Rūmī, the greatest mystic poet of Islam, knows such a distinction.[12] Indeed, though not known to many, even such a Cārvāka philosopher as

1. *Apta-Mīmāṁsā* 10.105.
2. *Bhagavatī-Sūtra* 18.6. cited in Dalasukh Malavania's 'Prastāvanā' to Śāutı Sūri's *Nyāyāvatāravārtika-Vṛtti*, p. 54.
3. Akalaṅka, *Laghīyastraya* 62.
4. *Prameyaratnārṇava*. p. 25.
5. Vidyayaṇya, *Pañdadśī*, Caturtha Dvaita-Viveka-Prakaraṇa I ff. ; Ṣaṣṭha-Citradīpa-Prakarṇa 13.
6. Āli-Imrān 191.
7. Al-An'ām 73; Ar-Rūm 8.
8. Al-Aṅbiā 16.
9. Al-Mulk 3-4.
10. Al-An'ām 32; Al Āṅkabūt 64; Muḥammad 36; Bl-Ḥadīd 20.
11. Al-An'ām 32; Al-Aṅkabūt 64.
12. Rūmī, *Masnavī-i Maānwī, Fairā2an-i Yūsuf* ed, Vol. I, p. 89.

Jayarāśī Bhaṭṭa accepts the distinction of paramārtha and vyavahāra in unequivocal terms.[1]

We are not concerned here with the situation that obtains in the Western tradition. Nevertheless, we may note in passing that we find a more or less clear distinction of three truths in Parmenides and Plato as under, respectively :

The way of Truth	The way of Seeming	The way of Not-being[2]
Real/Knowledge	Real-Unreal/Opinion	Unreal/Ignorance/[3]

Kant postulated the higher reality of things-in-themselves noumena and the lower reality of things/phenomena, the higher truth called 'faith' and the lower truth called 'knowledge'.[4] Bradley also postulated the distinction of reality and appearance. Hegel appears to deny the dichotomy of higher and lower truths,[5] yet he does maintain the distinction, inbuilt in his system, of the Absolute and the relative. Besides, he also speaks of ordinary, finite being and veritable being,[6] which betrays the tacit assumption of two orders of reality.

The two truths are not necessarily mutually exclusive, are not discontinuous with each other as of necessity, and it should be possible for man, in most cases, to live both simultaneously. They are conceivable as coordinate to each other, or subordinate or superordinate one to the other, or ane supplementary to or, exceptionally, even supersessive of the other. It is a pity that Indian philosophers in general tend to develop the two truths as two watertight compartments, as two closed worlds, having no inter-

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1. *Tattuopaplavasiṁha*, p. 1.
2. F.M. Cornford, *Plaia and Parmenides*, Parmenides '*Way of Truth* and Plato's *Parmeni-des*, pp. 31 ff.
3. *The Republic* 510 f.
4. Kant, *Critique of pure Reason*, Prefaee to the Second Edition, Bxxx, p. 29.
5. See Harsh Narain, *Evolution of Dialeciic in Western Thought*, pp. 27-28.
6. See *Ibid.*, p. 36.

communication. That is why, for example. Śaṅkara who stormed the whole world with his uncompromising non-dualism is found guilty of approving of the inequitous tradition of filling Śūdra's ears with tin and lac on his hearing the Vedas recited.[1] Indeed, here one can easily adopt two contradictory courses of conduct without prejudice to one's status in society, if one is intelligent enough to assign them to the two separate columns of paramārtha and vyavahāra.

1. *Śārīraka-Bhāṣya* 1.3.38 p. 280.

CHAPTER IX

VEDIC ORIGINS OF SRAMANA TRADITION

The tradition of Indian philosophical historiography is nearly two centuries old, although the tradition of compilation of compendia of philosophical schools began as far back as eighth century A.D , roughly speaking. It is strange. however, that a full history of Indian philosophy is still a desideratum. The so-called historians of Indian philosophy right from Max Müller down to Fraũwallner and Sinha remain, by and large, compilers of collections of Indian philosophies. If their different sections dealing with the different schools of Indian philosophy are published separately, they are likely to appear to be more or less independent monographs on the respective schools. Such compilations are far from fit to be designated as histories of Indian philosophy, and, when there is no history of Indian philosophy worth the name, a historiology of Indian philosophy is out of the question. In fact no methodology of the writting of the history of Indian philosophy has yet been mooted. Indeed, even an epistemology of Indian history has not yet been built up.

In view of this, there is an imperative necessity of writing not only a proper history of Indian philosophy but also of rewriting Indian history. Such a need seems to have been felt by potter, who, too, however, does not appear to have made a great headway for want of the right insight.

The deeper we dive into the Vedic texts, the more do we feel convinced that they are the fountain-head of much of subsequent basic thought traditions in India. It is not easy, however, to demonstrate the truth of this contention. The corpus of the Vedic texts used to be a stupendpus one, consistion of 1131 sākhā (editions)with their own Saṁhitā-s (collections of hymns), Upa-Vedas, Brāhmaṇa-s, Anu-Brāhmaṇa-s, Āraṇyaka-s, Niṣad-s Upaniṣad-s, Kalpn-s, Anu-Kalpa-s, and, surely, Anu-Sākhā-s (sub-editions). Of this huge body of literature only an infinitesimal

part is extant, viz. hardly a dozen out of the 1131 Saṁhitā-s, a fewer number of Brāhmaṇa-s, and Āraṇyaka-s, and hardly a score of authentic Upaniṣad-s. All else has been consumed by time So, we are condemned to depend upon this remnant of the Vedic literature. We are inclined to believe that, had the full body of the literature been extant, we would have been in a better position to trace the origins of the various traditions of Indian philosophy.

There are clear indications in the extant Vedic Saṁhitā-s that part of the Absolute itself has, somehow, become the world and that the rest of it remains transcendent.[1] The *Gītā* follows suit.[2] If we follow the implications of this apparently simple statement, we shall find therein the ground of Bhakti, as well as of the world process. We also find it possible to build up what may be called a Vedic dialectic as well as to trace the common source of the Brāhmana and Śramaṇa traditions.

Bhakti is the name of the craving of the devotee for the deity. Why such a craving ? If the devotee and the deity are altogether different entities, why this craving of the one for the other ? It appears, therfore, that they are not different but related by way of part and whole. The part has somehow got torn off from the whole and craves to be reunited with it. Hāfiz sings :

> Tāir-i gulshan-i quds 'm chi diham sharḥ-i firāq
> ki dar īn dāh-gah-ī ḥādisah chūṇ uftādam.

That is, I am a bird belonging to the garden of the Holy. How should I tell the tale of my separation (from it) and lapse into this abode of accidents ?' Sri Aurobindo seems to advance the Vaiṣṇava and Christian traditions when he observes that the craving and devotion are not unilateral but bilateral. If the devotee craves to go up to the deity, the deity craves to come down to the devotee, as Ghālib imagines in the following couplet :

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1. *RV* 10.90.3.
2. *Gītā* 10.42.
3. *Mahābhāṣya* 1.1.50.

Tāsīr-i ishq hotī hay donoṅ ṭaraf janāb !
Mumkin nahīṅ hay āg idhar ho udhar na ho

That is to say, love is a two way process. It is not possible for one party to it to catch fire and for the other to remain immune from the fire. It can be said that the craving on the part of the 'part' is greater than that on the part of the whole. In the *Mahābhāṣya* we find what has been called the 'Antarya-Niyama,' namely, a law of nature according to which everything tends to revert to its source. Aristotle believes that objects tends to fall to the ground because that is where they belong and that smoke tends to go up because that is where it belongs. Patañjali gives similar illustrations, e.g. things made of earth tending to fall to the ground and fire tending towards its source, the sun. The idea is found adumbrated in several other ancient texts, including the Qur'ān.

In the Vedic verse quoted adove, we find the germs of a veritable dialectic. According to it, one and the same Person/superperson is divided into the immanent person and the transcendent person. Naturally, therefore, the two crave to reunite. This dialectic is manifested to some extent or other in each and every part of the world, which each is in a state of flux. It appears that the world finds no rest in any of its states. At the human level, this restlessness becomes far more pronounced. Man is ever impelled by an urge for the better. Hālī, a leading Urdu poet, has well sung :

Hay justju ki khūb se hay khūb-tar kahāṅ
Ab dekhiye ṭhahartī hay jā kar nazar kahāṅ

It is this craving which is at the root of cosmic, especially human, evolution. The dialectical process is well known. Thesis gives birth to antithesis, both culminating into synthesis. Synthesis, in its own turn, becomes the thesis of a subsequent antithesis, both culminating into a new synthesis. This process is irrevesible. It is expressible in Indian terminology as under :

Sthāpanā	Prati-sthāpanā	Sam-anvaya
Sthāpanā	Ākṣepa	Siddhānta
Vāda	Prati-Vāda	Saṁ-vāda

Pūrva-pakṣa	Uttara-pakṣa	Saṁ-paksa/Siddhānta-pakṣa
Anu-Yogin	Prati-Yogin	Sam-anvaya
Saṅ-kalpa	Vi-kalpa	Adhyavasāya
Vi-sedha	Ni-ṣedha	Pra-sedha

Vedic literature abounds with trilogies which appear to be of a dialectical character.

From this point of view, the history of the world is a history of the dialectical action and reaction of the immanent and the transcendent.

The immanent and the transcendent, the mundane person and the transcendent, person, the perishable person and the imperishable person, the kṣara puruṣa and the a-kṣara puruṣa, may be said to be thesis and antithesis respectively, synthetized into the Person/Uttama-Purusa/Puruṣottama of the *Gītā*.

In the *Yajur Veda* also we find a dialectical trilogy which appears to be based on the above trilogy.

Sam-bhūti	A-sambhūti	Ubhayaṁ saha
A-vidyā	Vidyā	Ubhayaṁ saha

From other sources, we can add certain other trilogies to this :

Kārya-Brahman	Kāraṇa-Brahman	Para-Brahman
A-para-Brahman	Para-Brahman	Pāratpara Brahman
Saguṇa-Brahman	Nirguṇa-Brahman	Para Brahman

It is said that those who worship Sam-bhūti and A-vidyā enter deep darkness and that deeper darkness they enter who are given up to A-sambhūti and Vidyā [1] Thus, Sam-bhūti and A-vidyā on one side and A-sambhūti and Vidyā on the other represent partial truths and have to be combined for the attainment of the whole truth.[2] That their combination can be said to be a third term seems to be suggested in another verse, a verse of the *Atharva-Veda*, to the effect that there are three things worthy of being preached (upadeśya) : Vidyā, A-Vidyā and a

1. *YV* 40.9.12.
2. *YV* 40.11.14.

third thing[1] not specified. Of course, the three terms are said to be parallel to the three Vedas : Ṛk, Sāma, and Yajuḥ. These two dialectical formulas can be stated as under :

Vidyā	A-vidyā	Anyad upadeśya
Ṛg-veda	Sāma-Veda	Yajur-Veda

It appears that, in the circle of the spiritually advanced seers in the Vedic age, the Person/Superperson was the object of worship in His wholeness. Gradually, the imminent and the transcendent fell apart, the immanent leading to life affirmation and the transcendent to life-negation,asceticism.

In the beginning, both life-affirmation and asceticism were complementary to each other and were fully Vedic, as held by Manu.[2] By and by the tendency of life affirmation showed the way of works/yajña/dharma, and the tendency of asceticism the way of knowledge/Brahman.

In course of time, the way of works came to be known as yoga and the way of knowledge as Sāṅkhya.[3] Originally, the yoga the Sāṅkhya were not rivals. Both led to the same goal. The memory of this state of affairs is well preserved in the *Gītā*.[4]

The harmonious Vedic tradition began gradually to be marred by the growth of extremes. It is to this phase of the Vedic tradition that the afore-quoted Yajur-Vedic verses seem to refar. Some began to install the immanent and others the transcendent as the whole of the Person/Superperson.

In the Sāṅkhya-yoga tradition, renunciation without knowledge can lead to what is called absorption into Prakṛti-laya, while renunciation with knowledge leads to liberation, Mokṣa.[5] There

1. *AV* 11.8.23.
2. *Manu-Smṛti* 12.88-89. Cp. *Mahābhārata*. Śānti-Parvan 19.1 ; 268.15.
3. *Gītā* 13.3.
4. *Gītā* 5.4.5.
5. *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* 45.

is no return from Mokṣa, but there is from Prakṛti-laya.[1] Absorption into Prakṛti is a kind of temporary liberation.[2] That is why it is held that absorption into Prakṛti should not be our goal. And such absorption is the goal of the Nirvāṇa-oriented Śramaṇa tradition.

It appears that the worshippers of the immanent came to be subdivided into materialists and Brahmanists, the one treating the immanent or this world alone to be real,[3] and the other, though postulation another world over and above this world, regarding the other world as simply a revised edition of this world.[4]

Both these tendencies were essentially hedonistic. In reaction to these, a life-negating tendency came into being, setting as its goal Mokṣa or Nirvāṇa to the exclusion of pleasures here and hereafter.

These extremes were sought to be reconciled for the first time in the vedic verses pertaining to Sambhūti etc. In consequence, a new tradition was set afoot, the Kṣatrya/Rāja-rṣi tradition.[5] The Brāhmaṇa way of works and the Kṣatriya way of knowledge became complementrary to each other. The karma-yoga taught by the Gītā is the most prominent example of the synthesis of the two ways.

The ascetic tradition appears to be rooted in the Sāṅkhya tradition which developed into two channels, the ascetic and the non-theistic. Both these developments drew farther and farther from the Person/Superperson. In the beginning, Brāhmaṇa and Śramaṇa were not on inimical terms. The Buddha mentions both

1. *Vāyu-Purāṇa*, quoted in *Yoga-Vārtika* 1.19. It is not traceable in the extant text of the *Vāyu-Purāṇa* and Vāyavya-Saṁhitā of the *Śiva-Purāṇa*, however.
2. *Yoga-Bhāṣya*, Samādhi-Pāda 19.
3. *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 4.4.60.
4. Cp. *Gitā* 2.42-44.
5. Cp. *Gitā* 4.1-2 ; 9.2 ; *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad* 1.4.11 ; 6.2.8 ; *Chāndgya-Upaniṣad* 5.3.7.

together time and again, often in an admiring vein.[1] He is all praise for the Vedic seers and the Varṇa-system in its pristine purity.[2] It was later that Brāhmaṇas and Śramaṇas were found at daggers drawn, as indicated by Patañjali the grammarian.[3] The early Tirthaṅkaras of the Jainas also were not hostile to the Brāhmaṇic tradition. Ṛṣabhadeva and Bharata Cakravartin are traditioned to have founded the Varṇa-order, which is a speciality of the Brahmaṇic tradition.[4]

The next attempt to bridge the gulf-between life-affirmation and life-negation, between Yoga and Sāṅkhya, is found in the *Gītā*. The Vedic Saṁ-bhūti and A-sambhūti appear in the *Gītā* as Kṣara and A-kṣara. The third term of the dialectic left unspecified in the Vedas is termed Uttama-Puruṣa or Puruṣottama in the *Gītā*.[5] Corresponding to the Vedic dialectic of Vidyā, A-vidyā, and their combination, the *Mahābhārata* has the dialestic of Jñāna, niṣṭha, Karma-niṣṭha, and Mahīpāla-vidhi (the Kṣatriya way).[6] The *Gītā* declares Sāṅkhya and Yoga to be one at bottom, presumably because they both culminate into the attainment of the Puruṣottama.[7]

This synthesis reappears in the Vedantic tradition again and again, thanks especially to the wisdom of the Vaiṣṇava Vedātins. But they, too, seem to have unwittingly slided into the tradition of world-negation along their path of devotion. It is against this new-fangled way of life-negation that the *Viṣṇu-Purāṇa* thunders, saying that those who repeat ad nauseam 'Kṛṣṇa, Kṛṣṇa bidding good-bye to their religious and secular duties are verit-

1. *Dīgha-Nikāya* Pathika-Vagga, Siṅgāla-Sutta, for example.
2. *Suttanipāta*, Uraga-Vagga, Brāhmaṇadhammika-Sutta, for example.
3. *Mahābhāṣya* 2.4.12.2.
4. *Mahāpurāṇa*
5. *Gītā* 15.16.
6. *Mahābhārata*, Śānti-Parvan 320-25.
7. *Gītā* 5.4-5.

able enemies of Kṛṣṇa, for Kṛṣṇa incarnated upon this earth just to re-establish the way of religious and secular duties.[1]

Vedic origin of the Buddhist tradition is suggested in a queer tradition referred to by Śāntarakṣita. One of the Vedic Śākhās, according to him, is the Nimitta-Śākhā, which, he claims, refers to the Buddha's omniscience.[2] If there did exist such a Vedic text, we are inclined to hazard the opinion that it might have been one of the sources of the tradition of the Avatāra-hood of the Buddha.

Let us add one more dimension to the issue under consideration. We have reason to believe that there was a pre-Buddhaic theory of momentariness ascribable to Vārṣyāyaṇi, referred to by Yāska and Patañjali.[3] His thought on the subject was so powerful that the grammarians absorbed his thesis in toto, interpretiong 'bhāve' (being/existence) to mean activity or movement,[4] and the Budhist does uphold the activity theory of being. This circumstance, too, points to the Vedic origin of the Śramaṇa tradition.

The *Ṛg-Veda* sometimes speaks of 'sat' (being) arising out of 'a-sat' (non-being).[5] The *Taittrīya-Upaniṣad,* too, refers to such a doctrine.[6] Thc *Chāndogva-Upaniṣad* rejects it outright.[7] Thus, the Buddhist doctrine of arising out of nothing (pratītya-samutpāda) is already known to the Vedic tradition. The *Mahābhārata* yields some additional material germane to our inquiry. The theory of Nirvāṇa is said to be the most unique feature of Buddhism. But we find enough material on Nirvāṇa in the *Mahābhārata,* which does not appear to owe its existence to Bud-

1. Quoted by Kamalākara but not traceable in the extant text of the Purāṇa.
2. *Tattvasaṅgraha* 3511-3516.
3. *Nirukta* 1.1.1 ; *Mahābhāṣya.*
4. *Nirukta* 1.1.1 ; *Aṣṭādhyāyi, Kātyāyana-Vartika, Mahābhaṣya* 2.3.37.
5. *RV* 10.72.2-3.
6. *Tattirīya-Upaniṣad* 2.7.1.
7. *Chandogya-Upaniṣad* 6 2.1.

dhism. It refers to prominent Sāṅkhya teacher, Pañcaśikha, called a Bhikṣu, who speaks of uccheda-niṣṭhā and bhava-nisṭhā ucched and śāṣvata, in a manner characteristic of the Buddha.[1] He also postulates 'sattva-saṅkṣaya (dissolution of individuality), likening it to the loss of individuality of the rīvers falling into the sea.[2] The Upaniṣads, too, use this simile.[3]

The *Mahāabhārata* puts it into the mouth of Bharadvaja that, just as with the exhaustion of fuel fire is extinguished, the soul also becomes extinct.[4] This seems to anticipate the Buddhist doctrine of Nirvāṇa. In fact, the *Mahābhārata* itself states that with the cessation of volition, the soul gradually attains Nirvāṇa like fuel-less fire :

> Vihāya sarva-saṅkalpān buddhyā śārīra-mānasān
> Śanair Nirvāṇam āpnoti nirindhana ivānalaḥ.[5]

Elsewhere, the *Mahābhārata* defines Nirvāṇa as if in a Buddhist vein:

> Nirvāṇaṁ sarva-dharmāṇāṁ nivṛttiḥ paramā-smṛtā.
> Tasmān nivṛttim āpannaś caret sarvāṅga-nirvṛtaṇ.[6]

The *Gītā* uses the term Brahma-Nirvāṇa four times.[7] The term meant extinction into the Absolute, Fanā fi' llāh in Ṣūfī parlancc.

It is pertinent to point out that the Buddha never claims to have invented the idea of Nirvāṇa. A close scrutiny of the Buddhist scriptures would leave no doubt that the doctrine of Nirvāṇa was already there and that the Buddha only interpreted it in his own way.[8] That even the expression Nirvāṇa is pre-Buddhaic

1. *Mahābhārata* Śānti-Parvan 219.6, 41.
2. *Ibid.*, 219.42-43.
3. *Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣad* 3.2.8. Cp. *Praśna-Upaniṣad* 5.6.
4. *Mahābhārata*, Śānti-Parvan 187.5-6.
5. *Ibid.*, Āśvamedlika-Parvan 19.12.
6. *Ibid.*, Śānti-Parvan 339.67.
7. *Gītā* 2.72 ; 5.24-25.
8. *Saṁyutta-Nikaya*, Saṭāyatana-Vagga, Jambukhādaka-Saṁyutta, Nibhānapaṅhā-Sutta; Sāmaṇḍaka-Samyutta, Sāmaṇḍaka-Ṣutta ; for example,

is amply demonstrated by Pāṇini's derivation of it without the remotest awareness of the Buddhist conception of Nirvāṇa.[1] and Vālmīk's use of the term in an altogether different sense, consolation.[2] Indeed, Caraka seems to hark to a pre-Buddhaic tradition when he gives a number of synonyms for Nirvāṇa :

> Vipāpaṁ, virajaḥ, śāntaṁ, param, askṣaram, avyayam,
> Amṛtaṁ, Brahma, Nirvāṇaṁ, paryayaiḥ, śantir ucyate.[3]

The noble eightfold path, aṣṭāṇgika-mārga, too, does not appear to be a Buddhist innovation. The Buddha describes it as an ancient way (purāṇam maggam),[4] and we de find an eightfold path, aṣṭāṇga-mārga, prescribed in the *Mahābhārata*.[5]

There can be no gainsaying the fact that asceticism never precedes but always follows the tradition of life-affirmation. Civilizations are built up by life-affirmers and it is only at an advanced stage that worldweariness or asceticism supervenes.

From the foregoing considerations, the conclusion is irresistible that the Śramaṇa tradition, especially the Buddhist, owes its origin substantially to the Vedic tradition.

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1. *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 8.2.50.
2. *Rāmayāṇa* 1.36.14.
3. *Caraka-Saṁhita*, Śārīra-Sthāna 5.21.
4. *Saṁyutta-Nikaya*, Leon Feer, ed. (P.T.S ed.), Nidāna-Vagga, paragrapha 21-23, pp. 106-107.
5. *Mahābhārata*, Vana-Parvan 2.77.

Chapter—X

VEDIC ORIGINS OF THE GUṆA-DIALECTIC

The dominating section of Sāṅkhya scholarship today is inclined to trace the orgins of the Sāṅkhya to non-Vedic, ante-Vedic, and even anti-Vedic traditions. The present author proposes to strike a note of dessent in this chapter. To us, the tendency is an index to the sad plight of Vedic studies at our hands and is responsible for much misreading of Indian philosophy, history, and culture. It is a big topic, however, and refuses to be covered in a single chapter of morderate size. In the present chapter, therefore, we will content ourself with attacking the problem of the origin of not the Sāṅkhya entire but only the Sāṅkhya dialectic, which is guṇa-dialectic.

According to the Sāṅkhya, as embodied in the Sāṅkhya texts proper available today, the ultimate reality is twofold, the spiritual (*Puruṣa*) and the psycho-physical (*Prakṛti*). The psycho-physical principle to which the cosmos is ultimately reducible is said to have three dimensions (*guṇa-s*) : *Sattva, Rajas* and *Tamas* There are, that is to say, three dimensions to whatever there is, apart of course from the spiritual unities called *Purusa-s*. This trilogy of dimensions translates variously but not aptly. Neither English nor any other language for that matter has any appropriate equivalents for the trilogy, which is so multidimensional that one has to content oneself with partial translation by selecting a particular dimension of the concept as the occasion demands. It would be advisable, therefore, to bring home to the reader the richnes of the trilogy in content by juxtaposing to it as general equivalences as possible, current somewhere or other, independently, such as the following, culled from different sources, including Western thought and Sūfism.

Sattva	*Rajas*	*Tamas*	Knowing	Willing	Feeling
Mind	Life	Matter	Pleasure	Pain	Ennui
Elan intellectual	Elan vital	Elan mechanical	Rhythm	Mobility	Inertia
Intelligence	Instinct	Torpor	Light	Energy/ Activity	Darkness
Logistikon	Thumos	Epithumia	*Nūr* (light)	*Barzakh* (midway)	*Zalmān* (darkness)
Reason	Passion/ Spirit	Appetite	*Rūḥ* (soul)	*Nafs* (liff)	*Ṣūrat* (form)
Knowledge	Action	Desire	*Zāt* (existence)	*Sifāt* (essence)	*Asmā'-o-Af'āl* (names and (works)

The original Sāṅkhya trilogy is not just a trilogy but a veritble trichotomy of a dialectical character : it serves to divide the whole of reality, the whole of thought, the whole of the universe of discourse into three moments exhaustively, like the moments of dialectic, viz. thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Dialectic has developed in the main along two independent lines, viz. dialogical or reasoning dialectic on one hand and metaphysical dialectic or dialectic as the concept of struggle of opposites on other.[1] Here we are taking the Sāṅkhya dialectic in the latter sense. There are certain clear indications in certain ancient texts that the trilogy is all-pervading, without exception.[2] It is also suggested in serveral texts that the trilogy represents the unity, interpenetration, struggle of opposites, the proverbial form of objective or metaphysical dialectic.[3] Vācaspati Miśra has it that the *guṇa*-s

1. Harsh Narain. *Evolution of Dialectic in Western thought* p. 2.
2. *Bhagavad Gītā* 18.40, *Mahābhārata Devī-Bhāgavata* 6.30.48—51 31.34 ff. Cp. *Mahabharata* Śānti-Parvan 187 25 and Anuśāsanaparva 12.4 describing the three guṇas as attributes of soul (Jīva-guṇāḥ), 280.4, describing the three guṇas as identical with the Lord (Nārāyaṇātmakān).
3. *Bhagavad Gıtā* 18, passim, *Mahābhārata*, Śānti Parvan 19], 39-40, 248.22-24, Āśvamedhika-Parvan 36, 4-7, 39. 1-8, 12, *Vāyu-Purāṇa* Pūrvārdha 5.16-17, *Kūrma Purana* Pūrva-Bhāga 2 92, *Sāṅkyā Kārikā* with *Sāṅkhyatattvakumudi*, 12-13.

are mutually contradictory but do not destroy each other like Sunda and Upasunda (the mythological demon brothers who killed each other) because their functioning is for a common purpose, even as the wick and oil are opposed to fire and yet they cooperate with it in giving light.[1] Indeed, it is also suggested sometimes that the cosmos is essentially dialectical.[2]

Well, the Sāṅkhya dialectics has an interesting history. The burden of this chapter is to show that it owes its origin to Vedic cosmogony viz. :

(1) to the well-known cosmic trilogy of the Vedic texts,

(2) to the cosmogonic trilogy of creation, preservation, and destruction, and

(3) to the creation hymn of the Ṛg-Veda.

On the basis of the description of the three *guṇa*-s by Caraka[3] and Pañcaśikha,[4] Dasgupta is inclined to the view that 'originally the notion of *guṇa*-s was applied to different types of good and bad mental states, and they were supposed in some mysterious way by mutual increase and decrease to form the objective world on the one hand and the totality of human psychosis on the other'.[5] Burrow[6] and Johnston[7] also maintain that the *guṇa*-s were originally a purely psychological division, elevated to the status of cosmogonical principles later. Dasgupta credits Vijñānabhikṣu with being the first to describe *guṇa*-s as reals or super-subtle substances in a systematic manner, Vācaspati and Gauḍapāda keeping silent.[8]

1. *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudi* 13, pp. 30-31.
2. *Manu-Smṛti*, 1.26, *Mahābhārata* Śānti Parvan 238.20.
3. *Caraka Saṁhltā*, Śarīra-Sthāna 1.34, 66-67, 104.
4. *Mahābhāratata*, Śānti Pavrvan 219.25.
5. S.N. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. pp. 221-222.
6. T. Burrow. 'Sanskrit Rajas' *BSOAS*, XII, p. 469, quoted in J.A.B. Van Buitenent 'Studies Sāṅkhya' (III), *JAOS*. Vol. 77, No. 2 (April-June, 1957) pp. 92-93.
7. E.H. Johnston, *Early Saṅkhya*, pp. 134-4.
8. Dasgupt a, p. 223.

But this does not appear to be the case, to the present writer.

Carlton C Rice has come forward with the thesis that, originally, the word '*guṇa*' was an adjective signifying 'bovine', derived from the zero grade of the base '*go*' and formed by the secondary suffix '*-na*', the '*ṇa*' in it betraying the influence of Prakrit. The successive states of the evolution of its meaning are as follows : (1) 'bovine' (adjective) (2) 'bovine sinew' (substantive) (3) 'sinew' (4) 'strand', cord (of rope) (5) 'quality' (6) 'virtue.[1] The last four meanings are found actually attested in Sanskrit.[2] Disagreeing with Rice, Keith suggests that '*guṇa*' must have the same origin as the Avestan word 'gaono' meaning hair, and, 'if this is accepted as the earliest sense of *guṇa*, it is easy to see how from the practice of plaiting the hair the meaning "strand" might easily come to be that of *guṇa*.[3]

The earliest texts in which '*guṇa*' figures with a more or less clear sense are the *Taittirīya-Saṁhita* of the Black *Yajur-Veda*, where it means 'strand' as constituent of rope.[4] and the *Śaunaka-Saṁhitā* of the *Atharva-Veda*, where it means 'constituent'.[5] According to Keith, the Iranian term also assumes the sense of 'quality' and 'colour'. According to Walde, both the Avestan word and the Vedic '*gavini*' (*groin*) are derived from the root '*geu-*' (Avestan), 'biegen, krümmen, wolben'.[6]

In the Sāṅkhya system, '*guṇa*' retains its original (or almost original) sense of strand or constituent, whereas, in the Vaiśesika

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1. See *Language*, VI (1930), pp. 1930), pp. 36-40, discussed in A.B. Keith, 'The Elymology of Guṇa'. *K B. Pathaka Commemoration Volume*, pp. 311-314.
2. See, for example, Kālidāsa, *Raghuvaṁśā* 9.54, *Kumāsambhava* 4.15, 29- for 'guṇa' as bowstring, *Baudhayana Dharmasūtra*, 2.3.12, 2.5.12, 4.1 12, 16. 26 for 'guṇa' as merit, worth, Guṇa as quality needs no introduction, and guna as strand follows.
3. Keith, p. 313.
4. *Yajur-veda* (*Taittirīya-Saṁhta*) 7.2.4.2.
5. *Atharva-veda* 10.8.43.
6. Keith, p. 313.

system, it assumes the later sense of quality (or rather attribute). By the time of Patañjali the grammarian, it assumed a great variety of meanings.[1] In the *Mahābhārata*, monad (*manas*) intellect (*buddhi*), quantity, (*sattva*) 'I am the doer, 'another is the doer' 'this is mine and this is not mine', the matrix (*prakṛti*), the manifestation (*vyakti*) time (*kala*), etc. etc. are also termed '*guṇa*-s.'

From these considerations, it is evident that '*guṇa*' has, from the first, signified an objective fact and not just a psychological one as Dasgupta, Burrow, and Johnston take it to have signified originally.

In fact, on the basis of certain clear indications in the *Mahābhārata* the author is inclined to believe that, at first, the three mental states with which these writers identify the three *guṇa*-s were treated as dependent upon the *guṇa*-s (*tadāśritāḥ*) and christened '*bhāva*' or '*vedanā*'.[2]

The *Śaunaka-Saṁhitā* of the *Atharva Veda* is the first extant text to refer to the 'three *guṇa*-s',[3] where the ontological import of the expression is clear. It also happens to be the first to mention '*rajas*' and '*tamas*' together, by name, once, where, too, the objectivity of the concepts is unmistakable.[4] It is no less significant a fact that the trilogy of *guṇa*-s appears to have been used in the sense of the objective constituents of the Potentiality (*prakṛti*) even in the oldest known Sāṅkhya treatise, *Ṣaṣti-Tantra*, no longer extant.[5]

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1. *Mahābhāsya* 5.1.119.5.
   Mahābhārata, Śānti-Parva 320.103 ff.
2. *Mahābhārata*, Śānti Parvan 194.15, 29-30, 219.25, 243, passim 275, 25-28, 285. 16, 22-28, 295, 2. Cp. 320. 103-113 describing mind (manas), intellect (buddhi), etc. as 'guṇa-s'. I cannot bring myself to endorse Buitenen's interpretation of Bhāva to mean '(evolved) from of being', in his 'Studies in Sāṅkhya' (1) JAOS Vol 76, No. 3 (July-September, 1956), pp. 153-157.
3. *Atharvaveda* 10.8.43.
4. Ibid 8.2.1.
5. *Vyāsa-Bhāsya* 4.13, p. 415, *Bhāmatī* 2,1.3, p. 352,

Now, quite a number of triads are found scattered in the Vedic texts,[1] some of which are bound to interest us here. Besides the triads found therein elsewhere, full hymn of the *Śaiśirīya-Śākala-Saṁhitā* of the *Ṛg-Veda*, comprising a dozen stanzas, is devoted to triads of various sorts'.[2] As is well known, a recurrent phenomenon in this text is the trilogies pertaining to fire (*agni*).[3] Fire is spoken of as having three forms : the fire of the waters, the fire of the firmament, and the fire of the sun.[4] Correspondingly, the Vedas divide existence or the cosmos into three worlds arranged vertically, as subjoined from lower up : (1) The dark world cf the earth (*pṛthvi*) (2) The intermediate, and transparent world of the firmament (*antariksa*) (3) The bright world (*Dyo*).[5] This cosmic trilogy is variously designated, such as :

Pṛthvī (earth)	*Antariksa* (firmament)	*Dyo* (solar world)	*Avam* (low	*Madhyama* (middle)	*Ut-tama* (highest)[7]
Bhūr (earth)	*Bhuvas* (firmament)	*Svar* (heavens)[6]	*Avam*	*Madhyama* (middle)	*Parama* (extreme)[8]

1. See, for example, *Ṛg-Veda* 1.22. 17-18, 1.95.3, 1.146.1, 1.164.20, 2.80.4, 3.26.7, 4.1.7, 4,535, 10.45, 1-2, *Atharva-Veda* 3.21.7., 8 1.11.
2. *Ṛg Veda* 1.34.
3. See example, *ibid*, 1.95.3, 1 20.2, 3.26.7, 4.1.7, 10,45. 1—2, 10.46.9, 10.88.10.
4. See for example, *ibid.* 1.95.3, 10, 45, 1-2, 10.88.10 Of the last verse, we follow the last verse, we follow the interpreation given by Śākapūṇi. Yāska, *Nirkta* 7.7.5 Also see *Atharva-Veda* 3.21.7, 8.1.11.
5. See, for example, *Rg Veda* 2, 40, 4, *Atharva-Veda* 10.6.31, 12.3.20, *Aiiareya-Brahmana* 1.5,8, *Satapatha Brahmana* 13.1 7.3 Cp. *Yajur-Veda* 17.67, 68, *Yajur Veda Taittirty Saṁhita* 4.65. 3,4.
6. *Yajur-Veda* 35, 37, 7.29, 8.53, 23.8, 36.3, Yajur-*Veda* (*Taittirīya Saṁhita*) 1, 6, 2.2, 5.5.5.3, 7.4, 20.1, and in several other Vedic texts.
7. *Rg Veda* 5.60 6.
8. *Ibid*, 1081.5, *Atharva* Veda 10.7.8, *Yajar* Veda 1721. Cp. *Rg-Veda* 10.81.5.

Ut	*Ut-tara*	*Ut-tama*[1]
(high)	(higher)	(highest)
Ayaṁ lokaḥ this world)	*Antariksa* (firmament)	*Asau lokaḥ* (yonder world)[2]
Idam (this)	*Svapana* (dream land) or *Sāndhya-sthāna* (middling world)	*Paraloka-sthāna* (word) beyond)[3]

Mātṛ	*Bhrātṛ*	*Pitṛ*
(mother)	(brother)	(father)[4]
Manusya-loka (world of men)	*Pitṛ-loka* (world of manes)	*Deva-loka* (world of goods)[5]
Mitra	*Payasyā*	*Varuṇa*[6]
Prāṇa	*Anna*	*Apāna*[7]
Sam-rāṭ	*Vi rāt*	*Sva rāṭ*[8]

The three worlds constitute the three strides taken by Viṣṇu, as the *Ṛg-Veda* would have it.[9]

Incidentally, the three worlds are themselves devided into three sub-worlds each,[10] generally speaking.[11] The triads connected with fire and the cosmos are believed to be the most ancient of the Vedic triads.

Now, in the Vedas, term '*rajas*' is also used in the sense of

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1. Ṛg *Veda* 1.50.10.
2. *Yajur-Veda* (*Taittiriya Saṁhitā*) 7.2.4.2.
3. *Śatapatha-Brāhmana* 14.7.1.9.
4. Ṛg-*Veda* 1.89.4, 190.7, 1.164.33, 1.191 6, 6.51.5. *Atharva-veda* 6.120.2.
5. *Śatopatha-Brāhman* 14.4.3.11, *Taittirīya-Brahmana* 2.1.8.1.
6. *Śatapatha-Brāhmana* 12.9.2.12.
7. Vāyu-*Purāṇa* Pūrvārdha 45. 87. Cp. *Taittiriyaka* Prapāṭhaka 10 (known as *Narayana-Upaniṣad*), Anuvāka, 22, *Mahanarayana Upanisad* 14.1.
8. *Rg*-Veda 1.22.17-11, 1.154, passim, 7.100.3-4. We follow ākapūṇi's interpretation given in *Nirukta* 12. 2.8.
9. See, for example, *ibtd* 1.34.8; 2 27.8-9-9; 4.53.5; 7 87.5; 7.104.11 *Atharva-veda* 18.2.48.
10. See, for example, *Atharva veda* 4 14.3, which refers to a fourth world beyond the solar world.

firmament, over a dozen times.[1] Therefore, the cosmic trilogy of the Vedas is also expressible as : *Pṛthivī* (earth) *Rajas* (firmament) *Dyo* (solar world).

This '*rajas*' appears to have been a connecting link between the cosmic trilogy and the *guṇa*-trilogy of *tamas*, *rajas* and *sattva*.

Well, the earth is coares, inert, dark ; firmament represents activity and energy characteristic of the air and the heavenly bodies ; and the solar world is all light. Such a consideration seems to have, to some extent or other, been responsible for the suggestion of the principles of darkness (*tamas*), energy (*rajas*), and light (*sattva*), styled *guṇa*-s. This point will receive further elucidation in the sequal.

The connection of the triplicity of worlds with that of the *guṇa*-s is thrown into further relief by the statements, occurring in several scriptural texts, to the effect that *sattva* tends upwards, *rajas* remains in the middle, and *tamas* tends downwards.[3]

The Vedic deities are also divided into three, corresponding to the threefold division of the cosmos.[4] So, fire is assigned to the earth, the air or Indra to the firmament, and the sun to the solar world.[4] In the Vedas, the sun is also designated as Viṣṇu.[5] So, it is said that fire is the lowest and Viṣṇu the highest of the deities, all other deites falling in between.[6] It appears that later, in order of importance, Indra and fire yielded place to Brahman (masculine) and Śiva respectively.[7] In the result, the Vedic

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1. *Ṛg-Veda* 1.56.5, 1.62.5, 1.84.1, 1.124.5, 1.168.6, 1.187.4, 2.40.3 6.62.9, *Atharva-Veda* (*Śaunaka Saṁhitā*) 4.25.2, 7.41.1, 7.41.1; 10.3.9, 13.2.8; 13.2.43, *Yajur*-Veda 18.44.
2. *Saṁkhya karika* 54, *Manu-Smṛti* 12-40, *Bhagavad Gītā* 14.18, *Mahābhārata*, Sānti-Parvan 302.47.
3. *Ṛg-Veda* 1.139.II, *Atharva*-Veda 1.30.3, 109.12,
4. *Ṛg-Veda* 10.158.1, *Nirukta* 7.2.1.
5. *Ṛg-Veda* 1.22.16 21.
6. *Āitareya-Brāhmaṇa* 1.I.1.
7. *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* 1.7.3.8, for identification of Agni with Śiva/Rudra.

trinity of sun, Indra, and fire was supplanted by the Parāṇic trinity of Viṣṇu, Brahman (mas.) and Śiva.[1] It is significant that even in an Upaniṣad of sufficient antiquity *tamas* is identified with Rudra or Śiva, *rajas* with Brahman (mas.) and *sattva* with Viṣṇu,[2] on one hand, and fire, air, and the sun with Brahman (mas.), Rudra, and Viṣṇu, respectively,[3] on the other.

Thus, the cosmic trilogy as the divine trinity envisaged in the Vedas has had much to do with the origin of the *guṇa*-trilogy.

The cosmogonic trilogy of chaos (*vi-sarga, parti-sarga, pra-laya*), creation (*sarga*), and cosmos (*sṛṣti*) also seem to have been at the root of the *guna*-trilogy. In the Veda as well as other ancient texts, the state of cosmogonic chaos is always identified with darkness or '*tamas*', in a categorical manner.[4] An Upanisadic text identifies this '*tamas*' with the '*tamas*' of the *guna*—trilogy in clear terms.[5] Well, if chaos is identifiable with darkness, cosmos will naturally be indentified with light and the creative process with dawn or dusk as the case may be. In fact, the three cosmogonic phases are clearly described in certain texts as the night, the dawn, and the day of Brahman (mas.) on one hand[6] and slumber (*pra-svapa*), dream (*svapna*), and wakefullness (*jagarana*) an the other, respectively.[7] In some texts, God is said to be dark during chaos, red during the process of creation, and white during the life of the cosmos.[8] In several texts, it is also indicated that *tamas* is black, *rajas* red, and *sattva* white.[9] As already noted,

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1. Cp. *Vayu-Purāṇā*, Purvardh 5.14 18, 'Agnir api Rudra ucyate *Nirukta* 10.1.7 ff., *Rg-Veda* 1.27.10, 3.2.5, 4.3.1.
2. *Maitrāyanī-Upaniṣad* 5.2.
3. *Maitrāyanī-Upaniṣad* 4.5.
4. *Rg-Veda* 10.129.3, *Manu Smṛti* 1.5.
5. *Maitrayānī-Upaniṣad* 5.2. Cp. *Mahābhārata*, Śānti Parvan 194.33. 219.31, 247.22, 285.31.
6. *Manu-Smṛti* 1.52, 74.
7. *Śrimad Bhāgavata* 11.25.20 Cp. note 33, supra.
8. *Ibid* 10.3.28.
9. *Mahābhārata*, Śānti Parvan 302, 46, *Devī-Bhāgavata* 3.8.4, 6.9. In *Mahābhārata* Śānti Parvan 280.39, however sattva is called red.

tamas is also indentified with Rudra or Siva, *rajas* with Brahman (mas.) and *sattva* with Visṇu, the gods of chaos, creation, and cosmos respectively. Purāṇically, the dark colour of God is the manifestation of *tamas* ; the red colour, of *rajas* : and the white colour, of *sattva*—the three *guna-s* of Sankhya.[1] The Upanisad has it that there is a goat or eternal one (apparently *Prakrti* of Sāṇkhya)—black, white, and red-giving birth to beings of all kinds.[2] Here the reference to the *guna*—trilogy is unmistakable.

The penultimate form of the *guna*-trilogy in the cosmogonic context appears to be the trilogy of forms of existence (*rūpāni*) given in the *Chandogya-Upaniṣad*, viz, *anna* (solid), *ap* (liquid), and *tejas* (heat), which are said to be, respectively, the black, white and red forms of the world to be, and whlch are to become threefold each through contact with the *puruṣa* (self). Here the expression 'through contact with the *puruṣa*' is specially reminiscent of the Sāṅkhya. J. A. B. Van Buitenen has very ably traced[4] the why of this trilogy to a statement in the *Bṛhadaraṇynk-Upaniṣad*,[5] which need not be discussed here.

So, we have been able to trace the origin of the *guṇa*-trilogy to the Vedic cosmogony as well, to a considerable extent.

Dialectically the most significant hymn of the *Ṛg-Veda* is the one hundred and twenty-ninth one of the last book (of the *Śākala-Saṁhita* there of), the famous creation-hymn. Baldly, the first two stanzas of the hymn translate thus : 'Then there was neither *sat* nor *a-sat*, nor was there *rajas*, nor even the sky

1. *Śrīmad-Bhāgavata* 10,3.20.
2. *Svetasvatara Upaniṣad* 4.5, *Mahānarayaṇa-Upaniṣad* (Atharva Vedic) 9.2, *Nārāyaṇa-Upaniṣad* (the concluding, 10th Prapāṭhaka of the *Taittirīya-Araṇyaka*) 10.5, Cp. *Mahābhārata* Śānti Parvan 302.46.
3. *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* 6.2.3-4, 6.4.
4. Buiteuen, 'Studies in Sāṅkhya' (III), *JAOS*, Vol. 77. No. 2 (April-June, 1957) pp. 89.93.
5. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad* 1.2 1-2.

(*uyoma*) which is beyond. What did it cover up (or contain)? Who guarded it? Was there water, unfathomable, deep? Then there was neither death nor immortality. There was no beacon of night and day. That one (*tad*) alone sustained life, windless, by its own (*sva-dhayā*). There was naught beyond, other than it'[1] Out of this rather puzzling hymn, we can, on good authority carve a significant triad, *sat*, *a-sat*, and *rajas*—or, at any rate, two pairs of opposites—*sat-a-sat* and *rajas-vyoma*—for our purpose.

What does the triad or the pairs of opposites mean? One meaning of *sat* and *a-sat* is good and evil, right and wrong,[2] which is not attracted here, however, for the simple reason that, since the hymn institutes an inquiry into what was not there before creation, we must intepret the expressions under consideration ontologically rather than ethically. Another meaning of *sat* and *a-sat* existent and non-existent, being and non-being,—the meaning which this pair of opposites usually bears in philosophical parlance. This is the meaning in which *sat* and *a-sat* are found used in the *Chandogya-Upanisad*,[3] where referring to those who maintain that *a-sat* is the root of *sat* and posing the question how *sat* can spring from *a-sat* Uddālaka Āruṇi proceeds to prove to Śvetaketu, his son, that *sat* is root of all. In the same vein but in stronger terms, the *Taitiriya-Upaniṣad* has it that he who thinks the *Brahman* to be *a-sat* (non-existent) himself becomes *a-sat*.[4] Do the *sat* and *a-sat* of the Ṛg-Vedic hymn under examination, too, signify existence and non-existence? May be. In which case the first verse would have to be construed to say that before creation there was neither existence nor non-existence, neither *rajas* nor the empty space. *Rajas* according to Yāska, means, alternatively, light, water, world, the planet Mars, and day.[5] Here it may be taken to signify the world. It means atom according to Dayānanda, who also construes *sat* and *a-sat* to mean the void and

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1. *Rg-Veda* 10.129.1-2.
2. Cp. Bhagavad-Gītā 17.26 defining 'sat' as truth, goodness, beauty, modernizingly speaking.
3. *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* 6.2.1-2. Cp. 3.19.1.
4. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 2.6-7.

primeval matter respectively.[1] Sāyaṇa interprets *sat*, *a-sat* and *rajas* to mean the existent, non-existent, and worlds respectively. According to him before creation, there was neither existence nor non-existence but something beyond existence, and non-existence, indescribable, *Maya*.[2] The *Śatapatha-Brahmna* does say that "then it was all indescribable (*a-vyakrta*).[3] Manu also, speaks of the chaotic state unimaginable and unintelligible (*a pratarkyam, a vijneyam*).[4] Another verse of the *Rg-Veda* (*Śākala-Saṁhitā*) informs us that *a-sat* and *sat* were in the supreme space (*parame vyoman*).[5] Here Sāyana interprets *a-sat* as inscrutable (*a-vyākṛta*) and *sat* as scrutable *vyakrta*.[6] The *Taittiryia-Upanisad* has it that first there was *as-at*, from which *sat* sprang up.[7] But here *a-sat* appears to be the unmanifest *Brahman*, as held by Saṇkara[8] and, above all, suggested by the *Upnnisad* itself, adding, immediately after, that *a-sat* made itself (into the world).[9] It is interesting to note that, in *Rg-Veda* itself, there is a statement that before creation *a-sat* gave birth to *sat*.[10] Sāyaṇa interprets *a-sat* and *sat* there to signify the unmanifest *Brahman* and the manifest cosmos respectively.[11] The *Satpatha-Brahman* states that first there was *a-sat*, that the seers (*ṛṣyah*) are called *a-sat*, and that the breaths or vital energies (*prāṇāḥ*) are the seers.[12] Here, too, Sāyana, construes *a-sat* to signify 'having the unmanifest name and form.[13] Following him, we can construe *sat* and *a-sat* to signify the chaos

1. Dāyananda. *Rgvedādibhāṣya-Bhūmikā*, p. 131. Here Dayānand is not a trinitarian, which he is in his *Satyārtha-Prākaśa*.
2. Sāyaṇa on *Rg-Veda* 10.129.1.
3. *Śatapatha-Brāhmana* 14.4.2.15.
4. *Manu-Smṛti* 1.5.
5. *Rg-Veda* 10.5.7. Cp. *Atharva-Veda* 10.7.10 ; 17.1.19.
6. Sāyaṇa on *Rg-Veda* 10.5.7.
7. *Taittirīya-Upaniṣad* 2.7.
8. Śaṇkara an *Ibid.*
9. As in note 7. supra.
10. *Rg-Veda* 10.72.2.3 ; *Atharva-Veda* 10.7.25.
11. Sāyaṇa on *Rg-Veda* 10.72.2.
12. *Śatapatha-Brāhmana* 6.1.1.1.
13. Sāyaṇa ad *Ibid.*

and the cosmos. In Hesiod, 'chaos' which he considers antecedent to the cosmos, means the space, the firmament—'*antarikṣa*' in Vedic parlance. It is neither 'primordial disorder' nor primordial matter but the 'yawning gap' between earth and the sun. Does it have anything to do with the Vedic concept of *a-sat*? Plato's 'space' too, which he declares 'incomprehensible' and 'hardly real' and which is nevertheless the source of the four elements,[1] also appears to answers to the Vedic *a-sat*. In the Upanisad as well, *ākāśa* is sometimes to be the source of the four elements.[2]

Another import of *sat* and *a-sat* as used in the *Rg-Veda* that would suggest itself is 'reifled' and 'unreified'.

The *Satapatha-Brahmana* elsewhere says that there was (originally), as it were, neither *sat* nor *a-sat* and that what there was the mind (*manas*)[3] It adds immediately that the mind is neither *sat* nor *a-sat*.[4] Sāyaṇa explains that something beyond *sat* and *a-sat* there was, which was the mind ; for the mind is neither *sat*, being devoid of form etc. characteristic of the jar etc., nor *a-sat*, being cognizable.[5]

Sāyaṇa's explanation does not help us much, however. In fact, being too loose in experession, too profuse in the use of adjectives, and too paradoxical and symbolical in approach—'*bahubhakttvādīni*' viz. likening anything and everything to anything and everything,[6] the Brāhmaṇas cannot be taken literally.

According to a passage in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka—Upaṇisad*, nothing existed before the cosmos, which was all enveloped by death, that is, by hunger, which is death.[7] The Upaniṣad declares

1. Plato, *Timaeus*, *The Dialogues of Plato*, B. Jowett, tr. (4th ed., Oxford : Clarendon press ; 1953), 51ab, 52b.
2. *Taittirīya-Upaniṣad* 2.1 : *Chandogya-Upaniṣad*, 1.9.1; 8.14.1.
3. *Satapatha-Brahmana* 10.5.3.1.
4. *Ibid* 10.5.3.2.
5. Sāyaṇa ad *Ibid*.
6. *Nirukta* 7.1.1, read with Durga's Comments thereon.
7. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upanisad* 1.2.1.

elsewhere that before the cosmos there was *Brahman*.[1] At a third place. It equates *a-sat* with death and *sat* with immortality.[2] If we can make anything out of these obscure and mystical passages (of course to us moderns, not necessarily to those for whom these were composed), it is this that in the beginning there was the reign of the unmanifest inscrutable.

The hymn of creation is exquisitely dialectical. In it the thesis '*sat*' is negated by the antithesis '*a-sat*' and finally both the thesis and antithesis come to be negated altogether (*nāsad āsin no sad āsit*). This line of thought is also followed by the *Upaniṣads*, which, sometimes, categorically declare that the ultimate reality is neither *sat* nor *a-sat* : (*na san na cāsat*),[3] that it is neithis nor that (*neti neti*).[4] The dialectic thus emerging is expressible as under :

Thesis	Antithesis	Synthesis
Sat	*A-sat*	Neither (*neti neti*, *avyākrta*)

Sometimes, the *Upaniṣads* speak of the third moment as both *sat* and *a-sat*,[5] in which case their dialectic would stand revised as under :

Sat	*A-sat*	Both (*sad-asat*)

Both these patterns are found in the Vedic and Upaniṣadic literature. In the last analysis, both the creation-hymn and the *Upaniṣads* come upon positive principle : the hymn, upon the (*eka*)[6] the *Upaniṣads*, upon the *ātman*.[7]

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1. *Ibid* 1.4.10.
2. *Ibid* 1.3.28.
3. *Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣad* 2.2.1 ; *Svetaśvatara-Upaniṣad* 4.18 ; *Bhagavad-Gītā* 13-12.
4. *Bṛhadaranyaka-Upaniṣad* 4.5.15 Cp. *Kena-Upaniṣad* 1.4 ; *Katha-Upaniṣad* 1.2.20; 2.6.12; *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 2.4; *Svetāśvatara-Upaniṣad* 1.8; *Maṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad* 7.
5. *Praśna-Upaniṣad* 2.5; *Bhagavad-Gītā* 9.19; 11.37.
6. *Ṛg-Veda* 10.129.2.
7. *Kaṭha-Upaniṣad* 1.2.20, for example.

A dialectical relation involves presupposes not only a conflict but also a unity and interpenetration of opposites, and it is interesting to find that the Vedas do suggest such a relation between *sat* and *a-sat* while describing *a-sat* as the kin (*bondhu*) of *sat*.[1]

It seems that, in their eareer, the terms '*sat*' '*a-sat*', and '*rajas*' carried, among others, the sense of luminous, dark, and activity respectvely. Buitenen is inclined to believe that '*suttva*' has taken then the place of '*jyotis*' '*tapns*' or '*tejas*'.[2] In this connexon it is interesting to note that sometimes the *Mahābhārata* tends to use '*tapas*' for '*sattva*',[3] equating '*tapas*' with 'light' and 'knowledge'.[4] Likewise, while using '*rajas*' and *tamas* together, as '*rajas-tamas*', the *Atharva-Vada* juxtaposes them to 'light' (*jyotis*).[5] which appears to be easily interehangeable with *sat*. It is significant, indeed, '*sat*' and '*rajas*' retain their original sense in the Sāṅkhya system and that '*a-sat*' signifying 'dark' is patently interchangeable with the *guṇa* called '*tāmas*' in that system.[6] It is also significant that, in the creation-hymn itself, it is also stated that in the creation-hymn itself, it is also stated that in the beginning there was '*tamas*' enveloped by '*tamas*'.[7] Is the first of the two instances of '*tamas* not same as the Sāṅkhya ? If it is, the verb 'was' (*āsit*) will have to be construed to mean 'arose' or 'came into being' (*abhavat*). Indeed, there is a well-attested tradition for it. As already pointed out, the *Maitrāyaṇi-Upanisad* identifies the Vedic '*tamas*' with the Sāṅkhva one in so many words. Besides, when another Vedic hymn speaks of the birth *sat* from *a-sat*, as we have seen alredy, the term '*a-sat*' may be

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1. *Ṛg-Veda* (Śākala-Saṁhitā) 10.129.4. Cp. *Atharva-Veda* (Śaunaka-Saṁhitā 4.1.1; 10.7.10; 17.1.19; *Yajur-Veda* (Madhyadana-Saṁhitā) 13.3.
2. Buitenen, 'Studies in Sāṅkhya, (III) *JAOS*. Vol. 77, No. 2 (April-June, 1957), p. 106, note 80.
3. *Mahabharata* Sānti-Parvan 216.1 6-18; 217 16.
4. *Ibid* 216.16-17; 15-16.
5. *Atharva-Veda* 8.2.1-2.
6. *Sankhya-Karika* 12-13.
7. *Ṛg-Veda* 10.129.3.

taken to stand for the '*tamas*' in the creation-hymn. This is, however, pure conjecture in the present context. Generally speaking, the pair of opposites *sat* and *a-sat* framed in the *Bṛhaḍāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad*,[1] as well as *Taittirīya-Upaniṣad*[2] may as well be taken to correspond to the *sat-asat* pair of the hymn of creation. In that case, *sat* and *a-sat* would mean immortal (*satya* and mortal (*an-ṛta*) respectively. Thus, the terms '*a-sat*' and '*tamas*' ocurring in the creation hymn become synonymous.

The *Yoga-Sūtra* appears to refer to the *guṇa*-trilogy under a different nomenceature: '*prakāśa-kriyā-sthiti.*'[3] literally, light, activity and inertia, standing respectively for *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. This, too, serves to buttress the above thesis.

From the foregoing considerations, the conclusion is irresistible that *a-sat*, *rajas*, and *sat* of the creation hymn of the *Ṛg-Veda* are the precursors and prototypes of the three *guṇa-s-tamas*, and *sattva* of the Sāṅkhya system.

From an interesting passage in the *Taitirīya-Brāhmaṇa*, appears that the terms '*a-sat*', and '*sat*' of the hymn of creation are also identifiable with the Vedic triad of the three worlds—earth, firmament, and the solar world. We have seen that the opening verse of the creation hymn says that (originally) there was neither *sat*, nor *rajas*, nor *asat*. The unmistakable import of this statement is that there was nothing whatever. The *Taittirīya Brāhamaṇa* also has it that first there was nothing whatever (*naiva kiñcana*) and, rather in explanation of the 'nothing whatever', hastens to add that 'there was no solar world (*dyo*), no earth (*pṛthivī*), no firmament (*antarikṣa*),[4]—none of the three worlds. So, there appears to be an agreement between the following triads :

A-sat	*Rajas*	*Sat*
Earth	Firmament	Solar world

1. *Bṛhaḍaranyaka-Upaniṣad* 2.3.1.
2. *Taittirīya-Upaniṣad* 2.6.
3. *Yoga-Sūtra, Vyasa-Bhāṣya* 2.18.
4. *Taittirīya-Brahmana* 2.2.9.1.

Incidentally, the Vedic-Brāhmaṇic 'nothing' is not pure void It is something inscrutable, the 'one' of the creation-hymn already referred to. That is why the Brāhmaṇa text adds that the 'nothing' decided to 'be'[1] and gave birth to the mind (*manas*), which begot Prajāpati (the lord of creation) who created the world.[2]

The trilogies related to the trilogy of *guṇa*-s and discused above are culled below for a synoptic view of the matter :

Tamas	*Rajas*	*Sativa*
Earth	Firmament	Sun
Darkess	Energy	Light
Below	Middle	Above
Fire	Air/Indra	Sun
Rudrr/ Śiva	Brahman (masculine)	Viṣṇu
Chaos	Creation	Cosmos
Night	Dawn	Day
Slumber	Dream	Wakefulness
Dark/Black	Red	White

Solid	Liquid	Heat
A-sat	*Rajas*	*Sat*
Nothing	Becom- ing	Being
A-sat	Neither *sat* nor *a-sat*	*Sat*
A-sat	Both *sat* and *asat*	*Sat*
Inertia	Activity	Light

In fact, there are hundreds of trilogies corresponding to the Sāṅkhya trilogy of *guṇa*-s called *Sattva*, *Rajas*, and *Tamas*, scattered in ancient texts. Our aim being simply to trace the origin of the *guṇa*-trilogy in the proto-philosophical Vedle (including Brāhmaṇic and Upaniṣadic) literature, we need not try to explore them all in the present paper.

The question arises, if the Sāṅkhya dialectic has such modest origins as set out in this chapter, does it deserve to be taken so seriously as it has all along been, as a fundamental cosmological principle ? Our reply is in the affirmative. Our well considered opinion, not discussed in this chapter, is that, whatever it might have been its origins, the Sāṅkhya dialectic provides a wonderful

1. *Ibid* 2.2.9.1.
2. *Ibid* 2.2.940.

key to the understanding of Vedic cosmology, for which reason, we take it, it was entitled Vedānta long before the inception of the extant Sāṅkhya texts. Great thoughts are often found to have humble beginnings like the rose which originates from mud. Sometimes highly original idea are occasioned by remotest possible similarities between the terms at the farthest remove from each other. But our present project does permit a probe into this issue.

CHAPTER XI

WHAT IS RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE ?

Does religious language mean the language of religious preachers or scriptures ? Religious preachers and scriptures use both kinds of language, religious and non-religious. Being creatures of the world having to deal with other creatures of the world, religious preachers cannot avoid the use of non-religious language. Even while discoursing upon religion, they have to make a lot of non-religious statements. Muḥammad was allergic to onion for its bad smell. He even dissuaded his followers from attending the mosque after eating onion. But this was all non-religious : no such provision finds place in the Qur'ān or the Ḥadīth as an article of faith. So, the language used by Muḥammad in this regard cannot be said to be religious. In fact Islam does, generally and roughly, tend to recognize the distinction between the legislative (tashrī'ī) and non-legislative functions of the prophet, corresponding to what we have called his religious and non-religious statements.

In the same way, scriptures, too, are believed to contain religious as well as non-religious statements. According to a well attested Vaiṣṇava tradition, scriptural language (śāstra bhāṣā), is of three kinds : samādhi bhāṣā (language of religious experience) laukikī bhāṣā (empirical/secular language), and parakīyā bhāṣā (language of quotation/citation.)

Samādhi bhāṣā prathamā laukikī' ti tathā 'parā
Tṛtīyā parakīyeti śāstra bhāṣā tridhā smṛtā.

This floating verse seems to derive from Vallabha's statements of the three kinds of language constitutive of the *Śrīmad Bhāgavata.* According to him, when the *Bhāgavata* narrates something, as, for example, 'when it was dawn etc.',[1] it uses empirical language ; when it quotes/cites some authority, as for example,

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1. *Śrīmad Bhāgavata* 10, 70, 1.

'I heard it from the mouth of Dvaipāyana',[1] it uses the language of quotation/citation ; and, when its author describes his own trance-experience, it uses the language of religious experience.[2] So, all scriptural language is not religious language.

Even such scriptures as the Vedas, which are believed to be self existent or divinely authored, have both kinds of language, religious as well as non-religious. The Vedic texts are of two kinds, Mantra (primary text) and Brāhmaṇa (secondary exegetical and philosophical text). The Mantra-text is primarily and basically assertive (abhidhāyaka) of substances and deities involved in the sacrifice,[3] whereas the Brāhmaṇa text is injunctive (vidhi) with arthavāda (declamatory text) subserve the injunction, directly or indirectly.[4] The injunctive portion alone is the true Brāhmaṇa text, the arthavāda portion being just an adjunct to it. That is why Āpastamba defines the Brāhmaṇatext as the text commendatory of sacrificial activity (Karma-codanā Brāhmaṇāni),[5] The *Nyīya-Sutra* defines vidhi as injunctive (vidhāyaka).[6] Sāyaṇa postulates two kinds of vidhi : commendatory of action (apravṛtti-pravartaka) and revealer of the unknown (ajñāta-jñāpaka). The second includes such metaphysical statements as 'It was the Ātman alone which was in the beginning' (Ātmā vā idam eka evāgra āsīt).[7] This second kind of vidhi is not accepted by the Mīmāṁsakas. however. Āpastamba defines arthavāda as valedictory (stuti), deprecatory (nindā), illustrative (parakṛti), and narrative (purākalpa), He

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1. *Ibid* 6, 4, 9
2. *Tattvārthadipa Nibandha* Sāstrārtha Prakaraṇa with auto-commentary *Prakāsa*, 7, p. 28.
3. *Mimaṁsā Sūtra* 2, 1, 31, read with *Vājasaneyī-Prātiśakhya Ṭīkā*, 1, 4.
4. *Mimāṁsā Sutra,* 2. 1. 31, ff., with the commentaries. Also see *Apastamba-Yajñaparibhāṣā Sutra* 34,35.
5. *Apastamba Yajnaparibhāṣā Sutra,* 34.
6. *Nyāya-Sūtra* 2, 1, 64.
7. Sāyaṇa, *Ṛg-Vedabhāṣyopakryamanikā, Vedabhāṣyabhūmikā, Saṅgraha,* p. 24.

is followed in this by the *Nyāya-sūtra*.[1] Yāska grants to arthavāda the status of the Brāhmaṇa text.[2] Some, however, are inclined to demur to this view.[3]

The scripture sometimes narrates an event which never took place (asadvṛttāntānvākhyāna),[4] with a view to commending or eulogizing something laid down in the vidhi text tempting, prompting, or attracting the agent to perform the act. Such text are arthavāda texts, which are not authoritative on their own (svārthe) but as subsidiary to injunctive texts. They can, therefore, be said to exemplify religious language only by courtesy.

The *Vyāsa Bhāṣya*[5] seems to suggest, as brought out by Hariharānanda Āraṇya,[6] that it is not the whole of the scriptural text (āgama) but only the part of it containing realized truths needs to be regarded as scripture proper and, therefore, we are tempted to suggest, as representing religious language the remaining part serving only to iterate popular beliefs and sayings.[7] So, a religious scripture is not all religious language.

The Qur'ān has a different story to tell, however. It condemns those who are wont to follow part of it in disregard of other parts of it.[8] Of course, it is interpretable even otherwise. It can be construed to mean, for example, that its commands and injunctions are all binding upon the followers of Islam, even though all its language might not be religious language in the technical sense of the term.

Indeed, the Mīmāṁsā system conceives Dharma as sym-

1. *Apastamba Yajnaparibhāṣa Sūtra*, 37
2. *Nyāya-Sūtra* 2, 1, 65.
3. Cp. *Nirukta* 12, 2, 3 7, 7, 2.
4. *Śābara-Bhāṣya* 1, 2, 10.
5. *Vyāsā Bhāṣya* 1. 7, p. 32.
6. *Bhāsvati Vṛtti* 1, 7, p. 32.
7. Cp. *Mimāṁsā-Sūtra* 1, 2, 1.
8. Al-Baqarah 85.

bolized by injunction (codanā).[1] Declamation and description/ assertion (abhidhāna) come only as auxiliaries to it. In the Qur'ān, too, there is a kindred distinction between āyātu 'l-muḥkamāt and āyātu 'l mutashābihāt, between verses categorical and allegorical, definitive and figurative, precise and metaphorical, perspicuous and illusive, literal and analogical, definite and problematical.[2] Verses of the first kind are described as primary and basic on s, as the chief constituents and mother of the Qur'ān (ummu 'l Kitāb), relegating verses of the other kind to a secondary status for human purposes.[3] In the Mīmāṁsā parlance the former verses constitute Mantra and vidhi, where as the latter, whatever their intrinsic worth, are employed as declamatory to them, wiih this difference, however, that unlike in the case of Mīmāṁsā, the Qur'ān adjudges the latter to be of deeper significance beyond the ken of human beings.[4]

Being emboldened by this conception of arthavāda, Mīmāṁsakas like Kumārila as well as Advaitins like Gauḍapāda Maṇḍana, Śaṇkara tend to accord step-motherly treatment to the Vedic narratives of creation and to give to Vedic cosmogony a decent burial by lightly dismissing it as mere myth or fiction calculated at best to conduce to renunciation or self-realization in an indirect way.[5]

That the metaphysical statements contained in the Upaniṣads such as 'The Ātman alone was there in the beginning', is a kind of injunction, revelatory of the unknown (ajñāta-jñāpaka), is an Advaitic innovation designed to buttress and boost the prestige of

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1. *Mimamsā-Sūtra* 1.1.2.
2. Āl-i Imran 7; Hūd 1.
3. Āl-i Imran 7.
4. *Loc. cit.*
5. Kumārila, *Tantra-Vārtika* 1,3,2. Vol. I. p. 168 ; Maṇḍana, *Brahma-Siddhi*, pp. 124-128; Gauḍapada, *Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā* Advaita-Prakaraṇa 15 ; Śaṅkara, *Māṇḍukya-Kārikā-Bhāṣya*, 2.1; *Taittirīya-Upaniṣad-Bhāṣya* 2.6 ; *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad-Bhāṣya* 6.2.3.

the knowledge-part (Upaniṣad) of the Vedas vis-a'-vis their ritual part (Brāhmaṇa). It appears that Sāyaṇa, who seems to be the first Advaitin responsible for this innovation, took his cue from Śabara's statement that Codanā, technically injunction, is capable of revealing even such objects or entities as are past, present future, subtle, hidden, or remote (Codanā hi bhūtam, bhavantaṁ, bhavisyantam, sūksmam, vyavahitaṁ, viprakṛṣṭam ity evaṁ-jātīyakam arthaṁ śaknoty avagamayitum).[1] It appears as first sight to mean that injunction deals with not only action but also knowledge of entities, physical and metaphysical. But Prabhākara and Śālikanātha have it that injunction can reveal things only as connected with action and that, therefore, they are also conducive to action.[2] Kumārila identifies injunction with word which does reveal entities past, present, and future.[3]

The Mīmāṁsā division of the Vedas into vidhi and non-vidhi, so to speak, and emphasis on the former, with the latter rendered meaningless save as subservient to the former, directly or indirectly, serves to mar the glory of the Upaniṣads altogether. That is perhaps why, in defence of the Upaniṣads, Vallabha had to rule that the words of Vedic roots deserve to be taken on their face-value rather than interpreted metaphorically :

Ye dhātu sabdāḥ yasyārthe upadeśe prakīrtitāḥ
Tathaivārtho Veda-rāśeḥ kartavyo, nānyathā kvacit.[4]

Viṭṭhalanātha, the leading Vallabhāite philosopher. goes to the extent of ruling that, if the scripture says, 'Fire is non-hot it is valid and authoritative, for the simple reason that Brahman has all the forms, actual and possible, and that fire is non-hot, too (while unmanifest). (Brahmaṇaḥ sarvarūpatv-enāpi vahner anuṣṇatvenāpi 'Vahnir anu-uṣṇaḥ' ity ādi vākyāny api pramāṇāni).[5]

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1. *Śabara-Bhāṣya* 1.1.2.
2. *Bṛhatī*, 1.1.2, p. 23.
3. *Mimāmsā-Śloka-Vārtika*, 1.1.2, verse 7, p. 35.
4. Vallabha, *Palrāvalambana*, 4, p. 3.
5. Vṛṭhalanatha, *Vidvanmaṇḍana* (Bombay, 1926), p. 63.

In Islam, too, a controversy once raged round the question whether the verses of the Qur'ān should be interpreted literally or metaphorically. The school of the Ḥashwīyah was strongly in favour of literal interpretation. Imām Aḥmad bin Ḥanbal also favoured literal interpretation, but he made exceptions to this rule on three occasions. Imām Abu 'l Ḥasan Ash'arī, too, resorted to literal interpretation where to others the justification for metaphorical was obvious.[1]

It may also be noted that, according to the Mīmāṁsakas, the scriptural (Vedic) language is the same as ordinary language, their words and denotation being the same. Otherwise, it would be difficult to understand the Vedic injunction[2] The Qur'an has it the each time, clime, and people has its own revelations couched in its own idiom.[3] That is why all known revelations are tradition bound, bearing the stamp of their own respective cultural milieus. So, it abounds in local idiom, local metaphor. The Qur'ān was revealed to the Arabs in their own language Arabic, abounding in the categories of thought and expression peculiar to the Arabs, even though it claims to reiterate in essentials what was delivered by the galaxy of older prophets.[4] The Old Testament, too, regards revelation as varied and variegated.[5]

So, religious language is not philologically different from ordinary language. It is nothing but ordinary language put to religious use, used to communicate religious truth, religious experience. Religious language has the same relation to ordinary language as any technical language—philosophical language, mathematical language, and suchlike—has to ordinary language. The difference in the forms of religious language is due to the difference in its vehicles. Take, for example, the language of prayer, which goes the longest in orienting the individual towards

1. Shibli No'amani, *Al-Kalām*, pp. 139 ff.
2. *Śābara-Bhāsya* 1.3.30.
3. Ar-R'ād 7; An-Nahl 36, 63; Al-Fāṭir 24.
4. Yūnus 37 ; *Hā* Mīm As-Sajdah 43.
5. Hebrews 1. 1.

the source of his being. The form of the language of prayer is determined by the type of the individual offering the prayer. Rūmī, the greatest mystic poet of Islam, records Moses as chiding a shepherd boy for offering his prayer to God in his native language which Moses found too vulgar for God. Upon this, writes Rūmī, God censured Moses saying that He had given a language, an idiom, to everyone suited to his temperament, that He marks not appearance and expression (qāl) but reality and meaning (ḥāl), for the heart is substance and language only attribute:

Har kase rā-iṣtilāḥ-ī dādah īm
Har kase rā sīrat-ī bi nihādan īm
Mā burūṅ rā na ngarīm o qāl rā
Mā durūṅ rā bi ngarīm o ḥāl rā
'Zaṅ ki dil jauhar buwad, guftan araz
Bas ṭufail āmad araz, jauhar gharaz.[1]

Religious literature has three orders—first order literature, second order literature, and third-order literature. First order literature is such revealed or inspired and therefore self-certifying, literature as constitutes the fountain head of the religion concerned. Second order literature is also partly revealed or inspired but mediated by and subservient to the first order literature. Third order literature is all other religious literature, especially such as is designed to inquire into the rationale of the things religious Ṛṣi-s (seers)[2] and prophets are responsible for the inception of the first-order literature ; Śruta-ṛṣi-s (second-order seers aided by the first-order seers),[3] on the one hand and apostles, companions (ṣahābah), direct disciples of the prophets, and saints (awliyā) on the other, of the second-order literature ; and Tarka-ṛṣi-s (third-order seers called philosophers)[4] or, to use

1. Rūmī, *Mathnawī-i M'ānawī*, Muhammad Yusuf Shah, ed., under the title *Pairāhan-i Yusufī* Vol. III, p. 85.
2. *Nirukta* 1, 0.
3. *Loc. cit.*, with Durga's commentary.
4. *Nirukta* 13, 12.

a Vedic expression, Oha-Brahman-s (philosopher-sages),[1] or Ulamā, (divines) and Mujtahidūn (interpreters), of the third-order literature. The first-order literature is technically styled 'Śruti', 'Waḥy', or revelation ; the second-order, 'Smṛti', 'Ḥadīth', and Tradition ; and the third-order, 'Itihāsa-Purāṇa' on the one hand and 'Nibandha', 'Tafsīr' (commentary), and Fiqh' (theology-cum-jurisprudence) on the other. The Hindu scriptures sometimes suggest that whatever a self-knower has to say is tantamount to revelation.[2] Muḥammad is also reported to have remarked that Muslim divines are like the prophets of Israel (Ulamā'i ummat-ī ka-anbiā'i Banī Isrā'īl).

According to the *Kāvya-Mīmāṁsā*, the language of revelation is of three kinds : Brāhma, Śaiva, and Vaiṣṇava—that is, the language of Brahman (masculine) and, his family of Śiva, and of Viṣṇu—the lord gods responsible for revelation. Of these, the language of Brahman is of five kinds : Svāyambhuva (of Svayambhū or Brahman himself), Aiśvara (of the Īśvara-s that are the mental sons, like Bhṛgu and others, of Brahman), Ārṣa (of the Ṛṣi-s that are the sons of the Īśvara-s), Ārṣīka (of the Ṛṣīka-s that are the sons of the Ṛṣi-s), and Ārṣiputraka-s (of the Ārṣiputra-s that are the sons of the Ṛṣīka-s).[3] All these kinds have been defined and illustrated by Rājaśekhara.[4] This topic is also dealt with in certain Purāṇa-s.[5] Incidentally, the *Brahmāṇḍa-Purāṇa* speaks of seven kinds of the language of the Ṛṣi-s, without describing them, however.[6]

The differences in religious language described above are said to owe their origin to the circumstances of the genesis of the various revealed texts (mantra-dṛṣṭi-s)[7] or asbābu 'n-nuzūl (causes of the revelations). The circumstances of the genesis of the

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1. *Rg-Veda* 10, 71, 8, read with *Nirukta* 13, 13.
2. *Mahābhārata* Śānti-Parvan 268, 10.
3. *Kāvya-Mīmāṁsā*, 72 ff. (Chapter VII).
4. *Loc. cit.*
5. See, for example, *Brahmāṇḍa-Purāna* 1, 2, 33, 23 ff.
6. *Ibid.*, 1, 1, 1, 100.
7. *Ibid.*, 1, 2, 33, 23.

various Vedic texts are, queer enough, reported to be quite secular such as discontent (a-santoṣa), fear (bhaya), suffering (duḥkha), happiness (sukha), and sorrow (śoka).[1] Many of the verses of the Qur'ān, too, are reported to have come down to Muḥammad to set right what had gone wrong in his family,[2] etc.

It has also to be noted in this connexion that no revealed book can be taken to be a revelation in its entirety. Only the prophetic books of the Old Testament, constituting nearly half of it, are regarded as revealed. In the Ṛg-Veda, there are four hymns[3] which contain Viśvāmitra's curses against Vasiṣṭha and hence are not herrd or read by the descendants of the latter.[4] It is difficult to regard them as revealed or even religious.

In any case, it is significant that all revelation is not thought to be of equal status in the Hindu tradition. The Upaniṣads, for example, divide even the revealed texts into higher knowledge (parā vidyā) and lower knowledge (a-parā vidyā).[5] The sayings of the Buddha, too, are divided into those bearing outward, empirical meanings (neyārtha) and those bearing inward, transcendental meanings (nītārtha).[6] Sūfism, too, has a kindred distinction to make, the distinction between apparent or exoteric (majāzī) on the one hand and real or esoteric (ḥaqīqī) meaning of the Qur'ān on the other. Śabara observes that there are Vedic texts which are not helpful to us here or hereafter and thus are not fit to be followed in praetice.[7]

Religious experience or revelation, in its pristine purity, is translingual, translatable in various languages. It is published

1. *Ibid.*, 1, 2, 32, 68, for example.
2. At-Taḥrīm 1-5.
3. *Ṛg-Veda* 3, 53, 21-24.
4. *Bṛhad-Devatā* 4, 23, Cp. *Nirukta-Vṛtti* 4, 14, Vol. I, p. 323.
5. *Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣad* 1, 1, 4.
6. *Aṅguttara-Nīkāya* Duka-Nipāta, Bāla-Vagga 4, p. 57 ; *Samādhirāja-Sūtra* 7, 5, quoted in *Madhyamaka-Śāstra-Prasannapadā*, p. 14, *Madhyamaka-Śāstra-Prasannapadā* 1, 3, pp. 13-14.
7. 'Yadyapi śrūyerans tathā'py anupakārikatvān naiva kartavyā bhaveyuḥ.' *Śābara-Bhāṣya* 3, 1, 7.

first in the language of the subject, giving the impression that its own language is the language of the subject. That the content of revelation is translingual is well attested to by the fact that it translates in different languages. First, there is revelation pure and simple, having a translingual character. Then, there is what is called auto-interpretation, interpretation by the subject himself Lastly, there is what is called hetero-interpretation, interpretation by others—by compilers, codifiers, doxographers. This is a modern distinction almost echoing the Buddhist distinction between siddhānta-naya (pure revelation/realization) and deśanā-naya (communication/interpretation).[1] Ninian Smart discovers several types of interpretation constituting 'auto-interpretation' : interpretation after experience, called 'retrospective interpretation' ; interpretation during experience, called 'reflective interpretation' ; interpretation colouring the content of experience, called 'incorporated interpretation.'[2] Well, Muḥammad Ali aptly remarks : 'The Qur'ān is God's word truly enough, but it is in man's ill coin.'[3]

If the relevant verses of the Qur'ān are taken at their face-value, they will seem to suggest that not only the meaning but also the word of the Qur'ān is the work of God. The Qur'ān sometimes refers to itself as 'the word of God' (kalāma Allāh),[4] revealed in Arabic.[5] Mujaddid-i Alf-i Thānī regards the meaning as the clad (malbūs) or content and the word as the clothing (libās) or continent, ascribing both to the authorship of God.[6] Iqbal also regards the word of the Qur'ān as the work of God.[7]

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1. *Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra*, 3, 14-15, p. 60.
2. Ninian Smart, 'Interpretation and Mystical Experience', *Religious Studies*, (1965), I, pp. 75-87.
3. Muḥammad Ali *My Life, a Fragment* p. 276.
4. At-Taubah 6.
5. Ar-R'ād 37, for example.
6. See *Maktūbāt-i Mujaddid-i Alf-i Thānī* quoted in Sa'id Ahmad Akbarabadi, *Waḥy-i Ilāhī*, pp. 109-110.
7. See Akbarabadi, pp. 110-111.

But some very competent Muslim thinkers have come to the conclusion that God's attribute of speech (kalām) is essentially a unity without diversity in respect of meaning (madlūl), diversity residing in expression (dalālat) only. If the meaning is expressed in Hebrew, it is the Torah ; if in Arabic, the Qur'ān. So, it is the expressions or sentences that are various and variegated, not the meanings (kalām). Ibn kultāb and Abū'l-Hasan Ash'arī are of the same view.[1] Ibn Sīnā observes that 'God is eloquent' (mutakallim) does not mean that He uses sentences or concepts represented by words but that God gives knowledge to the prophet which does not admit of diversity (ta'addud wa takassur). The Qur'ān says that God's command is instantaneous like the twinkling of an eye.[2] He does not have to recite sentences. The Prophet received knowledge through the creative intelligence (al-aqlu fa'a'al) called an angel and his creative imagination gave words to it. Then the Prophet's heart/mind, originally as if a tabula rasa, became full of words, so that he could hear well constructed sentences and passages, witnessing somebody delivering.[3] So, according to Ibn Sīnā, the meaning of the revelation is God-made, but the word of the revelation is man-made, unconsciously though. The Mutakallimūn maintain that eloquence (kalām) is twofold, verbal eloquence (al-kalāmu lafzī) and eloquence of meaning (al-kalāmu nafsī).[4] Akbarabadi quotes Arabic verses to show that, when a lover and a beloved talk with the eyes, they do not have to use words. Words only follow the talk. Eloquence resides in the heart, the tongue simply gives it expression.[5]

Well, revelation is the substance and interpretations accidents. One has to try to penetrate beyond the accidents to reach the substance. And the pure revelation thus discovered will be found to be in much greater harmony with other specimens of pure

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1. *Ibid.*, p. 107.
2. Al-Qamar 50.
3. Ibn Sīnā, *Ar-Risālalu 'l-Arshīah,* quoted in Akbarabadi, pp. 29-30.
4. See Akbarabadi, p. 101.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 113-114.

revelation than the recorded forms of revelation appear to be. Much of their mutual differences and contradictions will then turn out to be due to the different planes of existence, levels of truth, and strata of value they represent. Interpreters of religious, especially revelational, language must bear this fact in mind.

Yes, recorded revelation cannot be taken at its face-value. The record runs the risk of being fallible, misleading, and far from faithful. The poet has well sung : 'Alas' the honey of my idea has turned sour just after coming into the bottles of words :

Afsos ! ki tursh ho gayā shahd-i khayāl
Alfāz ki botaloṅ meṅ āte āte.

The meaning of revelation ever struggles to find expression in language but never succeeds in finding full expression in language. The seer or prophet is obliged to use a particular language, a particular idiom, to communicate his revelation, but others take it as the only language, the only idiom, in which the revelation could be couched, unmindful of the patent fact that reality is bigger than its expression in a particular language. 'Language is smaller than the mind (or idea)' (Vāg vai manaso hrasīyasī), says the *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa.*[1]

That is why the linguistic analyst who takes the language actually used as holding the mirror up to reality in toto can never hope to reach the heart or spirit of revelation. All language is translation, and translation can never hope to represent the original in toto. Revelational language, the best specimen of religious language, is marked by a variety of levels of significance varying in verifiability and value. The polyvalence of linguistic expressions, as, for example, in the Vedic texts, is conducive to the development of different levels of significance. Intimations from, or experiences of, unobservable phenomena tend to find expression in terms of observable phenomena as myths, metaphors, or 'mutashābihāt', not susceptible to the criteria of science, logic, or linguistic anylysis. The question of their determination and truth conditions can be decided, if at all, by comparing and collating the various religious experiences available to us. In any

1. *Satapatha-Brāhmaṇa* I, 4, 4, 7.

case, religion tends gradually to outgrow language and regain its translingual matrix. Rūmī aspires to reach the level where language grows without words.

> Ai Khudā ! bi-nmā tu jāṅ rā āṅ maqām
> K' andar ū bī-ḥarf mī rūyad kalām.[1]

According to the Qur'ān, so far as we can see, knowledge (ilmu 'l-yaqīn) seeks certainty (ḥaqqu 'l-yaqīn), which, in its turn, seeks vision (aynu 'l-yaqīn).[2]

Religious language is language about the transnatural and the transcendent *as* the ground and goal ot the natural and the immanent/empirical.

The transnatural and transcendent as such has no language whatsoever, is unspeakable. That is why the Mādhyamikas would describe it as the state of silence (tūṣṇīṁ-bhāva) ;[3] they and the *Māṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad*, as the cessation of all speech (prapañco-paśama) ;[4] Bādhva, as the silent (upaśānta) ;[5] and so on. This is about the yonder side of religion But even this side of religion is pretty beyond language in some of its dimensions. If, for example, religion is what Rudolf Otto calls the experience of the numinous, it cannot be conceptualized, much less propositionalized or verbalized.

1. Rūmī, *Mathnawī-i* M'ānawi, Vol. I, pp. 60, 264.
2. At-Takāsur 5, 7 ; Al-Hāqqatah 51.
3. *Mādhyamaka-Śāstra-Prasannapadā* 1, 3, p. 19.
4. *Madhyamaka-Śāstra* 1 2 ; *Māṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad* 7.
5. See *Sārīraka-Bhāṣya*, with Brahma-Sūtra 3, 2, 17, p. 644.

CHAPTER XII

ASCENT THROUGH DESCENT : AN AUROBINDOAN PARADOX

Sri Aurobindo is a philosopher of involution and evolution of the Absolute or the Sprit, 'a self-involution of Consciousness in form and self-evolution out of form'.[1] The evolution is progressive except where it is typal : Asura-s and the subtle physical, vital, and mental Deva-s are typal beings and their abodes typal worlds, in that they mark the first and last term in their line of evolution. Is the involution also progressive ? It will be clear as we proceed.

The Absolute is describable, if at all, as 'an Asat, a Non-Being beyond' : 'it is beyond the highest and purest positive forms'.[2] It descends from its pristine purity, for self-delight through progressive self-oblivion, into Sat or Existence, then Cit/Cic-chakti or Consciousness/Consciousness-Force, and finally Ānanda or Bliss/ Freedom, thereby differentiating itself as Sac-cid-ānanda or Existence-Consciousness-Bliss, a triunity,[3] which is 'the highest positive expression of the Reality to our consciousness'.[4] Then this triune principle begins to involve itself or descend into Supermind into Overmind, Overmind into Intuitive Mind, Intuitive Mind into Illumined Mind, Illumined Mind into Higher Mind, Higher Mind into Mind, Mind into Life, and, eventually, Life into Matter.[5] Matter marks the end of this series of involutions or descents. Then there is inception of an inverse process of evolution or ascent from Matter to the Spirit through the successive steps of Life, Mind, Higher Mind, Illumine Mind, Intuitive Mind, Overmind,

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1. Sri Aurobindo, *The Life Divine* Vol. 1 p. 18. This work will henceforth be referred to as 'I'.
2. I, p. 42.
3. I, pp. 151-154.
4. I, p. 42.
5. Cp. I, 319.

Supermind, Bliss, Consciousness-Force Existence, and finally the Spirit. Spirit and Matter represent two involutions between which the world-process endures—Spirit in which all is involved and out of which all evolves downward to the other pole of Matter in which also all is involved and out of which all evolves upwards to the other pole of Spirit.[1] Sri Aurobindo remarks that, 'as Matter is the last word of the descent, so it is the first word of the ascent'.[2] This series of gradations is relative and tentative, so that 'from other principles and view-points another classification of the same things can be equally valid.'[3]

That the descent and ascent are both progressive is clearly indicated by the following passages: 'in the descent there are successive levels, in the concealing successive veils......the ascent and the revelation are both progressive'[4] Again: Being, consciousness, force, substance descend and ascend a many-runged ladder....,[5] Lastly, 'Our material world is the result of all the others, for the other principles have all descended into Matter to create the physical universe...'[6] There are also stray indications of particular higher terms being involved in lower ones.[7]

Sri Aurobindo appears to postulate two phases of descent, involution (but not of ascent, evolution), one for self-enfoldment, self-oblivion, and the other for self-unfoldment, self-recovery. All descent, all involution, is descent of the Spirit successively into Saccidānande, Supermind, Overmind,Mind, Life, and Matter. In the first phnse of descent, the Spirit aims at self-oblivion, self-concealing, self-enfoldment; in the second, at self-recovery, self-

1. I, p. 154.
2. I, p. 311.
3. Sri Aurobindo, *The Life Divine*, Vol. II (2nd ed., Calcutta Arya Publishing House, December 1944), p. 600. This work will henceforth be referred to as 'II'.
4. I, p. 53.
4. I, pp. 310-311.
6. I, p. 311.
7. See, for example, I, pp. 147, 223, 227, 265, 311-312, 319, 325 327, 333, 347 ; II, 510, 511.

manifestation, self-unfoldment. When the arc of descent in the first phase has been completed, the Spirit become Matter proceeds evolve and ascend into higher and higher forms, into Life, Mind, Overmind, and Supermind and finally recovers its pristine self. According to Sri Aurobindo, this ascent, this evolution out of Matter is possible because the higher stages are all involved in Matter. In the process of successive involution, every higher term hides and enfolds itself in lower terms ; in evolution, at reveals and unfolds itself. Sri Aurobindo has it that 'the material universe was bound in the nature of things to evolve from its hidden life apparent life, from its hidden mind apparent mind, and it must in the same nature of things evolve from its hidden Supermind apporant Supermind and from the concealed Spirit within it the triune glory of Sachchidananda.'[1] That is to say, involution must occasion evolution, which is in the nature of an inner, creative urge of things to realize their potentialities, to become completely themselves : 'evolution of the involved there must be.'[2]

But this is not enough, not all. Sri Aurobindo is inclined to hold that, if things are left to themselves, there will either be no evolution at all or, if evolution does take place, its pace will be too slow. He writes : 'The transition to Supermind through overmind is a passage from Nature as we know it into Super-Nature. It is by that very fact impossible for any effort of the mere Mind to achieve; our unaided personal aspiration and endeavour cannot reach ...it[3] Again : 'It is conceivable that, without the descent—in its second phase—by a secret pressure from above, by a long evolution, our terrestrial Nature might succeed in entering into a close contact with the higher now superconscient planes and a formation of subliminal Overmind might take place behind the veil ; as a result a slow emergence of the consciousness proper to these higher planes might awake on our surface... But this process would inevitably be a long and toilsome endeavour of Nature.'[4] So, it is, on his view, scarecely possible for lower principles to

1. I, p. 325.
2. I, pp. 324-325.
3. II, p. 765.
4. II, p. 766.

ascend to higher planes without active cooperation of the latter. 'Evolution comes, he says, 'by the unceasing pressure of the supramental planes on the material compelling it to deliver out of itself their principles and powers which might conceivably otherwise have slept imprisoned in the rigidity of the material formula.'[1] Evolution is a necessity from below, indeed, but 'this necessity from below is actually very much aided by a kindred superior pressure.'[2] Otherwise, the lower principles would evolve higher ones at best 'in a qualified and restricted emergence.'[3] Such descent is 'essential for bringing the permanent ascension.'[4] No 'real transformation' can take place without 'a direct and unveiled intervention from above.'[5] This will be the case with the future course of evolution; this has been the case with the past course of evolution. 'All the previous ascensions have been effectuated by a secret Consciousness-Force... : it has worked out by an emergence of its involved powers to the surface, powers concealed behind the veil and superior to the past formulations of Nature, but even so there is needed a pressure of the same superior powers already formulated in their full natural force on their own planes....'[6] Thus, on this view, evolution presupposes involution and the descent of higher into lower planes of existence is a necessary precondition thereof. So, also, in order for Matter to evolve Life, Life must be already involved in Matter and fresh Life must descend into it ; in order for Life to evolve Psyche, Psyche must be already involved in Life and fresh Psyche must descend into it; in order for Psyche to evolve Mind, Mind must be already involved in Psyche and fresh Mind must descend into it; in order for Mind to evolve Overmind, Overmind must be already involved in Mind and fresh Overmind must descend into it; in order for Overmind to evolve Supermind, Supermind must be already involved in Overmind and fresh Supermind must descend into it ; in order for Supermind to evlve

1. I, p. 312.
2. Loc. cit.
3. Loc. cit.
4. II, p. 755.
5. II, p. 767.
6. II, pp. 765-766.

Saccidānanda, Saccidānanda must be already involved in Supermind and fresh Saccidānanda must descend into it.

Roughly speaking, there are, on Sri Aurobindo's view, two Lives, two Psyches, two Minds, two Overminds, and two Saccidānandas, one involved and the other descending or scheduled to descend in order to aid evolution. Sri Aurobindo seems to believe that there is a cosmic, macrocosmic, or universal Life ; a cosmic, macrocosmic, or universal Psyche ; a cosmic, macrocosmic, or univarsal Mind ; a cosmic, macrocosmic, or universal Overmind ; and a cosmic macrocosmic, or universal Supermind ; even as there is an individual, microcosmic, or particular Life ; an individual, microcosmic, or particular Psyche ; an individual, microcosmic, or particular Overmind ; an individual, microcosmic, or particular Supermind and an individual, microcomic, or part cular Supermind.[1] Of course the individual, microcosmic, or particular Overmind and Supermind are awaiting their birth in the womb of the future. The former Life, Mind, Overmind, and Supermind are also called the hidden or transcendent and the latter, the apparent or immanent Life, Mind, Overmind, and Supermind.[2] Elsewhere, he also incorporte the note speaks of a 'primary Supermind'[3] which is the same as the universal Super-

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1. Cp. I, pp. 265, 266-267, 283, 285, 288, 289, 312, 322, 334, 339, 342, 344 ; II, 583, 588, 595, 598, 599, 503 604, 605.
2. Cp. I, pp. 224, 266-267, 325.
3. I, pp. 177, 178. Here Sri Aurobindo speaks of three general poises or sessions of the world founding consciousness of Supermind. 'The first founds the inalienable unity of things, the second modifies that unity so as to support the manifestation of the Many in One end One in Many ; the third further modifies it so as to support the evolution of a diversi fied individuality which by the action of Ignorance, becomes in us at a lower level the illusion of the separate ego.' (I, pp. 176-177). The primary Supermind is the Supermind in its first poise or session, which is nothing but what we have termed the universal or microcosmic Supermind. The Supermind in its second poise or session is termed the secondary and that in its third the tertiary Supermind. See, I, p. 180.

mind. He clearly suggests' the existence of a Life-world or Life-plane above the material' 'as a formative stage in a descent' and the idea that 'a pressure from some plane of Life above the mater ial universe has assisted the emergence of Life here.'[1] To sum up, in the words of Sri Aurobindo himself, 'It is the pressure of the life-world which enables life to evolve and develop here in the forms we already know ; it is that increasing pressure which drives it to aspire in us to a greater revelation of itself...It is the pressure of the mind-world which evolves and develops mind here and helps us to find a leverage for mental self-uplifting and expansion.... It is the pressure of the supramental and spiritual worlds which is preparing to develop here the manifest power of the spirit... [2]

There is, according to Sri Aurobindo, a double soul in us as every other cosmic principle in us is also double.'[3] We have two minds, one the surface mind and the other a subliminal mind ; two lives, one the superficial life and the other a subliminal life ; two psychic entities or souls, one the surface desire-soul and the other a subliminal soul.[4] 'The external forms of our being are those our small egoistic existence ; the subliminal are the foundations of our larger true individuality.[5] How do the higher planes descend into the lower ? Sri Aurobindo's reply is that the former 'create their own foundations in our subliminal parts and from there are able to influence the evolutionary process on the surface.'[6] The cosmic Mind influences us through the subliminal mind ; the cosmic Psyche through the subliminal Psyche ; the cosmic Life through the subliminal Life.[7] The subliminal Mind is such as has escaped from evolutionary absorption in Life and sometimes mistaken for the pure spirit.[8] Of course, it is held that

1. I, p. 224.
2. II, p. 595.
3. I, p. 265.
3. I, pp. 265-266
4. I, p. 266.
5. II, p. 766.
6. I, pp. 266-267.
8. I, p. 205.

'Overmind and Supermind are also involved and occult in earth-Nature, but they have no formations on the accessible levels of our subliminal inner consciousness ; there is as yet no Overmind being or organized overmind nature, no supramental being or organized supermind nature acting either on our surface or in our normal subliminal parts....'[1]

According to Sri Aurobindo, descent (or ingression, to follow Whitehead) of the higher principles into the lower, pressure and penetration from above, is not so unusual as it appears to be : 'there is not an entire absence of penetration from above into our mental limits. The phenomena of genius are really the result of such a penetration...'[2] He also seems to trace the origin of the phenomena of inspiration, mystic and spiritual experience, revelatory vision, intuitive perception to the influx of what he calls 'the overhead consciousness beyond us.'[3]

Above we have seen that there are two phases of descent, two phases of involution—descent or involution for progressive enfoldment and that for progressive unfoldment of the Spirit. From the foregoing delineation of the process of the descent in its second phase, it transpires that two phases of descend differ in an important respect, which is that, in the first phase, higher categories get absorbed in the lower, whereas in the second, they escape such absorption and continue in their pristine purity, however dim their luminosit : appears to be.[4]

Sri Aurobindo offers no proof of the ascent of Matter to Life, of Life to Mind taking place through the descent of Life into Matter, of Psyche into Life, and of Mind into Psyche. He simply takes it all for granted. He does not bother him-self to proffer evidence that Mind is going to ascend into Overmind or Super-

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1. II, p. 766.
2. I, p. 331.
3. Loc. cit.
4. In fact Sri Aurobindo tries to explain why not all the original divide luminosity of the descending categories is discernible in the lower ones. See I, p. 205 read with p. 331.

mind through the descent of the latter into it. In this behalf, he contents himself with assuming the fact of a similar descent causing the phenomenon of genius, insp iration, intuition, and mystic experience, which, to be sure, admit of an alternative explanation, e.g. assumption of supernormal ascent. In fact, he does not seem to succeed in demonstrating, with a sufficiently high degree o cogency, that man is going to exceed himself into a superman through the descent of Supermind. He has admirably set out a number of profound objections likely to be brought against his theory of spiritual evolution[1] without, however, being able to meet them. Let us examine the issue independently, with special reference to supramental transformatic of the earth-nature through the descent of Supermind, and see how far it can be said to be a necessity in the scheme of things.

The *Ṛg-veda* says that the world becoming time actuality forms but a quarter of the Godhead being eternity potentiality [2] Sri Aurobindo appears to share this belief, especially when he posits that the lion's share of the individual principles of evolution remains unabsorbed in the evolutionary process. Incidentally, such a view does not appear to be countenanced by such an Absolutist as Hegel, whose Absolute seems to undergo self-alienation entire and is nothing apart from, and over and above, the relative. According to Aristotle God is pure actuality, according to the Vedas as also Aurobindo, actuality potentiality in the ratio of 1: 3 Cp. Leuin, *Philosapical* Notebooks p. 324. Well, to Sri Aurobindo, temporal reality is part and parcel of the Absolute Spirit, which is not exhausted by it. Both the transcendent and immanent the aspects or moments of the Spirit are as if violently held apart and consequently striving to unite again. This is the rationale of evolution, which is a two-way process, of lower categories trying to ascend and of higher categories trying to descend with a view to aiding the former in their endeavour to ascend to higher and higher planes. Iqbal seems to be making a similar suggestion in his Persian couplet :

1. See II, Chapter XXIII entitled 'Man and the Evolution'.
2. *Ṛg-veda* 10. 90. 3.

Qadam dar justjū-e ādam-e zan
Khudā ham dar talāsh-e ādam-e hast

(Move thy feet in search of man. God, too, is in search of man.)

The finites one's forming part of a whole cannot bear the pangs of separation for long, and must strive to reunite. Yes, both sides will be active in this behalf, not only one side :

Mumkin nahīn hai āg idhar ho udhar na ho

(It is not possible that there is fire on this said and not on that.) Besides, being finite, the temporal aspect of the Spirit cannot, remarks Sri Aurobindo, 'remain permanently satisfied so long as it is conscious either of a finite greater than itself or of an infinite beyond itself to which it can yet aspire.'[1] It may be remarked here incidentally that the Spirit loses nothing even after self involution in the world-process. The Perfect and Infinite whole is not rendered imperfect and finite on subtraction from it of anything whatever, suggests the Upaniṣad :

Pūrṇasya Pūrṇam ādāya Pūrnam evāvaṣyate

The ancients claimed to have discovered a law of nature according to which everything tends to revert to its source. Aristotle believed that objects tend to fall to the ground because that's where they belong, and smoke tends to go up because that where it belongs. Patañjali the grammarian postulates a similar law, the law of what he calls 'āntarya' (proximity or kinshipl) and gives similar illustrations, e g. things made of earth tending to fall to the earth and fire tending towards its source, the sun.[2] This idea is found mooted in several other ancient or more ancient texts as well.[3] However, from this law, only the fact of ascent can be inferred, not of descent.

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1. I, p. 299.
2. Patañjali *Mahabhaṣya* Vol. I (Delhi ; Varanasi, Motilal Banarsidass. 1967), 1. 1. 50, p. 272.
3. *Yajur-veda* 13. 53 ; *Atharva-veda* 10. 5. 23 ; *Śatapathabrahmaṇa* (Mādhyandina) 7. 5. 2. 58 ; *Vayu Purāṇs* Pūrvardha 27. 26-27.

The Ṛg-*veda* passage, referred to above, speaking of the realm of becoming as forming only a quarter of the Supreme Being, does not go with Sri Aurobindo far enough. Descent is as much a case of becoming as ascent and is, therefore, as much assignable to the realm becoming forming a quarter of the Snpreme Being as ascent. This Being so, the question of the remaining three quarters of the Supreme Being *becoming* in any form or manner simply does not arise.

As a matter of fact, the postulation of descent, of the Supermind for instance, introduces an element of arbitrariness into the scheme of things. Such descent appears to be a gratuitous assumption. If, for the first phase of involution of the Spirit no such extraneous agency is needed, there is no reason why an extraneous agency like the transcendent Supermind is imperatively necessary for evolution of the Spirit. What is evolutlon after all ? Nothing but progressive actualization of potentialities, and it would not be going too far to suggest that the part or moment of the Spirit which can potentialize itself is as well capable af actualizing itself. There is no reason why the unbecome realm of the Spirit should have ingress into to enter realm of becoming. Again, it the Supermind does descend to effect ascent it will be either absorbed in the process of becoming or remain unabsorbed. If the former be the case, its status will be nondifferent from that of the already absorbed part of the Supermind for the release of which the transcendent Supermind has had to descend anew, thereby defeating its own purpose. If on the other hand, it is to continue uabsorbed after the so-called descent it will be as good as not descended at all. What is descent ? It is the transition of the timeless into time, the involvement of the transcendent into the affairs of the immanent, the ingression of the transcendental into the temporal, the subjection of the Supreme Being to the laws of involution and evolution, its forming part of the world process, the transition of the Spirit from transcendence to immanence. And such descent is very much there already, to undo and abrogate which the transcendent Supermind is believed to embark upon a new phase of descent. So, the new phase of descent, largely in the womb of the future,

helps merely reinforce the old phase of descent rather than undo and abrogate it.

It will, therefore, be quite in keeping with the law of parsimony to maintain that the part of the Spirit undergoing involution is itself competent to embark upon evolution. This will also help avoid confusion of levels, viz confusion of the transcendent with the immanent aspect of the Absolute.

Chapter—XIII

THE STRUCTURE OF SRI AUROBINDO'S SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

Sri Aurobindo's social philosophy is deeply rooted in and inextricably bound up with his omnibus metaphysics. And both his metaphysics and social philosophy are in the nature of reconstructions and adaptations from substantive Hinduism, duly tempered with modern scientific outlook, especially the theory of evolution.

Sri Aurobindo's metaphysics is called Purnadvaita/Integral Advaitism/Integral Monism. His Absolute partially manifests itself in cosmic history. The manifestation is twofold, non-evolutionary or typal on one hand and evolutionary on the other. Asura-s and the subtle physical vital, and mental Deva-s are called non-evolutionary or typal beings, their abodes being called non-evolutionary worlds. The other worlds and beings are all evolutionary. But their evolution is invariably preceded by an inverse process, the process of involution. The Absolute playfully involves itself in the Inconscient Matter before the process of evolution beings. The process of evolution starts from Matter, the potential Spirit, and ends up with the actual Spirit. Matter evolves Life, Life Mind, Mind Higher Mind, Higher Mind Illumined Mind, Illumined Mind Intuitive Mind, Intuitive Mind Overmind, Overmind Supermind, Supermind Bliss, Bliss Consciousness Force, Consciousness-Force Existence. The whole process culminates in the Absolute, the 'ineffable Being', which 'is neither eternal nor temporary neither infinite nor limited, neither one nor many ; it is nothing that any word of our speech can describe nor any thought of our mentality can conceive. The word existence undully limits it ; eternity and infinity are too petty conceptions ; the term Being is an X representing not an unknown but an unknowable value. All values from the Brahman, but it is itself beyond all values. This existence is an incalculable Fact in which all possible opposites meet ; its opposites are in truth identities. It si neither one nor many and yet both one and many...It is

neither personal nor impersonal and yet at once personal and impersonal.'[1]

Human society is a dynamic, evolutionary entity, having the following phases of evolution :

1. The Symbolic age (Adi-yuga/Adi-Treta-yuga/Krta-yuga/ Satya-yuga)
2. The Typal age (Treta-yuga)
3. The Conventional age (Dvapara-yuga)
4. The Individualistic age (Kali-yuga)
5. The Subjective age (the higher Karta-yuga)

This scheme Sri Aurobindo borrows from Lamprecht, but it admirably corresponds to the Hindu scheme of the yuga-s, as indicated by us in parentheses above.

Sri Aurobindo holds evolution to be 'cyclic rather than in one straight line'.[2] And there are 'cycles of human civilization' and 'human evolution, the *kalpas* and *manvantaras* of the Hindu theory'.[3] The experiment of human life on an earth is not now for the first time enacted. It has been conducted a million times before and the long drama will again a million times be repeated.'[4] The Hindu 'idea of eternal recurrence'[5] is fully acceptable to him. 'There is no beginning or end of the universe in space or time ; for the univers is the manifestation of the Eternal and Infinite.'[6]

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1. Aurobindo, *Thoughts and Aphorisms,* Sri Aurobindo Birth Centenary Library, Vol. 17 entitled *The Hour of God and other Writings* (Pondicherry : Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1972), p. 150. p. Also see *L.D*, I, pp. 94-95. Sri Aurobindo 'cannot' hence does not, describe the Absolute *in itself*, see *L.D*, I, p. 95.
2. Sri Aurobindo, *Evolution*, SABCL, Vol. 16 entitled *The Supramental Manifestation and other Writings* (Pondicherry : Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1971), p, 229.
3. *Loc. cit.*
4. *Thoughts and Aphorisms*, p. 149.
5. *Loc. cit.*
6. *Ibid.*, p. 148.

Manifestation is not an episode of the Eternal.'[1] 'A beginningless and endless eternity and infinity in which divisible Time and Space manage to subsist is the mould of existence.'[2] 'Unless the Eternal is tired out by Time as by a load, unless God suffers loss of memory, how can universe cease from being ?'[3] Sri Aurobindo raises the question 'whether the gnostic reversal, the Passage into a gnostic evolution and beyond it would not mean sooner or later the cessation of the evolution from the Inconscience, since the reason for the obscure beginning of things here would cease', 'whether the movement...is an abiding law of the material manifestation or only a provisional circumstance.' To him, the 'later supposition is difficult to accept.'[4] He also speaks of our achievements 'in our past cycles'.[5]

Chary as he is of binding down his theory of spiritual evolution to the modern theory of biological evolution, of form-evolution and physical life evolution, he does appear to favour 'the conception of vegetable and animal life-forms as the lower steps of a ladder, humanity as the last or culminating development of the conscious being'.[6] He is inclined to the view that humanity has evolved out of 'animal being of a type similar in some respects to the ape-kind but already from the beginning endowed with the elements of humanity'.[7] According to him, the theory of spiritual evolution is quite acceptable to the Hindu tradition. 'That evolution is not denied by the Hindu theory of *Yugas*. Each age in the Hindu system has its own line of moral and spiritual evolution and the decline of the *dharma* or established law of conduct from the *satya* to the *kaliyuga* is not in reality a deterioration but a detrition of the outward forms and props of spirituality in order

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1. *Loc. cit.*
2. *Ibid.*, p. 150.
3. *Ibid*, p. 152.
4. Sri Aurobindo, *The Life Divine* (2nd ed., Calcutta : Arya Publishing House), Vol. II, Dec. 1944, p. 17 '.
5. *Ibid*, p. 525.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 664.
7. *Ibid*, p. 670.

to prepare a deeper spiritual intesity within the heart. In each *kaliyuga* man gains something in essential spirituality. Whether we take the modern scientific or the ancient Hindu stand-point the progress of humanity is a fact. The wheel of Brahman rotates for ever but it does not turn in the same place ; its rotations carry it forward.'[1]

But here a difficulty arises. If higher species have evolved out of lower species, higher stages of society should be evolved out of lower stages, rather than the other way about. That is to say, within the same cycle, all later stages of society should be progressive as compared with the earlier ones. As a matter of fact, Sri Aurobindo himself acknowledges that there has been 'human progress since man's appearance' and that, though there have been 'falls from a high type of culture, a sharp temporary descent into a certain obscurantism, cessations of the spiritual urge, plunges into a barbaric natural materialism', 'these are temporary phenomena, at worst a down-ward curve of the spiral of progress.'[2] If this is the case, his arrangement of the stages of society is questionable. According to him, the first stage of society was more ideal than the second, the second more ideal than the third, and the third more ideal than the fourth. The fifth and last stage of society is the only one which marks a definite stage of progress as compared with the earlier stages. The earliest stage of society called by him Symbolic is far from being a stage of society marked by savagery and barbarism, far from being red in tooth and claw. As will transpire in the sequel, it is a stage of religiasity and spirituality. If this is the case, it is difficult to see how such society could have emerged from a state of animality. Indeed, the inconsistency is so glaring to us that we are inclined to hazard the opinion that, while in his theory of cosmological and biological evolution Sri Aurobindo goes a long way with modern science, in his theory of social evolution he seems to approximate to the Hindu theory of Yuga-s.

1. Sri Aurobindo, 'Yoga and Human Evolution', from the 'Karmayogin', *The Harmony of Virtue* : Early Cultural Writings, SABCL, Vol. 3, pp. 357-358.
2. *Ibid* , p. 669.

According to the Hindu theory, society begins with a golden age called Krta-yuga, which is followed by Treta yuga, then Dvapara-yuga, and finally Kali-yuga, all the succeeding Yuga-s being regressive spiritually as compared with the preceding ones. After the cycle of the four Yuga-s has been completed, a new cycle begins, with Krta-yuga. In Sri Aurobindo's scheme of stages of society, too, humanity begins with a golden age called Symbolic age, which is succeeded by more and more degenerate ages. The process of degeneration culminates in what is called the Individualistic age. The Individualistic age is, in its turn, succeeded by a new golden age called the Subjective age. One striking difference between the Hindu scheme and Sri Aurobindo's is that, whereas in the one the golden age is simply repeated, in the other a new golden age dawns, much more golden than the initial golden age.

Incidentally, Sri Aurobindo is not alone in committing the inconsistency of tracing human ancestry to lower species and at the same time describing social history as a process of degeneration within each cycle. Marx and Engels, too, appear to us to believe that there was a golden age of innocence represented by primitive tribal society and that civilization represents a veritable fall from that paradise. It is an ideal. egalitarian society, in which 'All are free and equal—including the women.'[1] Slavery was conspicuous by its absence, so much so that even aliens and belligerents were not subjugated. Production was essentially collective. The producers were masters of their process of production and of their product. There were no classes and hence no exploitation of one class by another, the bane of civilization. Engels is all admiration for it and considers it a veritable paradise. He laments its loss at the hands of civilization. He refers to the admiration felt by all white men who came into contact with members of such a society in America, for 'the personal dignity,

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1. Frederick Engels, *The Origin of Family, Private Property and the State* (1884). *Marx and Engels Selected Works* in two Volumes, (Moscow : Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1951), Vol. II, p. 279.

straightforwardness, strength of character and bravery of these barbarians.'[1]

Thus, according to Marx and Engels, the age of the mankind under primitive communism, though nearest to the age of animal kind, was a golden age inferior only to the more golden age of communism.[2]

Sri Aurobindo's Symbolic society was a society of seers and sages, not barbarians. They were 'not bound by outer laws or institutions', but were accustomed to follow the inner law of living, Dharma. They were 'freely social without society'. That age was always religious, mystical, spiritual. It was an age of original innocence, guided by intuition. They were not satisfied with material factors but were always on the look-out for symbolic, religious, or spiritual significance.

Sri Aurobindo bases his concept of the Symbolic age on the accounts of Vedic society and shows how the religious institution of sacrifice, the social institution of marriage, and the fourfold Varna-order were all permeated by mystical symbolism through and through.

Let us note in brief the special features of each age with reference to the Varna-scheme :

1. The Symbolic age is a religio-spiritual age which visualizes the Divine as Brahman (knowledge), Ksatra (power), Vis (desire), and Sudra (matter) and incarnated as Brahmana, Ksatriya, Vaisya, and Sudra. It is the religio-spiritual view of the Varna-scheme.

2. The Typal age is a psycho-ethical age which shifts the centre from the Divine to the social types and functions and force of character (guna-karma-svabhava). It is the psycho-ethical view of the Varna-scheme.

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1. *Ibid*, p. 230.
2. For a full discussion of the matter, see Harsh Narain, *Discovery of Marx* (Lucknow : Lucknow Akademi, 1982), pp. 132 ff.

3. The Coventional age is a formalistic-externalistic age which serves to routinize and stereotype the charismas and makes their outward expressions more important. It is an age of law, arrangement, and fixed conventions, and economic view of the Varna-scheme.
4. The Individualistic age is the iron age, an age in which 'the unclean diseased decrepitude of the old system has begun ; it has become a name, a shell, a sham.' At this stage, the Varna-scheme is rather a dead weight. But, otherwise, it is a revolutionary, rationalistic, and scientific age.
5. The Subjective age will transcend the Varna-scheme entire, like the Krta-yuga of yore as well as Samnyasa.

Thus, according to Sri Aurobindo, the Varna-scheme is 'an at once spiritual, psychicm, ethical and economic order'.[1]

Highlighting the special features of the coming Subjective or Spritual age, Sri Aurobindo writes, 'It will not try to make man perfect by machinery or keep him straight by tying up all his limbs. It will not present to the member of the society his higher self in the person of the policeman, the official and the corporal, nor, let us say, in the form of a socialistic bureaucracy or a Labour Soviet. ...His life will be led by the law of his own divine nature liberated from the ego.'[2] Considering the Subjective age vis-ā-vis the Symbolic and other ages, he contends that, 'having set out... with a symbolic age, an age in which man felt a great Reality behind all life which he sought through symbols, it will reach an age in which it will begin to live in that Reality, not through the symbol, not by the power of the type or of the convention or of the individual reason and intellectual will, but in our own highest nature.'[3] This is what the religions called the kingdom of God on earth.[4]

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1. Sri Aurobindo, *The Human Cycle*, SARCL, Vol. 15 entitled *Social and Political Thought* (Pondicherry : Sri Aurobindo Ashram. 1971), pp. 4 ff.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 243.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 244.
4. *Ibid*, p. 245.

The Subjective age will be the age of Supermen, Supermind. Supramental manifestation is the chief fact about this development. Such manifestation will help transform matter, transform the superman's body, which phenomenon distinguishes him from a living liberated soul (jivanmukta) on the one hand and Avatara on the other.

But, before the age of Supermind and Supermen comes into full swing, there will, according to the later views of Sri Aurobindo, expressed in *The Supramental Manifestation*, dawn what he calls the Age of New Humanity,[1] with its individuals having developed what he calls the Mind of Light, which is 'the last of a series of descending planes of consciousness in which the Supermind veils itself by a self chosen limitation or modification of its self-manifesting activities.'[2] The Mind of Light seems to be part and parcel, indeed the lowest part, of the Supermind, 'its subordinate portion or its delegate,'[3] and immediately above the Overmind.[4]

All through his writings, Sri Aurobindo takes it for granted that human nature is subject to change, that human essence can progress. He seems to be inclined to the view that essential progress is independent of institutional progress, as against Condorcet and Comte who maintained that institutional progress causes essential progress, as also against Hermann J. Muller who maintains that essential progress is guaranteed by improvement in the genetic makeup of the species. Many uphold that there is progress in the quality of not human nature but human culture, human institutions According to Marx and Engels, there is no human nature worth the name, but better men will result with the bettering of human institutions. We are inclined to the view that, if Akbar's experiment of isolating certain new born babes from society and then finding, after they had grown up, that they were little better than brutes is repeated today, the result will not be

1. *Supramental Manifestation*, p. 60.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 71.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.

different. In fact, Sri Aurobindo himself notes the contention that there has been no essential progress since the dawn of civilization but only seeming progress thanks to inheritance of culture.[1]

In any case, emergence of the race of supermen is not in sight. The race of seers, saints, and sages is on the verge of extinction. Though our age is an age of explosion of knowledge. it is no less an age of ever-growing depletion of wisdom.

Sri Aurobindo's social philosophy is characterized by its inwardness. He disfavours all attempt to explain the formation of human groups in terms of objective necessity. 'The nation or society, like the individual, has a body, an organic life, a moral and aesthetic temperament, a developing mind and a soul...for the sake of which they exist.' He hastens to add, 'One may see even that, like the individual it essentially is a soul rather than has one ; it is a group-soul that once having attained to a separate distinctness, must become more and more self-conscious.'[2] If, therefore, one wants to experience the identity of a nation, one should try to do it not through its external framework but subjectively. No institutional approach, such as invocation of economic, ethnic, geographical factors, will help us. Likewise, Sri Aurobindo sees purpose at the root of history, cosmic as well as social. Cosmological, biological, and social evolutions are not caused by objective factors, the propelling force behind evolution is the will or Lila of the Godhead, who under takes it for self-delight or delight of existence through self-willed self-oblivion.

But, if that is the case, if that is to say, the world-drama is so delightful to the Godhead, no part of it can be adjudged irksome or despicable. Even the merest atom is an atom of delight. All existence is willed existence, so all existence is welcome existence. To underrate any existence is, then, infidelity to the Godhead, Nastikya, Kufr. All is, therefore, equally good, even evil is good. If all is an expression of the divine delight of existence, all is equally sacred. Then why hurry up to attain the Supermind ?

1. *The Life Divine*, Vol. 11, p. 658.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

Sri Aurobindo himself says, 'God is a great and cruel Torturer because he loves.'[1] 'One called Napoleon a tyrant and imperial cut-throat ; but I saw God armed striding Europe.[2] Not only this : 'This world was built by Cruelty that she might love. Wilt thou abolish cruelty ? Then love too will perish...This world was built by Ignorance and Error that they might know. Wilt thou abolish ignorance and error ? Then knowledge too will perish.'[3] Indeed, Sri Aurobindo reminds one of Vallabhā's dictum that condemnation (dusana) and the condemnable (dusya) both are God (Yat kincid dusanam tv atra dusyam capi Harih svayam).'[4] Such a trend of thought is bound to lead to the thought, entertained by certain Ajivika-s as also the Ibahiyun of Iran, that all is allowed and that there is neither sin nor virtue, nor good nor bad.

Does the process of social evolution traced by Sri Aurobindo hold good only on a limited part of this globe, on the globe entire, or wherever else there is evolution? Sri Aurobindo makes no categorical statement about it. He does say, however : 'Obviously, such classifications are likely to err by rigidity and to substitute a mental straight line for the coils and zigzags of Nature. The psychology of man and his societies is too complex, too synthetical of many-sided and intermixed tendencies to satisfy any such rigorous and formal analysis.'[5] It appears, therefore, that he is not very rigid about his scheme of evolution. He adds, however, 'Undoubtedly, wherever we can seize human society in what to us seems its primitive beginnings or early stages,—no matter whether the race is comparatively cultured or savage or economically advanced or backward,—we do find a strongly symbolic mentality that governs or at least pervades its thought, customs and institutions.'[6]

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1. *Thoughts and Aphorisms*, p. 82.
2. *Loc. cit.*
3. *Ibid.*, p. 88.
4. Vallabha, *Srimad-Bhagavata-Subodbini*
5. *The Human Cycle*, p. 2.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

Sri Aurobindo favours the view, is indicated above, that the process of evolution is not going to come to an end with the inception of the highest stage of mankind. He seems to maintain, also, that if evolution does cease on this earth, another will be set afoot in some other line of Nature. 'A question might arise', he says, 'whether the gnostic reversal, the passage into a gnostic evolution and beyond it would not mean sooner or later the cessation of the evolution from the Inconscience, since the reason for that obscure beginning of things would cease.'[1] To this question he replies, 'Any complete reversal or elimination of the first evolutionary principle would mean the simultaneous manifestation of the secret involved consciousness in every part of this vast universal Inconscience ; a change in a particular line of Nature such as the earth-line could not have any such all-pervading effect : the manifestation in earth-nature has its own curve and the completion of that curve is all that we have to consider.'[2]

In any case, Sri Aurobindo does maintain that, on the highest stage of human society, too, 'the evolution here..., though remaining the same in its degrees and stages, would be subjected to the law of harmony the law of unity in diversity and of diversity working out unity : it would be no longer an evolution through strife ; it would become a harmonious development from stage to stage, from lesser to greater light, from type to higher type of the power and beauty of a self-unfolding existence. It would only be otherwise if for some reason the law of struggle and suffering still remained necessary for the working out of the mysterious possibility in the Infinite whose principle underlies the plunge into the Inconscience.'[3]

Here one is bound to hark to the Marxian answer to the question if the dialectic would cease to operate at the highest level of human development called communism. Marx contends that then antagonism will go but contradiction will remain. Engels observes that then social evolutions will cease to be political revolutions. They are in a position to say like this. But does

1. *The Life Divine*, Vol. II, p. 877.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 877-878.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 878.

Sri Aurobindo fare equally well ? We think not. It does become Marx and Engels to have a scale of values. They are quite within their rights to talk of higher and lower in human affairs. But, to Sri Aurobindo, all is equally desirable because all is desired by the Absolute.

Another question which comes to the fore in connexion with the Aurobindoan thesis of evolution and involution is whether involution follows the same course as evolution ? Sometimes, it seems, he his inclined to believe in a sudden plunge of the Absolute into the Inconscient, but he often appears to grant that involutiot follows the same process as evolution.[1] The same should apply to the stages of society outlined by him, but it does not.

Sri Aurobindo offers no proof of the ascent of matter to the higher and higher stages culminating into the Absolute Spirit and passage of society from the Symbolic to the Subjective stage. He does not seem to succeed in demonstrating that man is going to exceed himself into a superman through the descent of the Supermind.

Sri Aurobindo describes the successive stages of society and lays down the conditions for the coming of a spiritual age. But his recipes are too abstract to have any operational significance. He is professedly a harbinger of a great transformation, the supramental manifestation upon this earth. But he lacks a praxiology. In fact, we do not find such operational or praxiological vacuum in any other social philosopher having concern for normative standards. In reaction to this criticism, a follower of Sri Aurobindo will hasten to invoke his Purna—Yoga. But this, too, could not transform any part of humanity, so far as we can see.

One point must be noted here. The question arises, Is evolution real or imaginary ? Sri Aurobindo is never tired saying

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1. See Chapter XII; *The Philosophy of Evolution in Sri Aurobindo and Teilhard de Chardin* p. 63, passim; *The Life Divine*, Vol. I, July 1943, pp. 154, 312, 286 Vol. II, pp. 451, 452.

that the world-process is real, not imaginary. But he seems to approximate to the position of Saṅkara where he observes, 'Cosmos and individual are manifestations of a transcendent Self who is indivisible being although he seems to be divided or distri buted ; but he is not really divided or distributed but indivisibly present everywhere.'[1] This means that all evolution is apparent, not real.

Finally, Sri Aurobindo regards the series of gradations of the general evolutionary process outlined at the very outset of this paper as relative and tentative and frankly admits that 'from other principles and view points another classification of the same things can be equally valid '[2] Does this apply to his series of the stages of society, too ? Possibly, possibly not. We do not find any clear indications in his writings.

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1. *The Life Divine*, Vol. II, p. 95.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 600.

Chapter XIV

BHAGAVAN DAS : AN INTERPRETATION

Whitehead's oft-quoted remark, that 'Philosophy never reverts to its old position after the shock of a great philosopher,[1] can hold good only in the case of a culture sufficiently alive. The perennial Indian culture, though not so dead or moribund as to cease altogether to produce great philosophers, is to be sure, not alive enough to feel the shock of its great philosophers whenever it comes. This apathy of ours toward our own philosophers has, naturally, resulted in their apathy toward the call of our culture to further its philosophical tradition as well as in the growing tendency on their part to transfer the focus of their attention from real philosophical issues to those mostly unreal and irrelevant for them but fashionable for the moment in the ever-changing, varietist West. Thus, the Indian philosopher has come to develop the tendency of plying up to the Westerner, so to speak. People are raising so much hue and cry against the recent phenomenon of 'brain-drain', viz., the growing migration of scientific talent from the East to the West, but nobody seems to be conscious of the appall*in*g phenomenon of brain-drain in the field of philosophy. The brain-drain in the field of philosophy is a subtle process alienating our philosophical talent from its own moorings.

I reckon our characteristic indifference toward a philosopher of Bhagavan Das's calibre as exquisitely illustrative of the point sought to be made out above. And who else in our midst has fared any better ?

India, fabulously rich in religion, theology, and metaphysics, has, for ages, been poor in social philosophy. After the inception of the institutions of marriage and caste (varna) in rather pre-

1. A.N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality* P. 14.

Vedic times—in the Treta-yuga, to be traditionally precise,[1]—Kapila, the son of an Asura named Prahlada, is said to have introduced the institution of the four life stages called asramas,[2] Thus emerged the varnasrama scheme of social organization, which is the great distinguishing feature of Hindu social philosophy. The varnasrama system has ever since been the ruling ideal of Hindu savants down the ages, without exception. The system has had its critics, no doubt, from the great Buddha to the Tasawwuf influenced saints like Kabir, Nanak, and a host of others in the medieval times. Several later lawgivers of the Hindus also declared the institution of the fourth asrama, sannyasa, as abrogated for the Kali-yuga.[3] But none of them had the merit of re-establishing the varnasrama system on a sounder footing or proposing out and out an alternative system. As a matter of fact, the great basic fact about Indian thought is its native incapacity or disinclination to outgrow the social pattern set for it in the hoary antiquity, be its various schools and sects ever so deadly at daggers drawn with one another on other fundamentals.

An allied trait of Indian thought is its readiness to compromise with the status quo. India has hardly, if ever, tasted a real social revolution. Ours is an all-inclusive way of living according as it were, full recognition to the overgrowth of senseless as well as obnoxious superstitions without the least concern for weeding them out. Even the great Shankara and Ramanuja, teaching us to see the Brahman in the meanest of creatures, refer to the scriptural injunctions of sealing the Sudra's ears with lead in the event of his having heard the Vedas recited etc , without the faintest sign of

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1. 'The Vedas were compiled and sacrifices, castes, and āśramas organized, in Tretā.' *Mahabharata* Śānti-Parvan (Poona, 1932) 232, 35. In *Mahabharat,* Adi Parvan (Poona, 1929) 122. 9-20, one Śvetaketu is credited with having introduced the institutian of marriage so well known to the Vedas.

2. See *Baudhāyana-Dharmasūtra* 2.11.30.

3. See *Smrti-muktaphala* of Vaidyanātha Dīkṣita, p. 176 (Varṇśrama-dharma).

compunction.[1] Indeed, Alberuni, the greatest Indologist of olden times, was supremely in the right when he remarked that Indian culture had no Socrates to reform it.[2]

With the inception of the British hedgemony on our land, things begin to take a new turn. From about early 18th century to the fag end of the 20th, a veritable galaxy of Socrateses appear on the Indian sky. Of all of them, Dayananda was the one who could feel the need of reforming and refashioning the very basis of the Hindu social organization In the Satyartha-prakasha, he has mooted an almost new social philosophy based on the concept of caste by worth rather than caste by birth, by reinterpreting and reorientating the ancient Hindu social philosophy.

In the 20th century, two more social philosophers appear on the Indian scene—Gandhi and Bhagavan Das. It can be said without fear of contradiction that they happen to be not only the greatest social philosophers of modern India but also the most original social philosophers the world has produced after Marx and, possibly, Kropotkin.

Gandhi was not conscious of his being a social *philosopher*. Indeed, he repudiated being one, off and on. His motto was: 'The distant goal I do not care to see. One step enough for me.' The main differenee of opininon between Gandhi and Bhagavan Das centred round systematics. Bhagavan Das would press Gandhi to think out, encourage, and adopt a broad-based system of social organization and a model constitution, an outline scheme of Swaraj, faithfully projecting the image of the free India fought for. But Gandhi felt contented with his one-step formula. And this, though he had himself initially essayed the task of mooting a new social philosophy in his Hind Swaraj. Indeed, Gandhi's prophetic vision has opened to us vistas after vistas of a possible, sane, and above all humane, though non-glamorous, social order. His attempt at the institutionalization of such lofty, ennobling, man-making spiritual values as truth and non-violence, non-possession and non-attachment, and so forth, his forthright den-

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1. See their comments on *Brahma-Sūtra* 1.3.38 and 39 respectively
2. See*Alberuni's* '*India*' Vol. 1, Chapter I.

unciation of the craze for machinery and his daring readiness to sacrifice civilizaeion to the autonomy of the individual, his great ideal of trusteeship, and his revaluation of the much-maligned caste-system as as a means of eliminating reckless careerism and competition, promise to be important elements of a better social order, of a higher culture.

Dayananda and Bhagavan Das were undoubtedly the greatest system-builders of modern India in a way the greatest after the ancients. All embracing systematics has not been a recurrent phenomenon in this ancient land, after the Buddha and Mahavira The history of Indian thought is, by and large, a history of compilers, commentators, and paraphrasers, rather than of independent path finders and systematicians. The established practice has been take the tradition for granted, making deviations only stealthily and with a sense of guilt, rather than utilize it as material for new constructions.

System building has come under fire in recent times. It has come to be associated with intellectual stagnation, According to the dominant temper of our times, knowledgc can be had only piecemeal. Today, systems are dismissed summarily as metaphysical rubbish. But those who abhor system-building in all its forms appear to be oblivious of the fact that system building is at once a temptation and test of a thinker-tempation for unbidled speculation and test of the veracity and flawlessness of his otherwise unconected, uncoordinated, and incoherent theses. Coordination, collation, and checking are the very vascular sytem of true knowledge, which become possible only when stray ideas are dovetailed into a system. But, since system-building has fallen into disrepute in the West, it has fallen into disrepute in India, too.

There are, broadly, three types of systematicians. One type represented by Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, and Marx on the one hand H.P. Blavatsky and Baha Ullah on the other, who start from metaphysics or theology and end with organically related proposals for reorientation or reorganization of society. The second type is represented by Samuel Alexander and Whitehead, who try to give closely knit systems of philosophy without linking them to the problem of social reorganization. The third type of systematicians is represented by Russell, who has to his credit important

contributions to several fields of thought, social thought not expected, but has not cared to evolve an integrated ideology comprehending all his contributions in a single whole. Bhagavan Das belongs to the first type. Though not in a big way, he has brought fresh thought to bear upon religion, ethics, psychology, education, economics, historicism, politics, and, above all, social engineering, linking all together in organically interrelated whole, whatever limitations one may attribute to the whole thus emerging.

It has been a rule with the reformers of the Vedic religion in ancient times to try to restore the degenerate varnashrama-dharma to its pristine purity. In fact, it is the confusion of castes and anarchy in the institution of ashrama which, to them, constituted decadence and degeneration. Such has been the dynamics of Indian society. Of all modern reformers of Hinduism, it is only Dayanand and Bhagavan Das who seem to be conscious of this social dynamics and of their mission to work toward the definite goal of renewing, reorganizing, and rationalizing the varnashrama system. That way, these two modern exponents and reformers of Hinduism radically differ from the other savants of Hindusthan.

There has been much talk about modern or contemporary Indian philosophy since the early days of the modern renaissance in India, but today none seems to worry about what the expression actually means. Much of what passes for contemporary Indian philosophy is neither contemporary nor Indian nor philosophy. Only such a one can be called a contemporary philosopher as struggles with contemporary issues in philosophy. And such issues are bound to differ from culture to culture, from age to age, indeed from school to school. I agree with Spengler when he proceeds to 'designate as contemporary two historical facts that occur in exactly the same—relative—positions in their Cultures, and therefore possess exactly equivalent importance. It has already been shown how the development of the Classical and that of the Western mathematic proceed in complete congruence, and we might have ventured to describe Pythagoras as the contemporary of Descartes, Archytas of Laplace, Archimedes of Gauss'.[1] So, the contemporary Indian philosophy is one which

1. Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, Vol. I, p. 112.

would concern itself with the philosophical issues raging in India, rather than elsewhere. It would take up the thread from where our philosophers of the past have left it, rather than cramming itself up exclusively with the issues fashionable in the West but, judged by our standards, in many cases unphilosophical to the core. To this end, it would surely exploit the philosophical experience of the West, but it will by no means become subservient to it. A contemporary Indian philosopher is supposed to enrich and further the philosophical tradition of our homeland by contributing his mite to the fund of thought already stored up by it. Judged by this criterion, many a 'contemporary' Indian philosopher would turn out to be either a mere translator or paraphraser of Indian philosophy in terms of Western philosophy or else a mere echo of the issues discussed in the West with little or no relevance to Indian philosophy. Bhagavan Das was a contemporary Indian philosopher in the real sense of the term. He has sought not only to present the Hindu scheme of social organization in modern idiom and align it with modern thought but also to remodel it with a view to equipping it to compete with rival social philosophies and transforming it into a scheme of world order and world culture.

To those whom my approach may sound chauvinistic, I would commend close consideration of the following words of Albert Camus :

Love of one's native land can broaden without dying...Just take for example Ortegay Gasset...He is perhaps the greatest of European writers after Nietzsche, and yet it would be hard to be more Spanish. Silone speaks to all Europe, and the reason I feel so close to him is that he is also so unbelievably rooted in his national and even provincial tradition.'[1]

Well, Bhagavan Das is the first Indian seriously to set out a much too ambitious scheme of world religion buttressed by a world order based on varnashrama-dharma. This he has been able to do by exploiting the potentiality of Hinduism to become a world religion and reinterpreting the varnashrama-dharma in

1. Albert Camus, *Resistance, Rebellion and Death,* p. 172.

such a way as to qualify it to form the nucleus of a world order, the great desideratum of our age.

Bhagavan Das has the credit of continuing, enriching, and furthering the Indian cultural tradition in various ways. He essayed the overdue task of providing a broader base to Hinduism by making it comprehend within its compass not only the other religions of Indian origin, such as Buddhism and Jainism, but even Semitic religions like Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. Hindus are the most worshipful people known to history. The animistic, polytheistic, and pantheistic tendencies inherited by them from their forefathers and conserved by them through vicissitudes in a surprisingly tenacious manner, make them bow down before everything that has ever been worshipped as a god or goddess by anybody whomsoever. The result is that Hinduism has come to bear upon its shoulders the largest pantheon ever conceivable. The Hindu has such gods as Vateshvara (the banyan-god), Parvateshvara (the mountain-god), Gangeshvara (the Ganga-god). Narmadeshvara (the Narmada-god), Nageshvara (the serpent-god,), and what not. In an illuminating passage in his metrical work in Sanskrit, entitled Manavadharma-sara, Bhagavan Das lists some of such gods and poses the question why, if Hindus already worship an infinite variety of gods and goddesses, turning everything useful into gods and goddesses, they should fight shy of augmenting their pantheon a little by adding to it Makkeshvara (the god of Mecca), Kaabeshvara (the god of Kaaba), Romeshvara (the god of Rome), and so on and so forth. Such is the ambition of Bhagavan Das to turn Hinduism into a veritable world religion.

Bhagavan Das's philosophy is a system of triads, studiously collected from the whole gamut of Sanskrit literature, generally. Some of them have been borrowed from the West or fashioned anew.

Tradition has it, and not without reason, that Indian thought is basically of the Sankhya origin (Sankhyagata).[1] The Sankhya cosmology has all along been a system of dialectical materialism

1. See *Mahābhārata* 12.301.109.

in effect, so to speak, if the merely passive role of the selves (purusha) is discounted. The triad of its gunas (constituents of primeval matter) sattva, tamas, and rajas is reducible into terms of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis of the Western dialectic. It is, I take it, this dialectical system of the Sankhya which has yielded a world of stray triads to Hindu thought, in its long career extending over millenia. These triads were never systematized in the past. History had, as it were, long been waiting for a sage to arrange and dovetail them into a well-knit system, and ultimately found such a sage in Bhagavan Das. In his works, Bhagavan Das has taken pains to collect hundreds of triads strewn over the pages of ancient works In this task he was greatly aided by a Sanskrit work entitled Pranava vada attributed to an ancient author named Gargyayana and dictated to him by the late Pandit Dhanaraja Prajnachakhsu.

Bhagavan Das's initial triad is 'I-this-not' (ahametan-na), which he came to discover in the early stages of his spiritual career, at the tender age of nineteen, after a pitched battle with the ultimate 'why' and 'how', in a state of psychic fever, of a fine frenzy. The sudden flash of the triad upon his mind lighted up the darkness and confusion of his mind and brought an answer to the great questioning about the 'why' and 'how' of the world-process.

Some of the other triads mentioned by Bhagavan Das are tabulated below :

Thesis	Antithesis	Synthesis
Knowledge	Desire	Action
Knowing	Feeling	Willing
Cit (Consciousness)	Sat (Existence)	Ananda (Bliss)
The True	The Beautiful	The Good
Sattva	Tamas	Rajas
Light	Inertia	Movement
Being	Non-being	Becoming
Positive	Negative	Relative
Noumenon	Phenomenon	Illusion
Aham (I)	Etan (This)	Na (Not)

On the basis of such triads, Bhagavan Das has tried to build

up a metaphysical system akin to Advaita on one hand and the system of Fichte on the other. He has also employed the system of triads to build up a psychology of emotions by introducing order into the confused jungle of emotions, perhaps for the first time. According to Annie Besant, he 'reduces the chaos of the emotions into a cosmos, and shapes therein an ordered morality.'[1] If one goes through his The Science of the Emotions without preconceived notions, one is bound to realize that faculty psychology does have some perennial significance.

Bhagavan Das is at his best in his social thought. He has outlined an ambitious scheme of world-wide social reorganization on the basis of the theory of separation of powers as applied to social engineering. He finds definite indications in the ancient lore to derive the concept of caste from the concept of guna referred to above, and links it to the theory of separation of powers. Even as confusion of executive power with judicial power, for instance, results in degeneration of the body politic, confusion of castes (varna-sankara) results in degeneration and decay of society as a whole. Some of the triads relevant to this scheme of social organization are :

Sattva	Tamas	Rajas
Brahmana	Vaishya	Ksattriya
Honour	Wealth	Power
Dharma	Kama	Artha
Knowledge	Desire	Action
Prajna	Sraddha	Virya

It must be borne in mind that Bhagavan Das's scheme is a scheme of castes by worth and that there is no place in it for castes exclusively by birth which are eating into the very vitals of our society today. He gives a detailed account of the way caste will be determined in his ideal society and of the society planned on the caste-pattern.

Bhagavan Das accords an equal place to ashramas in his scheme of social organization. He believes in ashrama by age (vayasa) and not by arbitrary choice. Our legislators will be

1. See Annie Besant, *A Study in Consciousness* p. 225.

drawn from the fourth ashrama, sannyasa, for sannyasins alone can be relied upon as experienced, selfless, and really philanthropic workers. The problem of discovering a trustworthy anthropometric method has intrigued the minds of political philosophers right from Plato, the father of the ideal of 'philosopher-ruler', down to Shaw and is a despair of even the much-vaunted democracies of today. It is only the institution of ashrama, as interpreted by Bhagavan Das, which is capable of providing such an anthropometer.

This scheme of social organization envisages alliance for existence in place of struggle for existence, class cooperation in place of class struggle, rule of the higher self in place of the rule of the lower self, aristo-homo cracy (as he calls it) in place of democracy, and individuo-socialism in place of individualism and socialism.

This is not the occasion to dilate upon the social philosophy of Bhagavan Das. But this must be remarked in passing that his scheme of social organization cannot be lightly brushed aside as simply Utopian. It looks as practical and practicable as any other scheme whatever. There are anti-Utopian, 'scientific socialists' who proclaim that the state will wither away in their ideal society, but Bhagavan Das has it that the state can never wholly wither away. He writes : Thought the State, in the sense of an ultimate residual deciding and compelling Authority (inhering in Society), could never wholly "wither away", except when Society withers away and disappears ; still its compelling function would be reduced to a minimum...[1]

Who is more Utopian ? In fact, all the schemes emanating from the West have been tried and found wanting. There is no reason why Bhagavan Das's scheme should not be given a trial, of course after suitably revising it and combining it with the social philosophy mooted by Gandhi.

Like triads, scores of tetrads have also been collected or conceived by Bhagavan Das. But the tetrads are only an alter-

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1. Bhagavan Das, *The Fundamental Psychological Principles of Social Reconstruction* p. 20.

native way of saying the same thing. Thus, there are only three basic gunas, but when they are homogeneous (samyavstha) in the sense of being undifferentiated, indeterminate, and nebulous, we have a fourth category. Likewise, we have a fourth caste, Shudra when the temperament of the individuals concerned is not developed or crystallized enough to deserve assignment to the three castes Bhagavan Das says that his employment of triads and even tetrads is only for facility of treatment and that there are also other ways in which his philosophy could be presented, though not so well.

Whatever be the merits and demerits of Bhagavan Das's social philosophy, it must be acknowledged that, after Gandhi, it is he alone who has so courageously taken up the challenge of the Western mode of existence and the pattern of society emerging therefrom. A happy blending of the philosophies of Gandhi and Bhagavan Das alone would, I dare says, serve to fill the void created by the fall of almost all popular socio political ideals in our times.

CHAPTER XV

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY TODAY AND TOMORROW : SELF—RENEWAL OR SELF—ALIENTAION ?

Unless we delineate and follow the course of Indian Philosophy, it would not be possible to chart the future course of Indian philosophy. To this end, we would do well to be clear about the concept of Indian Philosophy.

Today, the common practice is to classify Indian Philosophy into orthodox and heterodox and divide each into six schools : the orthodox into the popular six systems of Nyāya Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Pūrva Mimaṁsā, and Uttara Mimaṁsā or Vedanta, and the heterodox into Cārvāka, Jainism, and the four schools of Buddhism (Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, and Mādhyamika). This is all that is known to be Indian Philosophy. It has of late been slowly but surely coming to be realized, however, that this list was unknown before the 12th century. Before that century, the list varied from classifier to classifier. Drawing up an exhaustive and scientific list would be a much more complicated affair and far from permissible within the scope of this paper. Suffice it to bear this much in mind, however, that we reject the popular classification as grossly misleading. Our general notion of Indian philosophy will be clear as we proceed.

Our first and foremost philosophers are styled ṛṣi-s, literally seers, who are credited with having 'seen' ultimate truths and eternal verities and 'manufactured' them into the form of the Vedic texts. In the age of these seers, three was literally speaking, no philosophy involving independent thinking or reasoning ; there was only darśana or vision involving seeing or experiencing : whatever thinking there was strictly based on and guided by the vision. I doubt if it would have been possible for the author of, say, the Īśa-Upaniṣad to reason out his truths like a Śaṅkara or an Aurobindo, who vie with each other in consider-

ing it their proud privilege to be his faithful followers. In modern parlance the seers were men of extraordinary genius, not men of extraordinary talent. 'Talent', says Jurgen Meyer, 'knows itself; it knows how and why in has reached a given theory ; it is not so with genius, which is ignorant of the how and the why. Nothing is so involuntary as the conception of genius.'[1]

The significant difference between seeing and thinking is thrown into bolder relief by what Abū Ali Sainā, one of the most encyclopaedic minds of all time and one of the greatest Muslim physicians and metaphysicians, anb Abū Sa'id Abū Khair, one of the greatest mystics of Islam, said of each other after remaining closeted together in the latter's monastery for three days and nights : the former said to people, 'What I know he sees (har-ce mnn dānam ū binad)' ; the latter, 'What we see he knows (har-ce mā binem ū dānad).'[2]

The creative race of seers began to dwindle in course of time and came to be totally extinct in a few centuries after the Mahābhārata war. Yāska narrates an anecdote, that, when the race of the seers was on the verge of extinction, people asked them who would act the seer for them. Then the seers offered them 'tarka,' viz. philosophy, logic, reasoning, as a substitute[3]

The age of the seers may be called the first phase of the creative age of Indian philosophy. It was followed by a second phase, the age of constructive philosophers. The constructive philosophy characterizing that age soon crystallized into Sāṅkhya Yoga, Pāñcarātra, Vedism proper, and Pāsupata,[4] which may be called the five root-systems of Indian philosophy. The darśana or vision of the seers was induced mostly by their penetrating

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1. See Cesare Lombroso, *The Man of Genius*, p. 19.
2. Abū Ali Sainā, *Kitāb-i Ishārāt*, chapters 'Tabi'iyāt' (Physics) and 'Ilāhiyāt' (Theosophy) translated from Arabic to Persian anonymously under the title *Tarjamah-i Kitāb-i Ishārāṭ*, Hasan Mishkan, ed. (Tehran, 13 16 Anno Hijri), Muqaddimaḥ (editorial introduction), page 'Ṭee'.
3. *Nirukta* 13 12.
4. *Mahābhārata*, Sānti-Parvan 149. 64.

vision of the phenomena of nature, with the result that the reality or realities discovered by them appear to be involved in natural phenomena[1] The vision itself was full of symbolism. The burden of the root-systems of philosophy was to use the visions as raw materials and constuct systems out of the chaos.

This was followed by a third phase of creative Indian philosophy, in which vision and construction yielded place to interpretative exegetical philosophy, styled ānvikṣiki, and embodied in early Mimāṁsā (both Pūrva and Uttara), Sāṅkhya, and early Yoga.

In the process, technique got the better of experience and loosened the Vedic moorings of these schools. This led to the rise of heterodoxy. Then there was a scuffle between heterodoxy and orthodoxy and the inception of logic was the result. By and by, logic gained ground, became mere dialectic or eristic, and displaced sound logic and philosophy for good.

Thus traditional Indian Philosophy has passed through five stages : the three creatives phases of creative vision, constructive philosophy, and interpretative exegetical philosophy and the two uncreative phases of logic and dialectic/eristic. The creative phase comes almost to a dead end with the inception of the Christian era. The bulk of the so-called post-Christian mediaeval Indian philosophies are not philosophies worth the name, the results of quest. They are motivated more, at their best, by technical considerations and, at their worst, by the will to victory in a dialectical duel, than by the will to truth characteristic of the creative age. Like Sartre's creative talent which, according to Alfred Stern, 'is feminine and needs to be inseminated and stimulated by other people ,'[2] mediaeval Hindu philosophy turned altogether feminine, without any initiative whatsoever, standing

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1. Cp. 'Ity ṛṣer dṛṣtārthasya prītir bhavati, ākhyāna-saṁyuktā.' in need of advances by the heterodox schools for stimulation and *Nirukta* 10. 46.

2. Alfred Stern, *Sartre : His Philosophy and Psychoanalysis*, quoted in the 'Translator's Introduction to Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, Hazel E. Barnes, tr., p. viii. f. n. 2.

in need of advances by the heterox schools for stimulation and insemination. There was a general trend toward stereotype and sterility.

The creativity and exuberance of Indian philosophical tradition exhausted itself almost completely towards the beginnings of the Christian era, without, however,—I daresay—exhausting the full sum of its possibilities. From then on, we find paraphrasers, abridgement—makers, commentators—a long line of them, without doubt—but hardly any new idea—patterns worth the name. And, remarkably but unfortunately enough, they, too, helped only whittle down the enormous scope of the original idea-patterns, instead of throwing into relief their multidimensional character. Compare, for example, the ancient Vedānta of the Upaniṣads and the Gītā with the mediaeval Vedānta of Śaṅkara and Maṇḍana, which pales into insignificance before the former in point, inter alia, of range and profoundity.

As a matter of fact, most of the philosophical developments in the post-Christian era appear to be in the nature of variation on familiar themes, and hence not so sigaificant from the point of view of creative advance in philosophy.

Another salient feature of the creative age of Indian philosophy was that then philosophy was relevant and essential to life and culture. The seers and constructive philosophers were leaders of society in a serious sense. Philosophy sought to elevate the individual on one hand and determine the pattern of, and plan cultural life on the other.

Modern Indian philosophy took its birth as part of the process of self-recovery of Indian culture after long self oblivion. It drew its nourishment from our pristine past as well as from Western thought. The Gītā was taken more seriously, more constructively, than perhaps ever before. The most significant event of the modern age of Indian philosophy was the realization, for the first time during at least two millennia, of the need to seek light and inspiration from the Vedic texts, after reinterpreting them with a view to catching their true spirit clouded during this period. Dayānanada was undoubtedly, the pioneer in the field Sri Aurobindo took the cue from him and exploited Vedic sym-

bolism in shaping his own philosophy, which short of the utopian theory of the descent of the Supermind, may well be regarded as a continuation of Vedic philosophy after an almost complete break in the tradition for over two millennia. Ananda K. Coomaraswamy was also responsible for trying to recapture the lost spirit of the Vedas to some extent or other. Bhagavan Das did not claim close acquaintance with the Vedic texts, but he was, in his own way, responsible for the resuscitation and reconstruction of the dialectical tradition of the dynamics of triads so richly enshrined in the Vedic literature. The greatest construc tive genius in the field of Vedic studies, however, was Madhusūdana Ojhā, so ill known to us, who has the credit of being the first in the memory of mankind to build up an architectonic system of Vedic cosmology by introducing order into the cofused jungle of cosmological material writ large on the pages of the Vedas. We are prone to identify modern thought with thought presented in English, to the utter neglect of a highly creative mind of his stature, who wrote in Sanskrit. The labours of other philosophers—K. C. Bhattacharyya, Tagore, Radhakrishnan-were confined to the Upaniṣads, the Gītā, and the mediaeval Vedānta.

Some of these pioneers of modern Indian philosophy may be said to be sufficiently original in their approach, at any rate in the earilier stages of their career. Sri Aurobindo, Bhagavan Das, and Ojha helped further and enrich Indian philosophical tradition in a way that entitles them to be counted in the long line of aur ancient sages K. C Bhattacharyya, Tilak, B.K. Mallick (the neglected author of *The Real and the Negative*) also have much to their ciedit as constructive thinkers. Iqbal the philosopher poet added a new chapter to the history of Islamic thought by reviving, revivifying, and recapturing the pristine spirit of early Islam, especially in his Urdu and Persian poems, and thereby imparting a new respectability to Islamic thought comparable, to a certain extent, to the one enjoyed by the philosophies of Nietzsche and Bergson.

Indian philosophy remained Indian thus far, but no further. Much of what passes for contemporary Indian philosophy (apart from the aforesaid 'modern Indian philosophy) seems to be neither contemporary nor Indian nor philosophy :

Ki rūḥ-i sharq badan kī talash men hai abhi

(For the soul of the East is still in search of a body). Only such a one can be called a contemporary philosopher as struggles with contemporary issues in philosophy. And such issues are bound to vary from culture to culture, from tradition to tradition, indeed from school to school. According to Spengler, any two historical facts are contemporary 'that occour in exactly the same-relative—positions in their Cultures, and therefore possess exactly equivalent importance.'[1] On this account, he mentions Pythagoras the contemporary of Descartes. The issues raging in one culture, one tradition, and one school cannot ipso facto be taken to be contemporary, for another. What, for example, is a contemporary issue for neo-Thomism may be a thing of the past for us. In several circles, the question of the existence of a personal God as the ultimate reality is taken to be an anachronism but Zaehner has made it a living issue, a contemporary issue. The question of religious experience may be out of date for some, but contemporary for others. Dialectic may be metaphysical nonsense for anti-Hegelians and anti-Marxians, but it is all the rage in the Marxist world. Metaphysics itself may be contemporarily irrelevant in some cercles and very relevant in others In fact, the development—I will not say progress—of philosophy is not unilinear but multi-linear, and each line of development is to be valued on its own account. This does not rule out the possibility of common criteria of criticism and comparison, however, but it is too much to demand that one line of development must conform to another.

That way, the so-called contemporary Indian philosophy appears to be far from contemporary. It has, as, a matter of fact, no issues of its own; it borraws them from the West. It is a mere echo of the issues discussed elsewhere with little or no relevance to Indian philosophy proper. Today there are these mere 'echoes', hardly any genuine voices' in Indian philosophy (to borrow a distinction from Carlyle). Only that philosophy deserves the title of contemporary Indian philosophy which concerns itself with the philosophical issues raging in Indian schools proper. It would

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1. Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*. Vol, I, p. 112.

take up the thread from where our philosophers of the past have left it, rather than cram itself up exclusively with the issues fashionable elsewhere. It would surely exploit the philosophical experience of the West or of any other part of the world for that matter, but it will not barter its individuallty on any account. A contemporary Indian philosopher is supposed to develop and further the philosophical tradition of our culture by contributing his mite to the fund of thought already stored by it. As authentic growths, we are supposed to be loyal to the sources of our being and to feel concerned of cultural energy. Culture is tradition, and tradition is memory, as Radhakrishan wculd have it. And, if we lose our culture, we lose our memory and thereby lose the very identity or individuality that we are. Loss of culture would mean loss of identity, death. We are so much dazzled by the glamour of the West that we have fallen headlong into self-oblivion relieved only by others. Asghar's couplet fits us so well :

Gum kar diyā hai did ne yūṅ sar ba-sar mujhe
Miltī hai ab unhṅ se kuch apnī khabar mujhe

It appears that the day is not far off when our self-oblivion will get so deep-rooted that we shall fail to recognize our own selves even when others hold the mirror up to us :

Chunāṅ az kheshtan begānah būdam
Chūṅ dīdam khesh rā na-shnākhtam man

Russell once predicted—gloomily, it is reported—that time will come when 'the only difference between East and West will be that the former is more Western'.[1]

This is provincialism, parochialism, chauvinism—they might retort. Albert Camus seems to be wiser than they on this score when he says that Ortega y Gasset 'is perhaps the greatest European writer after Nietzsche, and yet it would be hard to be more Spanish. Silone speaks to all Europe, and the reason...is that he is also so unbelievably rooted in his national and even provincial tradition.'[2] Indeed, those unrooted in or uprooted from their

1. Alan Woon, *Bertrand Russell : A Passionate Sceptic* p. 136.
2. Albert Camus, *Resistance, Rebellion and Death*, p. 172.

own native tradition are simply incapable of founding the much-vaunted world-tradition which is in the womb of the future. Those who teach us to renounce our roots in the tradition, in the past, would do well to ponder over the following lines of Akbar Ilāhabādi :

> Ik barg i muzmaḥil ne yeh speech meṅ kahā
> 'Mawsim kī kyā khabar nahīṅ, Ai Dāliyo ! tumheṅ ?'
> 'Achcha !' Jawāb-i khushk yeh ik shākh ne diyā
> 'Mausim se bākhabarr hoṅ to kya jaḍ ko chhoḍ den ?

The *Gītā* theory of svabhāva and svadharma is, to my mind, one of the most profound insights of the human race. It is well cultivated, well developed svabhāva and svadharma which can sustain a culture against odds. A culture devoid of these is bound to go under. If, therefore, Indian philosophy wants to survive, it must develop its own svabhāva, its own svadharma, its own individuality. Cultural identity is no less a desideratum than personal identity. World-culture ? Let it grow up. But why should Indian culture get ready to be devoured by it ? Why not take it into your head to make it a nucleus for worldculture, or at least an effective co-sharer therein ? Instead of thinking of assuming leadership in the field of philosophy, we betray a shameful lack of self confidence in our own destiny in trying to ape others.

We are becoming a complacent secondhand culture as America is known to have been before Walt Whitman. We write for others, we live for others, we are for others. We write in English, with an eye on appreciation by others. So, we cannot write what cannot prove palatable to others. Our whole ambition is to vie with each other in trying to conform as meticulously as possible to the fashions and fads prevailing in the other hemisphere. Indeed, tho deadliest poison which is paralyzing our philosophical limbs today is the patent fact that the so-called contemporary Indian philosophy is becoming more and more careeristic. In the process, we have become inauthentic, one dimensional, self-alienated. In fact Indian culture has never happened to undergo self alienation at such a tremendous scale. We hark to the tumult of some way of doing philosophy

from the Western hemisphere and mistake it for *Philosophy*, discounting every other way of doing philosophy as nonsense. Even the exceptional few who feel otherwise dare not strike a note of dissent, for fear of loss of caste.

Whatever be the shape of Indian philosophy to come, it will have to be relevant and integral to Indian culture. Philosophy is a part of culture in a significant sense. Culture is not a collective name for philosophy plus other elements of culture. In fact, culture is a unity, indeed an organism, of which philosophy (with religion) is the very elan vital. Philosophy is organically and integrally related to culture, it is not something superadded to it. So, philosophy is responsible to culture.

Our solicitude for the Indian philosophical tradition springs from even other motives than our loyalty to the source of our being or our concern for cultural identity Every great tradition has a truth-value. We ourselves speak of a perennial common tradition of humanity. But it goes to the credit of Hinduism alone to have preserved the lion's share of that tradition intact. Others have lost it entire, practically speaking. Hinduism in an inexhaust ible fund of truths brimming with the potentiality of giving birth to even new traditions undreamt of by the other religious traditions. Here truths grow wildly, profusely. There is no need of rationing thereof. Such a matrix of the one-time world tradition must be preserved at all costs.

Perennial Indian philosophy derives its validity from the spiritual insights of the seers and sages having direct experience of higher varities. In the field of poetry, the criterion of judgement is the work of great poets ; in the field of art, the works of great artists ; tn the field of morals, the life of moral savants.[1]

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1. Cp. :

'Ācāra-lakṣaṇo dharmaḥ, san'aś cācāra-lakṣaṇāḥ;

'Sādhunāṁ ca yathā-vṛttam etad ācāra-lakṣaṇam.

'Āgamānāṁ ca sarvesām ācāraḥ ṣreṣṭha ucyate

'Ācāra-prabhavo dharmo, dharmād āyur vivardhate.'

Mahābhārata, Anuśāsana-Parvan 104. 9; 105. 55.

If philosophy is to have any significance, it must relate itself to the visions and insights of great sages, who alone can and do lay claim to a firsthand knowledge of ultimate truths. In the beginning, such visions and insights seem to have been more common. Later, they had to be induced by what is called sādhanā or a course of spiritual discipline. In fact, metaphysical knowledge was regarded as fundamentally different from all other knowledge on the ground that, unlike in the case of the latter, proper training was prescribed for the former. Unless, according to this view, we cultivate a proper taste, receptivity, and objectivity for it, we shall not be blessed with an encounter with higher reality. This very important element is being totally ignored today without proper examination. I do not mean to suggest that it has to be taken for granted as a matter of course. What I do mean to suggest is that we must grant it the honour of due examination Today, the need for training is felt to be imperative in an ever greater number of fields, but mere verbal training is considered adequate in the field of philosophy dealing with eternal verities !

Positivists maintain that philosophy can yield no new knowledge. It can, on their view, only interpret the knowledge yielded by science. That way, philosophy has been called the logic of science. There does appear to be a grain of truth in their contention. If the instrument of philosophy is reason, as is generally maintained, the source of knowledge must be different. Left to itself, reason is incompetent to function as a source of real knowledge. Knowledge it must get from other sources so as to be in a position to work it up. Of course, the positivist restricts the source of knowledge to science or sense unduly. Science does provide us with what may be called physical knowledge. But there must be some source of metaphysical knowledge as well, as attested to by all known traditions. While much of scientific knowledge, such as that of wave length, relative density, and so forth, is of little moment for the philosopher, such knowledge as that of the principle of indeterminacy, curvature of space, and so forth does call for philosophical investigation But philosophy is primarily concerned to deal with metaphysical or mystical, spiritual or religious, experience. Science is competent to deal with itself, interpret itself, prononce upon itself. But mystical, spiritual,

or religious experience is simply dumb in this respect. Left to itself, it is something strictly private, rather than public. It does, therefore, stand in dire need of interpretation by the philosopher of the bulk of its knowledge. Poetry needs a critic of cultivated taste for apprectation and evaluation. The philosoper is the critic of religious experience. The raw materials of philosophy are the experiences of seers and sages, even as the raw material of criticism is provided by the poetry of the poet And, even as poetry needs a connoisseur of taste, called in Sanskrit sahṛdıya, moral or spiritual experience needs a kṛtātman or cultivated personality for appreciation and interpretation. If, therefore, real philosophy is to flourish on this soil in the future, it must relate itself to the deeper experiences of lofty souls. Our social order will have to be remodelled to produce and accommodate such souls as far as humanly possible.

In the past, the philosopher, along with the prophet, was looked upon as the leader of culture. Of late, he has been practically dismissed from this office or has voluntarily resigned or retired therefrom. The reason is not far to seek. After all, what is he worth today ? He was the salt of the earth but lost his salt. The commonsense view of things is that, if the type of philosophy fashionable today be abolished altogether, it will scarcely involve any loss to humanity. Secular philosophy, earth-bound philosophy, today is far from bound to the problems of the earth. It has relinquished its office of guiding humanity. The great Jayanta would dub it sheer wrangling or reasoning for reasoning's sake without a serious purpose (vaitaṇdika-kathā), on the ground that it has no practical bearing on life :[1]

> Na hi lokāyate kiñcit kartavyam upadiśyate ;
> Vaitaṇḍikakthaivāsau, na punaḥ kaścid āgamaḥ.

Indeed, Jayanta and Vācaspati were so proud of the praxiological excellence of substantive Indian philosophy that they jubilated over the phenomenon of the Buddhists, bankrupt in praxiology, having no alternative but to fall back upon the Vedic tradition in behavioral matters.[2] The so-called contemporary Indian

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1. *Nyāya-Manjari*, Pramāna-Prakarana, p. 247.
2. *Ibid*, p. 243 ; *Nyāvārtikatātparya-Ṭikā*, 2. 1. 68, p. 432.

philosophy will have to change its course, if it has to have a future.

Philosophy is a multi-order phenomenon. There is a first-order philosophy devoted to the issue of reality and unreality of experience and the experienced; a second-order philosophy devoted to the issue of sense and nonsense in existence ; a third-order philosophy devoted to the criteria of truth and untruth ; a fourth-order philosophy devoted to the issue of expressibility and inexpressibility of truth and reality ; a fifth-order philosophy, characterizable as science of philosophy (history of philosophy, sociology of philosophy, psychology of philosophy, criticism of philosophy, and so forth); a sixth-order philosophy, characterizable as philosophy of philosophy.[1] There is a growing tendency on our part to concentrate more upon the fourth-order philosoply, which has also begun to invade the fifth—and the sixth-order philosophies The first-and the second-order philosophies are going by default. Navya-Nyāya is becoming ever more respectable just because it comes under the fourth-order philosophy, and our interest in Navya-Nyāya or the fourth-order philosophy has been aroused only because it has been lent respectability by people in the other hemisphere If such philosophy is to dominate the field for long. the future of not only Indian but all other philosophy, too, is bleak. Indeed, if such a state of affairs is allowed to continue, it would not be too much to say that Indian philosophy has no future. Our traditions are becoming dead because we are becoming dead to them, our corpses floating on the waters of adolescent philosophasterships in the contemporary West.

Besides, as in other fields, weeds have grown and died in the field of philosophy alongside of corns that outlive them. The weeds always try to outdo one another in claiming to be corns,

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1. Cp. Mortimer J. Adler, *The Condition of Philosophy*, p 43, quoted in Theodor Oizerman, *Problems of the history of Philosophy*, p. 270, f. n. 1. The first-order philosophy is first-order because there must first be a reality to be talked about and appraised.

often basing their claim on the fact of their being new growths. But corns remain corns and weeds weeds. The farmer that is time weeds out the weeds and proclaims the cornhood of the corns by sharing them with human beings, leaving the weeds to animals and insects. All sciences are responsible disciplines, but philosophy appears to have declared war of independence upon the human situation, existential situation, and ceased to be that responsible it used to be. The future of such philosophy is doomed Marcuse does not apper to be unfair when, in his *One Dimensional Man*, he characterizes Wittgenstein' disavowal of such responsibility in effect as 'academic sado-masochism, self-humiliation, and self-denunciation of the intellectual whose labour does not issue in scientific, technical or like achievement.'[1] In his view, such philosophy represents easy-going chumminess.

Never has in the history of philosophy too much emphasis on technical philosophy laid the foundations of any sound tradition in philosophy Only direct encounter with the object and not the dropping of the object (to use Joad's expression) can ensure progress in philosophy, if progress in philosophy is a fact in any sense of the term. Our impression is that when technical philosophy waxes, constructive philosophy wanes. Coomaraswamy observes that 'it has always happened in the history of art that by the time perfection of technique had been attained, inspiration has declined It was so in Greece and in Europe after the Renaissance. It almost seems as if concentration upon technique hindered the free working of the imaginatson a little.'[2] This is by no means to suggest that technical philosophy should be given up altogether. Technical philosophy is very useful when it is employed as a means to constructive philosophy.

1. Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man* p. 141.
2. A.K. Coomaraswamy, 'The Aim of Indian Art', *Studies in Comparative Religion*, p. 7.

Indian philosophy today has become a kind of weather-cock indicative of the winds that blow in the Western hemisphere. The trolly of the so-called contemporary Indian philosophy has somehow got attached to the automobile of contemporary Western philosophy. Therefore, it is the course of the latter which is the course of the former, which has, accordingly, no future course of its own. It is water that flows, not the straw that floats.

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—*Śārīraka-Bhāṣya*, see Bādarāyaṇa. p. 178.

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WORD INDEX

ERRATA

Page	*Line*	*F.-n.*	*Line*	*Corrections*
10	10			For 'my' read 'our'
11	4			Between 'deal' and 'he' insert 'with'
11	23			For 'persuations' read 'persuasions'
17		2	2	For 'Drydon' read 'Dryden'
18		3	2	Between 'by' and 'Śūdra' insert 'a'
20	4			For 'time' read 'times'
20		3	6	For '22' read '522'
21		1	2	Before '318' add '310. 25;'
21		1	3	Delete '310.25;'
21		5	2	For '29.43' read '29-43'
21		6	1	For '19.3' read '19.36'
23	5			For 'divisions' read 'divisionis'
23		1	1	For '81-81-90' read '81-90'
23		5	1	For '25' read '24'
24	14			For 'of ' read 'to'
25		1	3	For '3630' read '3600'
28		1	3	For '3 0' read '320'
29	10			Between 'by' and 'this' insert 'posterity to'
29		2	1	For '13' read '23'
29		4	1	For 'note 20' read 'p. 21, f.n. 6'
30	14			For 'does' read 'dost'
33	29			For 'evolved' read 'levied'
34	9			For 'to' read 'no'
34	15			For 'only' read 'very'
38		6	1	Delete '8-1'
39		1	1	For ' '2-8' read '82-83'
40	15			For 'sammati' read 'sammuti' at both places
52		6	2	For 'XIV' read 'XXIV'
54	26			For 'oveamuch' read overmuch'
54	26			For 'p 55' read 'the issue of the world's'
54	27			For 'Constituent' read 'Constituents'
56		1	1	For '19' read '91'
56		1	1	For '42' read '43'
125	26			For 'satasya' read 'satyasya'

130	20	For 'and individuals' read 'and of individuals'
131	22	For 'traditional' read 'traditioned'
134	22	For 'buddha' read 'vṛtti'
138	27	For 'consistion' read 'consisting'
142	26	Add 'Prakṛti,' after 'into'
143	9	For 'postulation' read postulating'
149	9	For 'liff ' read 'life/ego'
161	12	For 'neithis' red 'neither this'
161	23	For 'positive' read 'a positive'
161	23-24	For 'upon the (*eka*)[6]' read 'upon the one (*eka*)[6];'
162	1	For 'involves' read 'involves and'
162	7	For '*suttva*' read '*sattva*'
162	8	For '*tapns*' read '*tapas*'
162	25	For 'as' read 'as the one in'
162	20	For 'birth' read birth of '
163	15	For '-*tamas*' read '—*tamas*, *rajas*,'
163	17	At the end add 'it'
164	32	For 'been' read 'been in'
165	7	For 'does' read 'does not'
729	29	For 'anu-uṣṇaḥ' read 'an-uṣṇaḥ'
171	13	For 'the' read 'that'
174	11	For 'herrd' read 'heard'
176	7	For 'kultāb' read 'Kullāb'
186	15	Separate 'world', 'bcoming', 'time' and 'actuality' by commas
186	16	Separate 'Godhead', 'being', 'eternity', and potentiality by commas
187	8	For 'said' read side'
217	1	For 'heterox' read heterodox'
217	1	For 'srimulation' read 'stimulation'
217	2	For 'stereotype' read 'stereotypy'
220	10	For 'concerned' read 'concerned for nconservatio'the

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